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PREFACE 
External economies and diseconomies considered jointly will, in this 
thesis, be called externalities. An externality, for the moment, may be 
defined as an effect on the cost structure of a firm which is not attrib­
utable to the action of that firm. Such effects may raise or lower costs. 
The following question is to be considered. Do externalities affect 
economic development and if so, in what manner? Incidental to this 
inquiry it is necessary to examine whether externalities are likely to 
advance or retard the rate of economic growth. 
There are two views. On the one hand there are those who regard 
externalities as important. This group includes, to name only a few, m 
Scitovsky (192), Chenery (29), Colin Clark (36), Hirschman (95), Islam 
(103), and Schumpeter (189). (Only Schumpeter and Hirschman argue that 
externalities systematically promote economic development; the others 
apparently believe the converse.) On the other hand, a group of economists 
including Fleming (66), Stockfish (205), Meade (137), Knight (116), and 
Young (236) appear to regard externalities, at least in pure competition, 
as so insignificant that it is difficult to find any realistic and con­
vincing examples. Moreover, there is confusion over whether externalities 
should be defined as attributable to a general range of market imperfec­
tions (including fewness of competitors), as is believed by Bator (9), 
or as attributable almost exclusively to dynamic factors as is believed 
by Ellis and Feliner (55), Thus, although a large number of articles 
concerned with externalities have been published, the subject is still 
somewhat confused. 
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In this study, the problems have been approached on two fronts. 
First it seemed necessary to examine the relationship of externalities 
to economic development using theory. This is done in chapters one to 
five. Problems are delimited in chapter one, while chapter two provides 
a review and synthesis of the literature—though this review is more con­
cerned with externalities than with economic development. 
The evolution of externality concepts has been closely related to 
both socialist thinking and welfare economics, as a study of Pigou's 
Economics of welfare (159) or Baumol's Welfare economics and the theory 
of the state (12) will confirm. Chapter three, therefore, is an attempt 
to apply modern welfare concepts to the problem. This procedure is more 
useful than might at first be imagined, because it helps a good deal in 
resolving definitional problems. In fact the definitions throughout, 
reflect the analysis of chapter three. 
Chapters four and five attempt to relate the externality concepts 
reviewed and extended in earlier chapters to problems of economic develop­
ment. It must be admitted that this section is more closely related to 
economic growth (as opposed to development) than is desirable and that 
in most places the argument proceeds little beyond comparative statics. 
But it does develop meaningful concepts for statistical examination. 
The second approach to externalities in development has been empir­
ical. This part of the study follows concepts developed in the earlier 
theoretical part, but it is only partly a parallel study. It is much 
narrower in scope and much more detailed. But even so it is cast in terms 
of large aggregates so that the econometric procedure involves a number of 
assumptions and estimates that are not as neat as one might desire. 
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The empirical part involves, first, an examination of how frequent 
and important are economies of scale; second, a method for estimating 
marginal costs to the industry of increments in output is developed; 
third, an attempt is made to estimate the extent of pecuniary external­
ities for various Canadian industries and to determine whether these 
accrue in such a manner that industrial expansion can be self-financing. 
The data on which this empirical work is based is not of uniformly 
high quality and the results must be interpreted with caution. But it 
may be concluded that, if prices to the industry are assumed constant, 
falling costs (in the industry) are fairly common. Pecuniary external 
economies (funds which are potential sources of internal financing) vary 
a good deal from one industry to the next and these variations do not 
appear always to correspond to capital intensity or to capital longevity. 
To the extent that they do not, the capital market is called upon to 
redirect the flow of investment funds. 
It is possible to conclude that economic growth may be less than is 
achievable because of externalities. . However, because development implies 
an increase in welfare, it is not clear that externalities do, in fact, 
interfere with economic development. It is clear that they might under 
certain circumstances, but that is a different matter. Pecuniary exter­
nalities are much easier to treat than technological externalities and 
one may even go some distance toward quantification of the former. But 
quantification of technological externalities appears remote. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Background of Externalities in Economic Development 
1. Purpose 
This study is an attempt to clarify the relationship between exter­
nalities and economic development. It is not clear whether externalities 
are important in the study of growth and development, nor is it clear 
whether externalities are more important in developed than underdeveloped 
regions, and finally it is not clear whether the presence of externalities 
impedes development and growth or actually aids development and growth. 
All these problems need to be examined both theoretically and, where 
possible, empirically. But while externalities have been the subject of 
a considerable volume of literature, and while economic development has 
recently been extensively investigated, there has been relatively little 
work devoted to the manner in which the two are related. This situation 
prevails, despite frequent reference in the development literature to 
external economies and diseconomies. 
Externalities have previously been examined primarily within a 
theoretical framework so that empirical aspects have generally been 
ignored. Therefore, it is one purpose of this study to examine partic­
ularly those aspects of the relationship between externalities and eco­
nomic development that can or might be quantified. 
The purpose is not to advance an additional theory of economic devel­
opment nor to see if there are previously unexamined causes of underdevel­
opment. Rather this study provides an examination of how externalities 
influence some of those parameters that are already generally accepted as 
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important causes of or restraints to economic development. 
2. Definitions 
Externalities are particularly difficult to define in a meaningful 
manner, and the subject deserves careful attention. This consideration 
is reserved until after chapter two (a literature review) and chapter 
three (on welfare economics) so that the matter may be more fully treated. 
Definitions are given here without explanation. In the following, 
an externality will mean: any change in cost or revenue in a firm A 
which is caused or made possible by some action taken by a firm B in such 
a manner that A might reasonably offer B positive or negative compensation 
for the action, but when no such compensation takes place (See chapter 
four). A shorter, less precise definition will sometimes be used: an 
externality is involved whenever socially relevant considerations are not 
included in the plans of decision-making bodies because the decision­
making bodies have no incentive to consider such effects. 
In order to avoid problems of monopolistic competition, it will 
generally be assumed that B was ignorant of, or indifferent to, the effect 
of its actions on A. In general, too, attention is focused on costs 
(rather than on revenues) brought about by B's action. Such shifts are 
called cost externalities, while shifts in revenues are called revenue 
externalities. And, any change in profits brought about in this manner 
are called profit externalities. The literature differentiates pecuniary 
and technological external economies, but this frequently appears gratu­
itous. It is useful, however, to refer to externalities that result from 
the growth of the whole region as scale externalities. 
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In all cases it is necessary, for reasons to be examined in chapter four, 
to use these terms in application to increments. It is B's new action, 
not just B's existence or a continuation of a former trend in B's action, 
that brings about the externality. For more explicit definitions (partic­
ularly of costs, profits, and revenues) see chapter four. 
Economic growth means a permanent increase in real per capita income. 
Economic development is defined in the same manner as economic growth 
except that when the word 11 development" is used, an increase in welfare 
as well as in per capita real income will be implied. This general 
definition has the advantage of enabling specific discussion of partic­
ular theories of development. 
Maximum rate of economic development means the highest rate of eco­
nomic growth which is consistent with increasing social welfare. 
If economic growth is to take place in a closed econoirçy* there must 
exist an endowment of unused productive factors or techniques or alter­
natively, a new source of such resources. Consequently, an underdeveloped • 
economy may be defined as an economy which possesses unused or ineffi­
ciently used productive factors which, were they put to use or to better 
use with the available state of technology, would bring about an increase 
in real income per capita as well as an increase in welfare. Alterna­
tively, and dynamically, an economy is underdeveloped whenever the rate 
of flow of technological discoveries is greater than the rate of adoption 
of such discoveries. It must be provided that this discrepancy results 
P^roblems of international trade are to be ignored. This does not 
imply advocation of autarky; rather it implies only an inability to deal 
with the whole universe of problems. For a consideration of how exter­
nalities relate to trade see Watanabe (230). 
h 
in a rate of change of real income per capita that is less than a maximum 
and that social welfare is suboptimum.* The former may be called static 
underdevelopment and the latter dynamic underdevelopment. It should be 
observed that neither state necessitates nor precludes the other. 
These definitions in no way confine the use of the word "underdevel­
oped" to situations that involve relatively undeveloped economies» Under­
developed, as used here, does not imply comparative poverty or under­
consumption; it implies a stage or rate of economic advance that is less 
than the possible stage or rate (See chapter three). 
Here, meaningful implies that the statement or hypothesis could be 
disproven (if it is false) by some imaginable set of observations made 
on real phenomena. A short interesting history of the concept is to be 
found in Ayer's Language, truth, and logic (5). 
General equilibrium, except where otherwise defined, implies a sit­
uation in which the marginal equivalence criteria of welfare theory are 
met by the freely operating market mechanism (that is, without government 
intervention). 
Market failure involves provision of a bundle of commodities or set 
of prices by the laissez-faire system that are inappropriate to welfare 
maximization because a feasible alternative bundle of goods or set of 
prices is preferable by a Pareto optimum criterion or by a social welfare 
criterion. Market failure may be dynamic (involving inappropriate time 
*"Real income" because it is possible that a shift of prices in favor 
of commodities produced in abundance will be confused with development. 
Such a shift in a competitive economy reflects shifting consumer tastes 
and so corresponds to an increase in welfare. In an inçierfectly compet­
itive economy it may only reflect the changing pattern of competition. 
It is not likely that a price index could satisfactorily take care of 
both situations. 
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rates of change) or static (involving inappropriate mixtures at one point 
in time) or it may be both. 
A Pare to optimum is a situation in which it is not possible to 
increase X's welfare without some sacrifice of Y's welfare, where X and 
Y are any two individuals in the society. 
The duality theorem is one of the by-products of the ideological 
controversy between socialist and laissez-faire economists. Briefly, the 
duality theorem means that in order to achieve maximum welfare using a 
Pareto optimum criterion, it is always necessary that rates of exchange 
exist; and while under socialism these rates of exchange can assume the 
form of shadow prices, under capitalism they correspond to the real prices 
of the business world if these are determined by an ideally competitive 
system. Duality only applies where all functions are smoothly convex, 
where tastes and individual welfare functions are independent, where 
production functions are only related through the market mechanism (that 
is, where no external economies or diseconomies exist), and where there 
are, in each industry, a large number of firms. If these conditions are 
not approximately realized, the competitive exchange ratios lose their 
normative significance, and it is necessary either to revert to positive 
economics or to assume some social welfare function. 
Market failure can occur whenever duality fails, but it should be 
emphasized that by no means all market failures may be attributed to 
externalities. Most frequently, when market failure becomes evident, 
imperfections of price-making are attributed to incomplete knowledge or 
to excessive individual power (the monopoly problem). 
Ideal levels of any parameters of economic development will be 
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called norms of development. 
B. Situations That Give Rise to Externalities 
1. Exemples 
The causes of underdevelopment are numerous. Some of these, for 
example psychological or religious taboos, are probably best considered 
outside of economic analysis. Others are attributable to what some might 
judge as unfortunate economic or social institutions. But here only one 
cause is of interest: that associated with market failure of a type which 
results from divorcing of socially relevant considerations from the plans 
of the decision-making body or bodies. 
The types of market failure which will be of concern in this study 
are exr ;ned in chapter three. Here, in order to more completely intro­
duce the subject matter, same short examples are given. 
1. Industrial safety devices cannot, in general, be provided by 
laborers. But monopsony power may be used to force laborers to assume 
avoidable risks without full compensation. The following table is 
illustrative. 
Table 1 indicates that workers were bearing a major share (65.lt 
percent) of costs of injury. Thus employers' costs were lower and the 
injury rate no doubt higher (because of absence of safety devices) than 
under full compensation. But, unfortunately, there appears to be no 
economic theory which can be used to determine if such a situation pro­
motes or retards economic development. An externality is involved because 
costs are shifted to the workers by the employers who, in turn, are the 
only ones capable of installing safety devices. Costs are incurred by 
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Table 1„ Extent of compensation for on-the-job injuries in Massachusetts 
1935a 
Extent of Percent 
disability compensated 
Fatal lU.8 
Permanent total 75»U 
Major permanent 32.li 
Minor permanent 39.2 
Temporary 5U.9 
Total 3L.6 
S^ource: Adapted from Kapp (109, Table 1, p. 62). 
one group, benefits by another. 
2. Ignorance of consumers and producers may result in tradition 
directed consumption and production patterns as Riesman et al. (165) have 
pointed out. But informing the public, through advertising, for example, 
will not be undertaken by private corporations unless advertising effects 
can be made specific in response. Moreover, a competitive price for 
information, because it would reflect society's values before the fact, 
cannot be of much value in determining the worth of that information 
(See chapter four). Galbraith (69) has treated such difficulties, but 
the most interesting theoretical discussion is by Haavelmo (78) who con­
siders certain social institutions as a possible prerequisite to achieve­
ment of a desired goal. In the absence of such institutions involuntary 
economic decisions may result. 
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Evidently market failure is involved in this example, but it is not 
clear that such types of failure should be included in an analysis of 
externalities. The subject is more fully treated in chapter two. 
3*. When bees freely fertilize fruit blossoms and orchards freely 
provide bees with nectar, when valuable inventions are not patented and 
consequently are used by others without payment, and when roads, built for 
exploration by oil companies, are used by others for their own purposes, 
market failure is involved. In these cases costs are borne by one group 
or individual and part of the benefits accrue to others. An externality 
therefore exists. 
2. Alternative economic systems 
Because discussions of the failures of the laissez-faire system are 
likely to be emotionally charged, any criticism of any capitalist insti­
tution may be construed as a frontal attack on the whole of western cap­
italist democracy. It is therefore necessary to point out that complete 
central planning or complete socialism is not necessary to eliminate 
possible existent failures. This point is well made by the World economic 
survey, 1959 (215, p. 6). 
"Though the objective of economic growth now dominates public 
policy thinking in all countries, in almost none of the 
advanced industrial countries has this objective been defined in 
terms of comprehensive policy for growth. In part this stems 
from a tendency to identify long-term economic policy with 
economic planning, which, it is feared, may endanger the system 
of private enterprise. As is evident, however, from the 
experience of a number of industrial countries, most notably 
France, Italy and Japan, even concrete long-term plans for 
economic growth need not carry any connotation of 'controls'; 
they may instead serve a highly useful purpose in the context 
of a private enterprise economy in providing a comprehensive 
framework for the harmonization of economic policy." 
9 
It is possible that central planners are able to take more account 
of the indirect costs and benefits that comprise externalities and there­
fore are in a superior position to promote economic growth. Comparison 
of growth rates in centrally-planned economies and capitalist countries 
(compare Tables 1.1 and 3»U in World economic survey, 1959 (215) indicates 
with p <0.001 that growth rates so different could be random samples from 
a population N(X, 6^ ), Again comparison of the growth rates of investment 
given in Table 3.U of World economic survey, 1959 (215) indicates with 
PC0.001 that such rates of change of investment could be random samples 
mm p 
from a population N(Xp ). 
But little can be gained from such crude comparisons. It does seem 
possible (especially after examining the Polish and Russian investment 
criteria (215)) that centrally-planned economies are able to take more 
account of externalities than are capitalist economies. If so, differ­
ences in growth rate suggest that the existence of externalities retards, 
rather than promotes, economic development. Most of this study is devoted 
to examining evidence related to that hypothesis. 
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II. EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT 
A. External and Internal Economies 
The immediate purpose of this chapter is to trace the development 
of the concept "external economy" from its introduction by Marshall to 
the present. There are three reasons for this procedure. First, it is 
desirable to use definitions that involve developments of, and not large 
changes in, previous concepts. Second, observation of some of the errors 
and weaknesses of previous analyses have had a definite effect on the 
direction this study has taken. Third, it is not clear, without first 
examining the previous literature, what development economists mean when 
they use external economies and diseconomies in their analyses. 
1. The shifting definitions 
According to general equilibrium assumptions,* firms that experience 
falling costs will expand so that either monopoly elements result or all 
economies of scale disappear—whichever happens first. Therefore, in 
order to avoid considerations, of monopolistic competition Marshall (13h) 
developed three tools : 1. the short life of firms, 2. the falling 
demand curve, and 3. external economies. 
Marshall's definitions of external economies are conceptually 
By "general equilibrium model" will be meant a model that involves, 
explicitly or implicitly, the assumption of ubiquitous competition, or, 
at any rate, the assumption that all marginal equivalence requirements 
of welfare theory are satisfied. 
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clear.'"" His analysis relates to realistic situations. But his defini­
tions are somewhat too vague to provide a basis for quantification; 
moreover, it now seems better to deal directly with problems of monopoli 
tic competition instead of attempting to use competitive models in 
imperfectly competitive situations. 
It would therefore be understandable if definitions of external 
economies were altered somewhat. In fact, some.definitions have been 
altered, but some still relate very closely to those used by Marshall. 
A few examples will illustrate. Vakil and Brahmanand (223, p. 201) 
use the following implicit definition. Economic development is stimu­
lated by economic integration. 
"This in turn requires considerable investment in services which 
provide external economies like banking and credit agencies, 
insurance services, savings institutions, marketing services 
and storage facilities, information and educational facilities, 
technical training, provision of long-term capital and so on." 
Williamson and Buttrick (233, p. 157) use a similar implicit défini 
tion which runs in terms of economies caused by social overhead facil­
ities. Similarly, Bauer and Yamey (11, p. 2I4J4) note' that assistance to 
some industries is not necessarily required 'even though; 
"It is suggested that assistance is necessary because of the 
absence in underdeveloped countries of common facilities such 
as developed transport and financial systems, a tradition of 
industrial skill, and other external economies which in 
developed countries are enjoyed even by new enterprises and 
those engaged in new lines of activity." 
"A. Marshall (13U).See pages 167, 265, 266, 26?, 271, 273, 278, 
311, 316, 317, 320, Wil, U60, I468, hi9. 
Three definitions are offered. External economies are economies 
"which arise out of the collective organization of.the district as a 
whole" (p. xiii), "those dependent on the general development of the 
industry" (p. 266), and "Those which result from the general progress 
of "the environment", (p. I4I4). He does not treat external diseconomies. 
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A seemingly paradoxical definition, quite unlike those provided by 
Marshall, is given by Leibenstein (119, p. 107). 
"External economies usually refer to the fact that as an 
industry expands, costs for all firms within the industry 
are reduced, although no firm within the industry is any 
more efficient than it was previously." 
A definition similar in part to the one used in this study is pro­
vided by Baron (8, p. 190). Investment in social overhead has a bene­
ficial effect. 
"This effect is referred to as 1 external economies' which arise 
whenever the operation of one enterprise facilitates (cheapens) 
the establishment or the conduct of another." 
These definitions, even the one given by Leibenstein, are clearly 
descendants of Marshall's definitions. But in non-perfectly competitive 
situations the difference between costs and revenue is not always clear. 
Advertising, product differentiation, good will, etcetera can affect 
both cost and revenue* Thus, the old definition in terms of costs is 
not entirely unambiguous except in competitive situations. For example, 
under imperfect competition an external effect that increases demand 
may be considered to reduce costs because the firm that.has been so 
beneficially influenced may sell the same amount as before at the same 
price as before with lower outlays on advertising. 
Consequently, as Scitovsky (192) has pointed out, there has been a 
tendency among more recent authors to define (hardly ever explicitly) 
external economies in terms of effects on profits rather than on costs. 
Rosenstein-Rodan (172) justifies this approach by arguing that where the 
capital market is imperfect, pecuniary external economies as well as 
technological external economies (that is, effects on profits as well as 
13 
effects on productive efficiency) can lead to market failure. 
2. Meaningful definitions 
A set of definitions advanced by Fleming (66) is in this tradition 
but is somewhat too complex to be simply dealt with here. Essentially, 
Fleming defines externalities as the divergence between private and social 
costs or private and social revenue. These, presumably, are intended to 
be meaningful definitions, but their use involves a difficulty of great 
fundamental importance. How can social cost or social revenue be defined? 
Not too long ago it seemed that a simple solution existed. Any 
deviation from the marginal equivalence criteria of welfare theory could 
be defined as the result of some private but not social cost or revenue. 
This was unambiguous as long as welfare theory could tell exactly in which 
direction, and by how much, it would be necessary to change prices or 
output in order to reach the social ideal. In fact, this cannot be 
accomplished without reference to a social welfare function. (See chapter 
three.) Too, it appears from the L ip s ey-Lanc as ter (127) exposition of 
the theory of the second best that where there are major imperfections 
(such as monopoly elements) in the system, application of particular 
general equilibrium norms to such other imperfections as externalities, 
may lead away from, rather than toward, the social ideal. Galenson and 
Leibenstein (70), using a different argument, arrive at the same 
conclusion. 
Thus, it is not clear in any particular case what social costs or 
social revenues mean. And any definition making use of these concepts is 
not likely to be of much help in quantification of externalities. 
lli 
3. Definitions and measurement 
Unfortunately, there does not appear to be any definitions which 
provide for measurement of external economies. Indeed, a fundamental 
difficulty arises in connection with measurement. If an external influ­
ence be regarded as a factor having positive or negative productivity, 
how can it be quantified? Physical units are, of course, not adequate. 
But factor evaluation based on productivity leads to difficulties of 
imputation if there are non-constant returns to scale. This difficulty 
is a familiar one in production theory. There is apparently no solution. 
Thus, it is evident that any meaningful definition of externalities 
which can at once provide the basis for policy and for quantification 
must fulfill two requirements. 1. It must provide a method of evaluating 
external influences without attempting to do this by imputing total values 
of externalities from productivity theory. 2. It must relate to some 
welfare model; moreover, it is almost necessary that such a welfare model 
explicitly treat income distribution. 
B. Importance of Economies of Scale 
For two reasons, the theoretic development of the externality con­
cept has not received much recent attention. This is because, first, 
theories of monopolistic and imperfect competition were put forward and 
seemed to comprise a more legitimate if less general method of approach, 
and second, because empirical evidence on economies of scale appeared to 
indicate that these were not as significant as had been thought by the 
classical economists. The classical economists tended to treat all non-
agricultural pursuits as subject to decreasing costs, but this belief 
1$ 
conflicted with results of empirical studies (see Table 2), and so was 
given up. But it has recently been revived. 
1. Some evidence 
A large part of the examination of economies of scale followed the 
pioneer work of Douglas and Cobb. A tabular summary is provided by 
Leser (123), and a reduced version is included in Table 2. 
With the exception of three studies, one on agriculture in the 
U.S.A.J one on manufacturing industries in the U.S.A., and one on the 
whole U.S. economy, there appears to be little evidence in Table 2 of 
increasing returns to scale. Quite the contrary, roughly constant returns 
to scale, appears to be the rule. Confronted with this impressive array 
of evidence it is no wonder that economists lost interest in economies 
of scale, whether of the internal or external variety. 
But it is not clear that these studies provide valid measures of 
economies of scale. Consider a simple test. The exponent of capital 
for all the above studies averages 0.U2. Thus, if there is a law of pro­
duction having generality it would be expected that in less developed 
areas (having relatively much less capital and much more labor) the 
capital-output ratio would be considerably smaller than in developed 
countries.* But, in fact, as indicated by Table 3 capital-output ratios 
are surprisingly constant and do not appear to be (except in the case 
*This follows from the function. For example, if, in general, 
q o slPoSQQ0,k2 there is constant returns to scale. But holding labor 
constant and decreasing capital one percent will result in a decrease of 
output equal to only 0.U2 percent. Therefore, output/capital should be 
larger where there is relatively less capital, and the capital/output 
ratio should be smaller. 
Table 2. Results of fitting Cobb-Douglas functions3. 
Subject Date*5 Sum of exponents0 
Agriculture in U.S. 1920 1947 0.85; 0.87; 0.55; 3.67 
Coal mining; U .K. 1923 1953 1.08; 0.00-1.02 
Manufacturing; U.S. 1889 1922 0.93-0.96; 0.94-1.01 
Manufacturing ; Australia 1910 1937 1.07; 0.98; 0.98-1.01; 0.90-0.99; 0.99 
Manufacturing; Canada 1923 . 1937 0.98-1.01 
Manuf ac tur ing ; New Zealand 1915 1939 0.91; 0.96 
Manufacturing; South Africa 1937 1938 0.98; 1.02 
Manufacturing; U.K. 1924 1930 0.85-0.90 
Manufacturing; U.S. 1920 1940 1.95-2.27 
Whole economy; U.S. 1921 1941 2.47 
Whole economy; 24 countries 1937 1957 0.88; 0.90; 1.01; 1.06 
S^ource: Leser (123). A Cobb-Douglas function is of the form Output •» aX^  
bl b2 
-*n 
bn 
where the (i-l...n) are factors 
bOnly earliest and latest dates for each study are given; this does not imply that each or 
any study extended over the period shown. 
cQnly results not requiring the exponents to sum to one are shown. This leaves 25 studies, 
If thé sum of exponents > 1 there is increasing returns to scale. 
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of Mexico and India) related to the stage of development. 
Now as a first approximation, the constant capital-output coefficients 
presented in Table 3 suggest the exponent of capital in a Cobb-Douglas 
function equals 1.0. This leads to the conclusion that either the expo­
nent of labor is roughly zero and there is constant returns to scale; 
or the exponent of labor is positive and there is increasing returns to 
scale as Leser (123) has pointed out. Perhaps this is an excessively 
Table 3. Capital-output ratios3. 
Country Period Coefficient 
Argentina 1913 5.8 
Australia 1913 5.5 
Italy 1913 4.4 
U.S.A. 1913 4.3 
Japan 1913 3.6 
U.S.A. 1889 3.0 
U.S.A. 1909 3.4 
U.S.A. 1919 3.8 
U.S.A. 1939 3.3 
Avg. 30 countries ? 3.0-4.7 
Mexico ? 1.5 
India ? 1.5 
S^ource: Tinbergen (213, p. 72). 
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naive conclusion. Certainly it appears simple when it is compared with 
attempts to explain constant capital-output ratios such as that made by 
Kaldor (108). But even a simple approach like this leads to doubt 
respecting the universal nature of constant returns. 
The extremely aggregate data used in the studies reported in Table 
2 is another source of difficulty. The more aggregative the approach, 
the less justification there is for assuming that capital prices are 
independent of total output and therefore the less conclusive are the 
results (123). And this is by no means the only difficulty encountered 
in such studies. Other difficulties are examined in chapter six in 
connection with equations fitted for this study and reported there. 
Recent empirical work appears to indicate that increasing returns 
is a considerably more common phenomenon than would be concluded from 
results of the Cobb-Douglas studies presented in Table 2. Thus, it seems 
unfortunate that attention was diverted from study of increasing returns. 
(The subject did receive a thorough examination in welfare theory, but 
most of the work suffers from a tendency to ignore income distribution 
(l53)•) Recent studies are relevant to the empirical part of this thesis 
and are examined in chapter six. They do not belong in a consideration 
of the historic evolution of concepts, but anyone interested in a summary 
might page ahead to the tables and graphs of chapter six. 
C. Technological Development as Related to Scale of Output 
Whether there are, at any one time, either untapped scale external­
ities or internal economies of scale, is not the only relevant question. 
Development itself may involve technological change so that economies of 
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scale are generated by the very process of economic growth. This line 
of thought goes back to Adam Smith (196). He claimed that, "The division 
of labour is limited by the extent of the market," and he provided some 
interesting and convincing illustrations in an attempt to prove it.* 
While it often happens that increases in productivity are positively 
associated with time, it seems evident that Smith thought of the division 
of labor as being initiated by increases in market size. This was not 
only because existent technological means were indivisible and so required 
a large market before being brought into use; but also because techno­
logical discoveries and labor skills were stimulated by expanding and 
expanded markets.** 
There is modern evidence to support Smith's contention. A study 
of Table U leads to the conclusion that frequency of performance begets 
labor efficiency if not invention. 
These learned skills, incidentally, may result in an external dis­
economy to the firm responsible for them, if other firms are able to lure 
*See Smith (196, Book 1, Chapter 3). 
**H. Leibenstein (119) has argued that this proposition is only some­
times true. He presents two diagrams in which the ordinate represents 
(division of labor). He then presents two isoquants in each figure in 
such a manner that the minimum capital per man expansion path moves to 
the right (increased specialization with increased output) in figure 1, 
but to the left (decreased specialization with increased output) in figure 
2. Smith is only correct, he argues, if the situation is as represented 
in figure 1. Smith was, however, concerned with productivity in total 
and not just productivity of capital. But were he concerned only with 
capital it seems unlikely he would reach the conclusion implied by 
Le ibenstein® s figures where it pays up to some point to specialize but 
beyond that point to reduce the amount of specialization already achieved. 
Le ibenstein thinks figure 2 must be admitted as a possibility because 
large indivisible multi-purpose machines may exist. They may, but are not 
likely to be more efficient than large indivisible single-purpose machines. 
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Table lu Progress ratios of eight products, 19U6-195la 
Product 
Progress 
elasticity3 
Progress 
ratioc 
Adjusted 
correlation 
coefficient 
Semi-automatic turret lathe #1 -.2868 18.1 .965 
Semi-automatic turret lathe §2  
-«UllU 2U.8 .975 
Automatic machine tool §1  
-.2996 18.8 .890 
Automatic machine tool §2  
-.3370 20.8 .915 
Automatic machine tool #3 
-.2595 16.5 .837 
Automatic machine tool #\x -.2868 18.1 .856 
Textile machine 
-.2771 17.5 .889 
Multi-purpose construction machine -.3233 20.0 .906 
aSources Hirsch (9k ,  Table 1, p. 139). 
T^his is the average percent change in labor requirement associated 
with a one percent increase in cumulative output. 
°This is the average percent decline in labor requirements after a 
doubling of cumulative output. 
the skilled workers away. The progress ratios shown in Table U would 
seem to suggest not only falling average costs but falling marginal costs 
as well. 
There is additional evidence along the same line. For example, 
Hirsch (9U) reports an "eighty percent curve" has been found by the air 
force to approximately describe labor requirements in air-frame manu­
facture, That is, doubling the number of frames ordered reduces by 20 
percent the amount of labor required for each. Certainly Table it leads 
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to the conclusion that the efficiency of labor is limited by the size of 
the market; it appears that Smith was right. 
1. Trends toward monopoly 
But while the position that large scale makes additional division 
of labor possible has been treated as plausible enough, it has never 
seemed congruent with the assumptions of competition. If advantages of 
scale are available, why do firms not combine to achieve them until 
either the advantages of scale are lost or monopoly results?* 
Theories of oligopoly provide one answer, Stigler (203) has provided 
another. Some processes, he contends, are carried on by a firm subject 
to increasing, others to decreasing costs. When all processes are con­
sidered, therefore, the firm may be subject to increasing, decreasing, 
or constant costs. Naturally if the industry remains competitive, firms 
must be subject to constant or increasing costs even though certain 
processes exhibit decreasing costs. This hypothesis may be given empir­
ical content using data prepared by Schuman and Alpert (165). 
It is evident from Table 5, that full advantage of scale is obtained 
at a somewhat lower level of output in pumps than in motors, and that 
there would be a lowering of capital costs'so far as pumps are concerned 
*The question is attributable to Knight (116). Piero Sraffa (201) 
has argued that the concept (I.R.T.S.) may be rescued under competition by 
assuming that the result of decreasing costs is not lower supply price 
but improved quality of product. Clapham (35) doubted the validity of 
dividing industries into a group exhibiting increasing, and a group 
exhibiting decreasing returns. The controversy is reviewed by Ellis and 
Feliner (55). 
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Table $. Exponent n in the relationship C=kSn for components of a water 
pumping plant (Cost=k (output)11) 
Flow gpm. 
(output) 
Pump 
n 
Motor 
n 
Total 
plant materials 
n 
1 0.5 0.1 0.2 
10 0.2 0.2 0.2 
100 0.2 0.6 0.3 
1,000 0.9 0.9 0.8 
10,000 1.1 1.0 1.0 
100,000 1.2 1.0 1.2 
1,000,000 1.2 1.0 1.2 
S^ource2 Schuman and Alpert (18$, p. U95)* 
if ten or more plants were established to pump the million gallons. The 
same, however, is not true of motors. Stigler (203) contends that firms 
would like to sell or subcontract those activities subject to increasing 
costs (pumps) in order to concentrate on those subject to decreasing costs 
(motors ). But the former may be too small to support a special fabri­
cator, or too small to obtain needed market information, or too closely 
related in a physical sense (as above) to make this vertical disinte­
gration possible. Expansion of the industry might make it possible that 
such activities be undertaken by separate-firms and even, after a while, 
produced competitively. Thus, expansion of the market allows vertical 
disintegration and tends to make it possible for each process to be 
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carried on at least-cost scale.* A similar proposition is advanced by-
Austin Robinson (167). 
Evidently this situation involves an economy of scale. It is not 
an economy internal to any firm since activities originally performed by 
one firm are transferred to others. Therefore, it is appropriate to call 
this type of economy a negative cost externality (because costs are 
lowered), or a scale externality. 
It remained for Young (235) to relate such economies to economic 
development. He reinterpreted Smith's theorem to read: the inducement 
to invest is limited by the size of the market. Schumpeter (189), on 
the other hand, appears to have regarded technological change itself as 
subject to something like decreasing costs. When one innovator manages 
to break through restraints and establish a new process he makes it easier 
for those following to duplicate his feat.** Each innovator makes the 
next innovation easier and less costly. 
2. Economies of scale and balanced growth 
The modem formulation of the Smith-Young line of thought involves 
This represents an economy external to individual firms. It is 
further argued that indivisibilities of management will prevent firms 
from expanding so that each produces under decreasing cost conditions, 
that is, firms twice as large would be inefficiently run. Firms only 
slightly larger would be more efficiently run. But this fails to explain 
why larger firms (those with corporate, rather than single proprietorship 
form) do not expand until decreasing cost tendencies are over come by the 
increasing cost tendencies associated with indivisible management. 
This may be compared with Marshall's third definition of an exter­
nal economy, i.e., an economy which results from the general progress of 
the environment (13k} p. 144). Marshall, however, had in mind economies 
in the cost of production and not economies in the cost of development 
itself. 
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policy implications and the theory of balanced growth. Rosens te in-Rodan 
(172,173) and Murkse (lk9} 150), combining hypotheses of increasing returns 
to scale and inelastic demand for exports, have advocated a simultaneous, 
balanced expansion in output of all products. This "Big Push" as 
Rosenstein-Rodan (172) named, it, appears to have some historical justi­
fication in what Rostow (17U) has called the "take-off into self-sustained 
growth." But only if outputs are balanced will there be a demand for 
every product, because effective demand must ultimately derive from pro­
duction as Islam (103) has observed. Supply creates its own demand only 
if output is balanced. But, Kindleberger (lilt) has noted that the 
important word "balanced" is not satisfactorily defined. 
Rosenstein-Rodan and Murkse concentrated mainly on production of, 
and demand for, final consumer goods. The situation leading to balanced 
growth proposals was described as a horizontal external economy because 
all products were at the same level in the production process. Strangely 
enough, Rosens te in-Rodan felt he needed to justify use of the term exter­
nal econony by describing how costs of output would be lower under balanced 
growth due to smaller marketing risks. 
Recent treatments by Islam (103), Ohlin (l$l), and Scitovsky (192) 
incorporate vertical external economies into the theory. These arise 
due to the expansion of demand for intermediate products. In the later 
treatments expansion of demand is stressed and all or most processes are 
assumed subject to internal economies of scale. 
Balanced growth theories have been carefully criticized by Fleming 
(66). He concludes that, in general, they fail to consider external dis­
economies arising from factor shortage, and that these will became (at 
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some level of output) larger than the external economies deriving from 
balance. But, at least to some extent, this criticism misses the point. 
Output is to be expanded anyway (and so there will be factor shortages). 
The question is, should output be balanced or specialized? Activity 
analysis done by Chenery (29) and Haldi (82) appears to indicate that 
the answer depends on the extent of increasing returns in important 
industries, whether increasing returns are, or are not, a general 
phenomenon, and the effect of specialization on the terms of trade. 
But the balanced growth theory has generally been treated as a sub­
ject related to, but separate from, the remainder of the externality 
analysis. This practice will be maintained. Balanced growth is a policy 
deserving mention. But it has received satisfactory treatment elsewhere— 
particularly by Chenery (29) and Haldi (82), and it need not be of con­
cern here. It is useful to return, therefore, to the more basic question 
of how external effects influence costs and revenue within the firm, 
0. Cost Curves and Rents 
Generally non-constant returns to scale within the firm are attri­
buted to some variant of the law of proportionality or to physical con­
stants such as the relationship between area and circumference or volume 
and surface. It is convenient, however, to call all such physical phe­
nomena indivisibilities.'* 
*To use Joan Robinson's (168) example, were every factor as divisible 
as sand, every producer could have all the advantages of large scale in­
dustry. Chamberlin (27) objects to such loose definitions of divisibil­
ity. His approach is more correct, as is demonstrated by Boulding's Plea 
analogue, though it does not lend itself so readily to analysis. 
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1. The number of cost curves 
A significant indivisibility may cause increasing or decreasing costs 
as output expands.* Two types of indivisible factors affect supply. 
First, those that are indivisible from the point of view of the firm 
(management, machinery, etc. ) but not from the point of view of the 
industry; and, second those that are indivisible from the point of view 
of the industry (highways, dams, trade journals, etc.).** Thus, 
indivisibilities bring about at least two kinds of cost curves. But 
even in the absence of indivisibilities and rents there are three more 
average cost curves. They are average cost as output is expanded: 1. 
at the extensive margin, 2. at the intensive margin, and 3. by means of 
some combination of 1 and 2. Moreover, rising costs give rise to rents ' 
so that there corresponds to each of the above average cost curves, a 
curve drawn marginal to the average cost-including-rent curve. Thus, 
there are a very large—if not confusing—number of cost curves. 
In Wealth and welfare (159, pp. 172-179) Pigou introduced a diagram 
illustrating two rising cost curves. The lower, labelled S^, he defined 
as a supply curve of the ordinary type. Sg was described as "the differ­
ence made to aggregate expenses by the production of one more unit." He 
concluded that the intersection of Sg (and not S^), with the demand curve 
*A factor is significantly indivisible if, in the relevant range 
(while there are still enough firms that the situation remains competi­
tive), it is not possible for a firm to equate the factor price with the 
marginal value product of the factor. The inequality may lie in either 
direction. 
**The latter implies, to paraphrase Lerner (122), that at the equi­
librium output of the industry the marginal value product to the industry 
of the indivisible factor is not equal to factor cost. 
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provided the ideal output, and that, therefore, a system of bounties and 
taxes was required to obtain this ideal. His statement initiated a 
debate over the realism of externalities (55)» 
It is not clear which of the curves described above 'he intended to 
imply by Sg. S^, apparently, was a curve of costs internal to the firm; 
Sg was a curve of total costs (including both internal costs and external 
costs). Young (236), however, argued that the difference between Sg and 
Sjl (the external costs) could only be nominal (i.e., rent) and so did 
not represent a real social cost. 
The reasoning, briefly, is as follows. Private costs rise or fall 
because of indivisibilities and rents. But, if factors are indivisible 
from the point of view of the industry (for example, roads, dams, etc.) 
there will result one sort of imperfection or another or else such factor 
indivisibility is not significant. (The imperfect case was not, unfor­
tunately, under discussion—at least not by Young.) It is for this reason 
that a fall in factor prices with increased factor demand could not take 
place under competition. If factors are indivisible from the point of 
view of the firm, expansion in demand will, after some point, be met by 
a proliferation of firms rather than by an increase in output per firm. 
But this will not involve an increase in costs other than rental costs. 
Thus, indivisibility (in competition) does not result in rising or falling 
supply curves. There remains only scarcity as a cause of increasing cost, 
and this gives rise to Ricardian or transfer rents. Consequently, in­
creasing private costs can only be attributable to rents. And since rents 
are not social costs but merely transfers, the intersection of with 
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the demand curve provides the ideal output. Pigou gradually gave ground 
until, in the fourth edition, his argument is relegated to the situation 
in which rents are paid to foreign factor sellers.* As will be seen, he 
need not have given up quite so much of the argument if he had been 
willing to give up some of the assumptions of perfect competition.** 
2. Pigou was partly right 
Suppose, to use Young's (235) example, a subway is proposed but it 
appears to the subway company that revenues will be less than costs. 
However, the subway would cause values of contiguous real estate to rise. 
It is possible that by including this appreciation in value of real 
estate in the profit calculation, the subway proposal becomes profitable. 
But the company might not be able to buy the real estate without grossly 
affecting market values. In this case the subway will not be built. 
Apparently the private cost-revenue calculation cannot be made to corre­
spond to social costs and revenues even when there are no restraints on 
the amount of capital the subway company might borrow. 
Consider another example. Several companies are planning to mine 
a previously-worked and now flooded submarine coal pit. The first 
company to start work must pump out all the water and thus increase its 
private costs to the point where the venture is unprofitable. It remains 
*Ihis position was similar to that taken by Graham (7b,75). 
**An external diseconomy such as air pollution could hardly be 
compensated for by increased (rent) charges of air owners to all 
customers. This would have been a reductio ad absurdum of the com­
petitive model, but such an escape seemed toHbe blocked by those who 
questioned the very existence of external economies and diseconomies. 
These included Clapham (35) and Robertson (166). 
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unprofitable unless the decreased costs of all subsequent firms (who now 
do not have to pump water) is allotted to it. All firms will avoid 
starting work first. The development will be put off indefinitely unless 
the firms can be integrated or unless they can come to a gentleman's 
agreement. 
If these are the sorts of situations Pigou had in mind (as seems 
likely) then his primary error was in choosing a competitive framework 
for his analysis. His examples were easily shown by Robertson (166), 
Young (236), and Knight (116) to involve non-competitive assumptions. 
It was, for this reason, alleged that his analysis was unrealistic (116). 
Further, in general equilibrium analysis it is assumed that the 
capital market is perfect so that rents, accruing as net revenues at 
various inelastic nodes within the economy, can be mobilized and logisti-
cally allocated by a frictionless system to where they are most needed. 
But these assumptions do not appear very useful in studies of development. 
Rather the competitive assumptions appear to lead to models involving 
stationary statics. 
3. Types of models 
More recently, there has been a tendency to move away from con­
sideration of perfectly competitive situations. But the trend toward 
dealing with more practical situations has not come about without a great 
deal of difficulty. The nature of this difficulty may be illustrated 
following Knight (116). Knight finds Pigou*s analysis (involving the 
overcrowding of a smooth road as compared to a rough road) weak because : 
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"...the assumptions diverge in essential respects from the 
facts of real economic situations. The most essential 
feature of competitive conditions is reversed, the feature 
namely, of the private ownership of the factors practically 
significant for production" (116, p. 586). 
Evidently, real economic situations to Knight are synonymous with 
competitive conditions. The fact that the ownership of roads is really 
public was not in dispute, but "real economic situations" involved 
treating roads as though they were privately owned. 
It now appears odd that such an effort should have been made to 
retain the competitive model. So long as it was used, no firm could be 
subject to increasing returns to scale and any economies of scale were, 
as a consequence, external economies. Once imperfect or monopolistic 
competition is introduced, however, it is quite reasonable to treat most 
or all economies as internal to some firm. The definitions thus became 
much less strained, but this is even now not always apparent as is 
evidenced by the paradoxical nature of Le ibenstein1 s definition (see 
page 12 above). 
Thus, it gradually became clear that one of the more important 
difficulties involved in the debate over the realism of externalities 
was the nature of economics itself. It was always possible to make the 
competitive output a social ideal by introducing more and more stringent 
definitions of competition. And while in its extreme form the model was 
interesting, it was hardly related tcrthe solution of any significant 
problem of the real world. There has been, however, a gradual return 
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toward realistic models.* And with this return, attention has been 
redirected to problems of income distribution. 
E. Can Pecuniary Externalities Result in Market Failure? 
1. Financing economic activity 
There exists now and there was, even in Marshall's time, evidence 
that some firms and indeed some industries were producing in regions of 
falling average cost. This leads, in a general equilibrium model (that 
is, under marginal cost pricing), to an immediate and intractable dif­
ficulty. How shall the deficit (MC is less than A C) be financed? And 
this question can only be answered if the normative income distribution 
is known. As a matter of fact as Oort (153) has observed, decreasing 
returns gives rise to the same questions about income distribution; 
however, in that case, welfare implications of income distribution can 
at least temporarily be put aside. (If MC is greater than A C, firms do 
not require a subsidy, to stay in business even if MC = price.) The 
question of income distribution has generally not received enough con­
sideration in welfare analysis, and the most important consideration of 
the question now appears to derive from students of economic development. 
2. Pecuniary externalities are alleged to cause market failure 
It has become customary in literature concerned with economic devel­
opment to refer to external economies whenever the profits of one firm 
*Thorbecke, associate professor of economics at Iowa State Univer­
sity, has pointed out in a private communication that some economists 
regard the realism of the underlying assumptions as largely irrelevant 
provided the model has predictive capacity. In the case above, the model 
did not have predictive capacity (smooth roads do become crowded) nor was 
it realistic (roads are not privately-owned). 
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are decreased by the action of another firm (192). It is implicit that 
such situations result in an allocation of resources that fails to 
correspond to a maximum rate of growth, and it is no doubt because of the 
ubiquitous inter-dependence of profits that externalities are so fre­
quently thought to be a cause of difficulty.* 
This is rather surprising because general equilibrium theory suggests 
that the price system does its best work in allocation of goods to alter­
native investments. And pecuniary externalities do not lead to market 
failure in the general equilibrium model. The equilibrating mechanism 
of general equilibrium works as follows. (Let capital letters stand for 
firms and lower case letters for their products.) Relatively large 
profits in any industry C leads to additional investment in output of c; 
this is followed by a lower c price and a consequent elimination of the 
excess profits. Evidently this mechanism is thought to fail, but it 
is not clear exactly why. Capital rationing is mentioned by Rosens te in-
Rodan (172) and imperfections of information and competition are implicit 
elsewhere. 
Apparently, it is felt that excess profits either do not lead to 
additional investment and output (for example, because of monopoly 
restraints on entry or because of indivisibilities), or that additional 
*See Rosens te in-Rodan (172) ; Murks e (l$0, p. 13), the "real-income 
effect"; Arndt (3, p. 210), "...external economies are due to the fact 
that the investor is, for one reason or another, unable to appropriate 
to himself the whole of the yield of the investment"; Hirschman (95, 
p. 70-72), and especially Eckstein ($0). 
In the meantime someone has obtained extra profits, but as men­
tioned before, in general equilibrium theory this is ignored because 
it involves a problem of income distribution. 
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investments and output do not lead to a fall in the rate of profit (for 
example, because the industry is subject to decreasing costs). Scitovsky 
(192) suggests a third possibility: one industry C takes some action 
(for example, it lowers its product price) which gives rise.to relatively 
large profits in industry B (which, for example, uses c as a factor); 
then investment in B may stimulate C to extend even further its original 
action. This action and reaction may continue for some time, and until 
an equilibrium is reached it appears that there will not be an ideal 
allocation of resources. Integration of the two industries or even 
co-ordination of plans would provide superior resource allocation. 
Eckstein (50) provides a similar argument. 
External economies as used in economic development appear now to 
mean a shift in profit caused by an outside influence. This change in 
terminology* should not be too surprising. The effect of one industry's 
purchases on the scale and therefore unit cost (and sometimes selling 
price) in other industries have been recognized for some time.** But 
what has not frequently been recognized (except by students of develop­
ment) is the possibility that pecuniary externalities may result in 
market failure. Still, interdependence of profits is not a sufficient 
condition for market failure. (Profits are interdependent in general 
equilibrium too.) Why, then, do development economists think market 
failure is involved? 
^Originally, as noted above, the terms "external economies" and 
"external diseconomies" were applied only to costs and not to revenues. 
**Viner (228) called these pecuniary external economies, but they 
were not considered to result in market failure until about the time of 
Scitovsky's important paper (192). See also Stockfish (205). 
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A shift in the rate of profit within one or several industries 
brought about by a shift in price, falling costs, or technological changes 
provides the economic system with a signal to transfer resources from 
some industries to others. This temporary disequilibrium in profit rates 
provides—in the classical case—shortlived windfall gains and shortlived 
windfall losses. Moreover, it is possible to treat this disequilibrium 
state as without a time dimension so that windfall gains and losses equal 
zero. At any rate, these gains and losses are the cost of the signal. 
They persist no longer than is necessary to bring about the appropriate 
resource shifts. They are like a flow of electricity in the wire to a 
signal light at a railroad crossing—entirely necessary for the signal's 
proper operation. One certainly would not want to consider the size of 
such windfalls as a reflection of the system's failure. Rather they are 
in the neo-classical tradition, incidental to the system's success. 
This is satisfactory so long as the theory makes use of a general 
equilibrium model. But the real world is not. always so flexible. What 
happens if resources fail to move because of inertia, capital rationing, 
scarcity of entrepreneurs, lack of information, indivisibilities, govern­
ment intervention or monopoly constraints? (These reasons for failure 
of adjustment receive more adequate treatment in chapter five.) Then 
the signal goes on flashing but eliciting no response. It is as though 
a light signals the presence of a train but there are no automobiles in 
view and none is expected. 
Still, in a general equilibrium model it is not extra profits that 
involve failure; the system's failure is involved only to the extent that 
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tangible resources are not appropriately shifted. But this conclusion 
reflects the systematic neglect, by general equilibrium theory, of changes 
in income distribution. Actually, a change in profits or rents is not 
irrelevant. Changes in income distribution (particularly between firms) 
do count. Fundamentally, this is because of the inevitable imperfection 
of the capital market. When the capital market is imperfect asset 
expansion may have to be financed out of internal funds. And the economic 
system may fail to expand in an appropriate manner if internal funds do 
not accrue in an appropriate manner. 
F. Summary 
This chapter has provided a partial description of the evolution of 
that aspect of economic research which concerns itself with market failure 
in economic development. References in other chapters help to provide a 
more complete picture. 
Several points have been stressed. These include: the importance 
of income distribution among firms; the difficulty of defining exter­
nalities in the absence of a satisfactory normative model; and the dif­
ficulty of measuring externalities because of the imputation problem. 
The next chapter provides an examination of the welfare aspects of 
externalities, and in the following chapter the definition of exter­
nalities is examined in connection with a simple model of economic 
development. 
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III. NORMS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
A. Capital Formation 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter an attempt is made to indicate how externalities 
in economic development relate to modern theories of welfare economics. 
It turns out that welfare theory plays a significant role in the defin­
itions used in this thesis as well as the obiter dicta 'and implicit 
definitions found in development literature. Difficulties involved in 
dynamic welfare economics are considered in the first section. Welfare 
implications of the various externalities are considered in the second 
section. 
2. Ideal rate 
Suppose some omniscient central planner knows the exact form,of all 
production functions, the relevant welfare functions of all existent and 
unborn persons, and suppose that there is no difficulty regarding the 
manner in which individual welfare functions at any one time enter the 
social welfare function. In these circumstances it is still not possible 
to find the ideal rate of saving, investment, and capital formation. 
This is because, even given these extreme assumptions, the ideal 
rate of capital formation depends on how much the welfare of future 
*In this thesis social welfare functions except where otherwise 
specified are assumed to be of Paretian type. If one persons8s welfare 
increases ceteris paribus, the social welfare increases. 
generations* is to count. The rate of capital formation influences the 
inter-temporal distribution of consumer goods. Then if future generations 
dominate the social welfare function, the ideal present rate of capital 
formation must be high. While if generations farther away than some 
time horizon are ignored, it will be unnecessary to make allowance for 
the prior formation of capital equipment for them. 
In practice, the welfare functions of future generations are not 
known; nor are they independent of -the present level of capital formation. 
Even the size of future populations probably depends on the present rate 
of capital formation. This complicates the matter still further. 
It might be argued that the future is so uncertain that little 
attention should be given to the welfare of persons who might be born in 
several hundred years. This does not change the basic problem but only 
narrows it in time. For if such distant future people are not to count 
it is still necessary to allocate weights to persons within the immediate 
future. 
In fact, it is rather difficult to believe that sufficient weight 
was given, by decision-makers of the past, to future (now present and 
future) needs. Carter and Williams (25) believe the United States has 
made profligate use of her natural resources. Table 6 does not neces­
sarily corroborate their view, but it does raise some important questions 
respecting inter-temporal decision-making. 
It should be noted that this sort of approach also has its critics. 
*Here future generations means the existent community at some time 
beyond the present. This might mean tomorrow or it might mean 100 years 
hence. 
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Table 6. Approximate degree of exhaustion of economically available 
mineral resources in the United States as of 19l+Ua 
Percent of 
Mineral orig inal remaining 
Magnesium 100 
Nitrogen • 100 
Bituminous coal and lignite 99 
Salt 99 
Phosphate rock 93 
Potash 92 
Molybdenum 91 
Iron ore 68 
Natural gas (proven reserves) 65 
Anthracite 65 
Sulfur • 59 
Fluospar 56 
Antimony bk 
Petroleum (proven reserves) h2 
Copper ho 
Zinc 33 
Tungsten 30 
Manganese 30 
Bauxite 28 
Vanadium 28 
Chromium 21 
Chromite Small 
Gold 20 
Lead 17 
Silver 17 
Mercury 3 
Cadmium Small 
Platinum Stoall 
Asbestos Small 
Nickel Small 
Tin Small 
S^ource: Kapp (109, p. 273). 
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Scott (193) has noted that the conservation question might be better put 
as: which is it most important to leave for posterity; natural resources, 
or capital equipment manufactured from those resources. But if this is 
the relevant question, the record still appears blemished. 
It is quite reasonable to suppose, for example, that future gener­
ations (people 20 to f>0 years hence) will have a use for trees and 
forests. Yet according to U.S.D.A. sources (see Kapp, 109), management 
of timber is frequently poor and sometimes destructive. Table 7 is 
illustrative. 
Table 7» Timber cutting practices in the U.S.A., 19U8C 
Ownership Character of cutting (percent) 
characteristics High-order*3 Good0 Faird Poor6 Destructive^ Total 
Private 1 7 28 56 8 100 
Public 8 59 19 13 1 100 
Size of holding 
Small 11 69 19 1 0 100 
Medium 6 37 32 21* 1 100 
Large 3 a 10 Ul 2 100 
All lands 3 20 25 U6 6 100 
^Source: Kapp (108, p. 275). 
^Will maintain quantity and quality of yields. 
cLeaves land in control of desirable species. 
^Maintains a reasonable stand of growing timber. 
^Limited means of natural reproduction, no growing timber. 
f Land left without timber and without means of reproduction. 
Ho 
Again it might be argued that since the welfare functions of future 
generations cannot be known the only persons who should count are those 
whose welfare functions are known. The only persons who should count are 
the present generation of choice-making adults. But this argument rests 
on a false premise. The welfare function of existent persons is not com­
pletely known, nor is the welfare function of future persons completely 
unknown. 
True, uncertainty makes it necessary to use a different set of 
weights than would otherwise be used. But it does not eliminate the 
weighting problem. 
There is one possible way within the new "welfare economics to avoid 
the difficulty posed above. That is, the method of inter-temporal over­
compensation. Since capital formation influences the inter-temporal 
distribution of consumer goods, it presumably operates so that persons 
at one time may benefit while persons at another time may lose. Those 
who gain may be able to more than compensate the losers. 
For example, the large scale of investment required just before 
take-off into self-sustaining growth is associated with full employment 
but a scarcity of consumer goods.* The beneficiaries of this postponed 
consumption are largely those who inhabit the country after take-off. 
Is it possible to say that take-off into self-sustaining growth 
involves achievement of some desirable goal? Application of a Paretian-
type welfare function indicates that such a statement is not possible, 
because of the shortage of consumer goods prior to take-off. 
*For a description of historical stages in economic growth see 
Rostow (l?it). 
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However, under some circumstances the beneficiaries may over-
compensate the losers. Then take-off would be a desirable goal. But, 
in this situation, overcompensation involves transfer of funds through 
time. And compensation must be paid.* Thus, it becomes important to 
know whether funds can or cannot be transferred through time. 
Under some circumstances the inter-temporal transfer of funds for 
overcompensation is possible. International borrowing and lending pro­
vide just this service to both creditor and debtor nations. But it may 
frequently happen that such international transactions are not feasible. 
In this case welfare functions which specify desirable inter-temporal 
distribution of income are necessary (see the next section: Welfare 
implications). 
The inability of the new welfare economics,** under even a very 
extreme set of assumptions, to define an ideal rate of capital formation 
is discouraging. The new welfare economics is generally able to provide 
criteria for the determination of certain interesting necessary conditions 
for an ideal under some strong set of comparatively unrealistic assump­
tions. Here that is not possible. The ideal rate of capital formation 
can not be determined unless a considerable segment of future populations 
are assumed away entirely. 
Consequently, in economic development, it appears necessary to stress 
*There seems still to be some doubt that compensation must be paid 
as Reder (l61t) goes to considerable trouble to prove. But it is self-
evident so long as a Paretian-type of welfare function is used. 
**The new welfare economics is a term here applied to that body of 
welfare economics which is able to avoid inter-personal comparisons. 
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problems of positive economics. But this provides a special difficulty 
for the approach taken here. Traditionally, external economies and dis­
economies have been related to normative general equilibrium analysis. 
An alleged external economy or diseconomy was only concluded to be a real 
external economy or diseconomy if it resulted in interference with the 
usual marginal conditions of general equilibrium analysis. But these 
marginal conditions were also necessary for welfare maximization. Con­
sequently, external economies and diseconomies were of normative signif­
icance. 
But this procedure cannot be retained in a consideration of exter­
nalities in economic development. There, externalities cannot be defined 
so that they have necessary normative significance because few normative 
statements may be made. Consequently, the definitions and procedure used 
by those who treat external economies and diseconomies in economic devel­
opment do not represent a development of those concepts from former uses.* 
B. Welfare Implications of a Simple Model 
In the previous section attention was focused on the requirements 
for normative statements using the weak criteria of the new welfare eco­
nomics. In this section externalities are related to the usual require­
ments for welfare maximization in order to highlight and clarify the dif­
ficulties. This procedure is also of use in comparing the value judgments 
required to specify an inter-temporal W function with the value judgments 
required to specify a W function in statics. 
*It seems likely that this is the reason why economists concerned 
with economic development have been loath to define the terms external 
economy and external diseconomy. 
Assume the following. Two homogeneous factors, labor L and capital 
C, in fixed supply may be used to produce two homogeneous products, 
apples A and nuts N. The two production functions A = f(L^ C^) and 
N = g(Ljjj Cjj) exhibit independence, constant returns to scale, and dimin­
ishing returns. Two persons, Jones J and Staith S, have ordinal utility 
functions Uj = h(Aj Nj) and % = i (Ag Ng) sensitive only to own consump­
tion. What conditions define the maximum social welfare?* 
Figure 1, p. provides an Edgeworth box diagram in which any 
point defines six quantities. These are the amounts of L and C used in 
production of A and N, respectively, and the total output of A and N. 
The lower left corner is the apple origin, the upper right corner is the 
nut origin. Isoquants (marked ii), by the assumption of diminishing 
returns, are convex to their origins. The dimensions of the box are 
ft# given by the amounts of L and C available. The marginal rate of sub­
stitution of factors is given by the slope of the isoquants. 
In this situation it is necessary, for a Pare to optimum, that the 
ideal output point, A*, occurs where the marginal rate of factor sub­
stitution in A production and in N production is equal. That is, iso­
quants must be tangent. If isoquants were not tangent it would be possi­
ble to have more A without sacrifice of N, or more N without sacrifice of 
A. In Figure 1 all such points of tangency are connected by the line hh. 
*There is much to be gained by starting with this simple, almost 
traditional model. If it seems elementary one can only plead that things 
get complicated soon enough. 
"^Elastic factor supplies are difficult to fit into graphic analysis 
for this reason. 
Figure 1. Tangency of isoquants 
Figure 2. Production possibilities 
Figure 3» The social welfare function 
Figure U. Interdependent isoquants 
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Let apples be fixed at some level A1 (not marked), then the maximum 
amount of nuts, N*, which can be obtained is given by the nut isoquant 
which is tangent to the A* isoquants. Alternatively the amount of nuts 
could be fixed at W1 in which case the maximum amount of apples would-be 
A1. It is possible to use this procedure to obtain, in apple-nut space, 
a single curve which indicates for each level of one product the maximum 
available amount of the other product. Such a curve is labelled TT in 
Figure 2, p. U5. 
At any point S on TT a new Edgeworth box diagram may be constructed. 
Let S represent the origin of Smith's ordinal utility map and let J 
represent the origin of Jones' ordinal utility map. 
It is necessary for welfare maximization that the ordinal utility 
curves of the two persons be tangent. If not, it would be possible to 
move either Jones or Smith to a higher ordinal utility curve without 
reducing the ordinal utility of the other person. The line SJ traces 
the locus of all such points. But at the ideal point, A*', it is also 
necessary that the subjective MRS curves be equal in slope to the slope 
of TT at S. If this were not true it would be possible to move northwest 
or southeast a marginal unit on TT (in effect transforming apples into 
nuts, or nuts into apples) in such a manner as to make one person better 
off without making the other worse off. For example, both consumers may 
be just willing to exchange one apple for one nut. And in production, 
by shifting resources, it may be possible in effect to trade one nut for 
one and one-half apples. Then, if both exchanges were made consumers 
would be no worse off, but there would be half an apple left over. This 
hi 
could be used to increase the utility of either Smith or Jones. 
For each box diagram such as the one in Figure 2 it is possible to 
proceed as follows. For any level of Uj obtain the maximum level of Ug. 
In this manner it is possible to obtain for each point on TT a curve .in 
Uj U5 space which indicates the maximum level of Uj for each level of Ug. 
Mow, one may draw such a curve for each point on TT and obtain the 
envelope.* 
This envelope is plotted in Figure 3, p. hS as the line UU. The 
scales of the diagram in Figure 3 may expand or contract so that it is 
not possible to say anything about the shape of UU. But UU defines an 
infinity of points which are all efficient in the Paretian sense. To 
proceed further it is necessary to have a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare 
function defining the relative weights to be given to Ug as opposed to 
Uj (lU, 180). Let such a function be WW. A*" therefore defines the 
society's bliss point.** 
Implicit in this maximization of welfare procedure is the deter­
mination of prices. Let A1" correspond to A*correspond to A*. 
Producers will use the minimum cost factor combination, that is, the 
factor combination which equates ratios of marginal factor productivities 
with ratios of factor costs. Then at A (Figure l), factor prices must 
be as represented by the price line p'p'. Similarly, in Figure 2, pro­
ducers will not produce the S combination unless the product price ratio 
^Corresponding to each point on TT there may be only one point on 
the JS curve that exhibits the same slope as TT. Plotting the UjUg values 
at such a point yields a point on the envelope in Uj Ug space. 
**This terminology appears to originate with Samuelson. When there 
is danger of using words having emotive value he seems to find it useful 
to use instead a word which is ludicrous. 
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(confronting producers) is P* *P . And consumers will not consume the 
A*' combination unless the product price ratio (confronting consumers) 
is again PUP". The WW function defines the ideal distribution of goods 
and therefore (in the absence of saving) provides information respecting 
relative factor ownership.* In the absence of saving, by Euler's theorem: 
1. L PL + C tan ô'PL  = A PA * N tan 0' 'P&. 
This equation defines a ratio between the factor prices and the product 
prices. Consequently all the price ratios are known. The absolute level 
of prices is not known but all quantities may be fixed without it.** 
This completes the analysis and provides a simple, if not very rigorous, 
proof of duality. 
It is interesting to note the role played by WW. The Pare to optimum 
can only provide assistance in finding UU. But this is not sufficient. 
An infinity of points (the area between UU and WjW^) which are suboptima 
by the Pare to criterion, are superior by the WW criterion to a point such 
as B (Figure 3) which satisfies all Paretian requirements. In practice 
this means that even the simplest recommendations cannot be made unless 
one knows whether the effect on income distribution is or is not desir­
able. It was only by ignoring this question that general equilibrium 
^Factors must be owned so that for Smith: 
LgPL + Cs tan 6'pl » * % tan 9' !P^. 
A similar equation could be written for Jones but it is not independent 
of the above. But two equations are required to determine Lo and Cc (and, 
by subtraction Lj and Cj). Therefore various factor ownership mixtures 
will do. 
**A11 of this may be found in elementary texts. Bator (10) provides 
the most concise graphical treatment. The 2x2x2 case is analogous 
to the n factor, m product, g person case. Using calculus instead of 
graphs the same price ratios may be found. 
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analysts were able to give externalities normative significance. The 
ultimate consequences for a theory of development have already been con­
sidered. Normative statements are not possible. In stationary statics 
the situation is not nearly so difficult. We may not know the shape of 
WW or everyone may tender his own idea of how WW should look. We may 
not know whether to obtain WW by a voting procedure or by a paternalistic 
government. But at least we know what it means: national income should 
be distributed equally, is a meaningful statement so long as it is con­
fined to the current situation.* Moreover, the marginal conditions will 
hold respecting any WW. But the crux of the matter is that in statics 
distribution is only one of many problems and so its treatment can be 
postponed, but in development, inter-temporal distribution is the very 
essence of the problem. 
To facilitate consideration of changes which take time, let Figure 
1, Figure 2, and Figure 3 be horizontal slices through a vertical time 
dimension. Position on this time axis may be indicated by a subscript 
(for example, A^ or At_^). It is convenient to let the origin of the 
time axis be the time-slice depicted in Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3, 
and to denote this by the absence of a subscript. Finally, let the sub­
script T (for example, Ap) represent the path of the variable through 
time. For the moment assume is meaningful. In this situation it 
m 
may be demonstrated that achievement of &T inplies the existence, at 
any time, of the price and tangency conditions demonstrated above. 
Naturally there are other conditions to be met in order for the 
*Actually, there is some question about even this. Does income mean 
money income only, or does it also include psychic income: 
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system to track any solution. Now each producer must be perfectly 
informed respecting the instantaneous rate of change of all prices and 
must react so that it is a matter-of indifference to him how further 
increments of investment are scheduled. This condition alone results 
in an efficient (one of many) program of capital accumulation. 
Let P^ (t) be the price of commodity 1 at time t, then all producers 
know with certainty each Pi(tXl), i=l, 2,....n. Let rj_(t) be the net 
earnings of commodity 1 over and above maintenance and replacement 
expenses, during the t-th period so that r^ (t)/P^ (t) is the own-rate of 
interest of commodity 1. The condition above may be interpreted to mean: 
2. rx(t) ^ Px(t+1) = r2(t) ^  P2(t+1) = r.(t) ^  Pj(t+1) 
p^ Tty + px(t) = ?2(t) + p2(t) "'pTTtj + p.(t) " r° + ls 
Here the o-th commodity is numeraire so that rQ is the money rate 
of interest. If equation two does not hold it will be possible for 
arbitragers to change from one kind of investment to another and thereby 
make a certain profit. Equation two, therefore, is in the invisible 
hand tradition (U8). Bat these conditions though they enable the system 
to track some A-p are not sufficient for the system to track the par­
ticular ,4 J*" solution. 
1. Types of market failure in a welfare model 
It has been implicitly assumed that all points of tangency occur 
within the Edgeworth box diagrams. This is not necessary. When,tangency 
occurs outside the diagrams a combination on the bound may be chosen. 
This causes inequalities to creep into the mechanics of defining necessary 
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conditions, but introduces no difficulties in finding a maximum of wel­
fare. For example, in Figure 2 the slope of TT may not be equal to the 
slope of subjective MRS at any feasible output. This implies specialized 
production of either apples or nuts. 
a. Indivisibilities The assumed homogeneity of factors and 
products together with constant returns to scale and diminishing returns, 
produced smooth convex curves. Indivisibilities if not too large result 
in linear segments and sharp corners. But linear programmers have demon-
. 
strated how such situations may be handled. Larger indivisibilities can 
cause increasing or decreasing returns to scale. This is a difficulty 
of more substance. Under decreasing returns to scale the ideal factor 
prices (given by p'p' in Figure 1) times their respective factor quan­
tities do not generate enough income for purchase of the product at the 
ideal product prices (given by F11?'1 in Figure 2). If the difference 
accrues as entrepreneurial profits, then entrepreneurship as well as 
factor ownership must be distributed in a manner consistent with the 
ideal income distribution. 
Increasing returns to scale, on the other hand, result (when factors 
are paid their MVP) in larger incomes to factor owners than expenditure 
on products. Morse, it may result in non-convexities in transformation 
functions (TT of Figure 2).* If TT were non-convex at S, the A11 con­
figuration would not be maintained by price PnPl! because S would 
"^Increasing returns to scale in the output of apples may be more 
than compensated be decreasing returns to scale in the production of nuts 
so that TT remains convex. If both products are subject to increasing 
returns to scale, it is still possible that TT will be convex because of 
factor substitution under diminishing returns. Such difficulties are 
less serious when there are a large number of producers. See chapter 
five under non-convexity. 
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represent a minimum rather than a maximum profit position for producers. 
S could be maintained by a system of ad valorem sales taxes. But this 
might not be consistent with maintaining &"• If not (and this would 
be the usual case), there is no price appropriate bo both sides of the 
market. Producers must receive prices different from those paid by con-» 
sumers. Moreover, under increasing returns to scale average costs are 
falling and M C^A C. Therefore, competitive producers sustain continued 
losses. Alternatively, if producer output is so small that losses are 
not realized, the marginal conditions are not met. 
Indivisibilities also result in tendencies toward monopoly. Monopoly 
results in some producer control over prices. Thus, for example, if 
apples are produced by a monopoly and nuts are produced competitively, 
P*'P*' in Figure 2 may be tilted counterclockwise. This may imply an 
income distribution closer to or farther from the ideal A* ' '. Monopoly 
may result in excess capacity (failure to use the full Edge worth box of 
Figure 1). This problem might be set aside by assuming full employment, 
but it is not clear in dynamics what full employment means. 
b. Interdependence The assumed independence of production 
functions precludes the existence of technological external economies 
(228). If this assumption is withdrawn, say in apple production, the 
production function for apples may take the form A = f*(L^ C^) or 
even A = f^(L^ Ljj Cjg N). It is possible to trace out new isoquants 
for Figure 1 on these assumptions because at any point the quantity of 
each independent variable is known. Let the dotted curve in Figure 1 be 
such an isoquant. Ihe locus of socially ideal factor proportions must 
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go through the points where such dotted apple isoquants are tangent to 
nut isoquants. Part of such a curve is shown as HH. 
If, however, the apple producers do not pay for the effect of Ljj, 
Cjj and N on apple output they will continue to equate the ratios of mar­
ginal productivity of factors for which they pay with the price ratio. 
That is, they continue to seek out points along hh. 
The result is failure to achieve UU in Figure 3. Moreover, at any 
achieved point on hh, apple producers obtain more or less output than 
that for which they have budgeted. They obtain windfall gains or losses.* 
There are three possible measures of the extent of such external economies 
and diseconomies: 1. the worth to apple producers of the increment in 
apple production; 2. the cost to apple producers of purchased factors 
which could be used to substitute for the unpaid factors; 3» the amount 
which such unpaid factors could be worth to apple producers who used 
them under existing prices to maximize output.** 
Refer to Figure U, p. U5. Solid curves are (hypothetical) isoquants 
of the type A = f (L^ C^). Dotted curves are isoquants of the type 
A ° k(L^ Ljj Cjj W). Profit maximizing apple producers seek the point 
h. They expect output to be 10 and output is really 12. There is an 
*After a time expectations may become so reconciled to such isoquant 
shifts that no one is able to estimate the position of the original iso­
quants. Could an orchardist estimate the level of yield in a world 
devoid of bees? 
The amount which such unpaid factors would be worth to society 
under the " configuration of inputs, might also be used as a fourth 
measure. But this is extremely difficult to obtain. 
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external economy under measure one of 2 Pa.* But apple producers might 
attempt to substitute labor for capital along the price line hk. If . 
prices did not change apple producers could reach the point k, and there 
would be an external economy (measure three) of li Pa. But, unless the 
nut isoquant is linear along hk, factor prices will change.** 
Apple producers would presumably discontinue any shifts that led 
to isoquants lower than A = 12. Nut producers would presumably discon­
tinue shifting toward less intensive use of labor if they found such 
shifts leading to nut isoquants lower than N = 9.*** The result would 
/ be production at point H where the external economy = 3 Pa. H should 
| 
not be confused with A . H is only one of a series of such tangency 
points, while A* is the socially ideal point of tangency. 
*Under constant returns to scale and competition the external econ­
omy under measure two will also be worth 2 Pa. 
**The possibility of linear segments, corners and nonconvexity in 
dotted isoquants is not troublesome so long as producers respond only 
to private production functions (solid curves). 
But it seems unlikely that producers are so wise. In fact the 
usual n firm situation confronting them is one in which recognition of 
the true isoquants (the dotted ones) is hopelessly complicated. 
^Index number problems have been assumed away. Actually P^ and 
Pjj will change. But this model only provides relative prices so it is 
not possible to determine how much. Even when hypothetical as well 
as actual values of A, N, P& and Pm are known all four would likely be 
different in the two situations (n and H). This gives rise to grave 
index number difficulties. The Hicks (91) overcompensation criterion 
could presumably be used to find out whether a social economy or social 
diseconomy existed. For example, (letting superscript, h, stand for the 
situation as it would exist in the absence of the external economy or 
diseconomy and superscript, a , stand for the actual situation) if 
V na ~a n. V h h andr- h h . r* h a then a social external economy LP 9 >L P q L p q <L p q 
exists. 
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If H were achieved, there would be no external economies by a Pareto 
criterion. But if A* were not achieved, there would be an external 
economy or diseconomy by the social welfare criterion. Probably enough 
has been said to indicate the difficulties attendant in measures other 
than measure one. Unfortunately measure one does not relate to the 
social ideal A « In fact it is possible if IV = g11 (L^ Cy A) (that 
is, if there are external economies in nut production), that HH will 
fall on hh and in fact that A* be at h. This unlikely chance occurrence 
involves private external economies and diseconomies, but no failures of 
the price system. The unfortunate fact is that A* may be in any direction 
from h. Consequently, sound recommendations cannot be made in the absence 
of full knowledge of both total production functions. And a measure of 
externalities that has normative significance requires the same infor­
mation respecting both total production functions plus information 
respecting how producers actually react to the free factor. 
If the assumed independence of consumers' utility functions is 
withdrawn, difficulties such as those just analyzed in connection with 
Figure 1 arise in Figure 2. The analysis is parallel and may be omitted 
here. 
c. Social goods Despite introduction of time, this model is 
still excessively static. Where does L and C come from? So far they 
have just been assumed to come into existence at just the right moment 
in the specified amounts. If the labor force is allowed to grow exoge­
nous ly, and if C^2 m Nt+15 moc*el becomes more interesting. The 
Edgeworth box of Figure 1 now expands in a vertical direction by an 
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amount equal to the production of nuts in the previous time period. It 
expands east by the amount of growth of the labor force. Incentives for 
nut purchases (that is, investment) reflect individual preferences for 
future income. When any individual can buy in t+1 only a small proportion 
of the nut output, his income in t+2 presumably must reflect this 
purchase.* 
Yet we may require an income distribution that does not reflect 
rewards for investment (for example, equality of income)» In this sit­
uation At''' can only be achieved by interference with the laissez-faire 
mechanism. The tangency of subjective MRS curves in Figure 2 is not 
111 
consistent with achievement of . Anyone who is foolish enough to 
buy nuts provides for a very slight increase in his own and everyone 
else's future income. This uncompensated gain received by all other 
persons may be termed an external economy. 
It is possible, with fairly major manipulation to obtain the JS 
locus from Figure 2. The returns to be derived from nut purchases (social 
goods) accrue equally to both Jones and Smith. Then add the MRS of Jones 
at each level of nuts Jy to the MRS of Smith at Sy (where = J^). Do 
the same for MRS curves having origins at S. Connect all points of 
tangency of such summed MRS curves and the resulting locus of points is 
JS. b! 1 will be somewhere along JS.** J^ and Sy have nominal signif-
*That is, he must believe that the size of his income at t*2 is 
positively affected by his purchase of nuts at t+1. But if the society's 
income is equally distributed, this is manifestly untrue. Individuals -
would not invest. Then when income is equal or nearly equal, provision 
of investment takes on attributes of a social good. 
**This matter is more fully treated in chapter five where the reasons 
why this technique may be used are set forth in detail. 
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icance only. Actually, Ug and Uj depend on the amount of N and not on 
its distribution. 
But this procedure may be somewhat disconcerting. If subjective 
MRS curves depend on WW, then in what sense may WW be obtained outside 
of the system? Does not WW have also to be determined simultaneously 
with the price and quantity parameters? It does, and this means that 
externalities cannot be normatively defined except when everything else 
is known; WW, MRS, Uj, Ug, L, C, and production possibilities. 
d. Technological changes Technical advances involve potential 
increases in productivity. If technical advances appear like manna from 
heaven, it may be possible to treat them by using Figure 1 and simply 
relabeling isoquants with every change in time period. This would not 
be very satisfactory, as most likely the slope of isoquants will also be 
affected. But surely such developments are closely related to presently 
used inputs, outputs and techniques. If this is the case, technical 
advances depend (in Figure 1) on the position of A and N producers. If 
producers remain at à' for one time period isoquants must be relabeled 
and slopes changed in one manner, while if producers remain for one 
period at any other point in Figure 1 isoquants must be relabeled and 
slopes changed in a different fashion. Moreover, a technological break­
through may require that producers remain at one point for an unspeci­
fied (long) time.* 
^Slices (on the apple production surface) vertical to the LC axis 
and through some point A* and the A origin may have almost any curva­
ture. Such a slice involves A on the ordinate and various levels of some 
fixed proportions of L and C on the abscissa. If such curves are obtained 
on the assumption that corresponding to each point on the production 
function, the LC set of inputs have been held constant through the gamut 
of time, the curve may be non-convex. 
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Take A* and any second best point in Figure 1 at t=0. Production 
for one period at either position involves shifts in technical potentials. 
In both cases choose the production combination for the next period. 
Continue in this manner. After a number of periods the second-best ini­
tial choice may correspond to the best rather than the second-best final 
choice. (There seems to be no reason why the two should converge.) Thus, 
when allowance is made for technical advance, Figure 1 fails to provide 
h-ph-p—the dynamic Pare to optimum production locus. This result derives 
from uncertainty respecting where or when technical advance may be made. 
Again the consequence is that externalities can at best be given only 
quasi-normative significance. 
e. Irreversibilities As has been noted above, technological 
changes make it difficult to specify production norms. Discontinuous 
change may be treated by using linear programming methods, but irrevers­
ible changes are more difficult. One can cross a stream on an ice floe 
by a leap which propels the floating ice to the other side. Presumably, 
one can get back the same way. But the decision whether or not to cross 
would become much more difficult if the ice only moved in one direction, 
or if one could not tell in advance whether return would or would not 
be feasible. A wrong decision may be catastrophic. 
Yet, the world is characterized by irreversible change. Mines become 
exhausted, soils erode, wage rates and consumer tastes become institution­
alized, and overripe crops do not become less ripe. Some changes are 
reversible, of course. Machinery may be replaced, and even good or bad 
work habits can be changed, given enough time and determination. 
Introduction of irreversibility into the model involves more than 
making allowance for derivatives that are of different magnitude depending 
on the direction of approach to the limit. From one direction or the 
other derivatives may not be defined. Socialist planners might treat 
such phenomena the same way they treat kinks and linearities in pro­
gramming a solution. But unfortunately the solution obtained by the 
decentralized decision makers of the business community is not likely 
to correspond. To achieve the norm requires that they move to the 
solution from the right direction and stop at the right time. No approach 
involving successive approximations will do. tâtonnement does not work. 
In Figure 2 imagine each subjective MRS curve to be marked with an 
arrow indicating necessary direction. It may happen that the A" solu­
tion is not obtainable because it is found at a point of tangency of a 
MRS curve for Jones and a MRS curve for Smith which involve proceeding 
in different directions.* Moreover, though A*11 might be feasible in 
the sense that both MRS curves involve, at the point of tangency, moving 
in the same direction it still may not be possible to obtain the A11 
position by means of the laissez-faire system. Achievement of a position 
from which A*' could be approached may be impossible under free enter­
prise. 
Unfortunately the matter is too important to be sloughed over. But 
it does not fit very conveniently into the simple welfare model used 
here. It is evident that A?' may not be achieved under a free enterprise 
w An might be maintained if the society were there at the beginning 
but be unobtainable if the society were not there at first. 
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system because of insufficient provision for irreversible changes such 
as soil erosion. That is, inter-temporal benefits or costs may accrue 
without the possibility of inter-temporal compensation. A complete system 
of forward prices cannot solve this problem because it makes no provision 
for inter-temporal transfer of funds.* 
f. Equilibrium difficulties So far in this chapter it has been 
possible to avoid most considerations of uncertainty. But, while this is 
not a study of uncertainty, it is largely a study of the consequences of 
failure to integrate plans and failure to integrate accounts. And with­
out uncertainty, failure to integrate plans and accounts would not likely 
be of great importance. Uncertainty may be related to the welfare con­
siderations of Figure 2. The à,1 ' configuration is obtained at price 
PMPM. But relatively higher nut prices may give rise to a gross shift 
toward more nut output and less apple output (to the southeast in Figure 
2). The price may shift beyond PUPl ' to a relatively high price for 
apples and relatively low price for nuts. Producers may again over-
respond, and so on. The hog cycle provides an ideal example of this 
sort of response. But business cycles appear to be related, and are 
certainly much more important in studies of economic development. 
Conceptually, a perfect system of forward prices would solve this 
difficulty (192). But in the absence of such a system it may sometimes 
be useful to relate changes in the output of one firm to changes in cost 
*It might seem that future sales of (say) land of a certain quality 
would provide present land owners with both funds and incentives necessary 
to avoid soil erosion. But funds (if any) received by present owners of 
land sold under futures contracts come from contemporary purchasers and 
not from persons at the time of future sales. 
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and revenue in each other firm. Were this possible (and were plans based 
on such a calculation) the cyclical equilibrium difficulties might be 
avoided. This matter receives more thorough consideration in chapter 
five. 
C. Theory of the Second Best 
The difficulties involved in a normative definition of externalities 
have now been extensively treated. Some difficulties exist even in static 
perfect competition (the distribution problem) but in a dynamic world of 
imperfect competition, prescriptions based on general equilibrium cri­
teria simply do not have normative significance. Such prescriptions 
are very likely to be wrong. 
As an example, consider the problem of maximizing output in a single, 
unintegrated, successive-stage, productive process having one final prod­
uct sold to consumers. Firms are A, B, .... C, .... 2; where A sells raw 
materials to B and Z sells to final consumption. There is an equal degree 
of monopoly so that markup r = > 1 is everywhere constant. Withdrawal 
of a small amount w of a productive factor from stage i reduces the out­
put of that stage by rw. The succeeding stage is deprived of a factor 
p 
worth rw and its product falls by r w. Losses cumulate so that with­
drawal of factors worth w from i, reduces the output of the Z^1 industry 
by w(r)z"*i. 
It follows that output will be larger if productive services are 
taken out of later stages and put in earlier stages. Intermediate prod­
ucts will be priced too high relative to unprocessed factors so that 
unprocessed factors tend to be too much devoted to later stages of the 
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production process. 
Any policy which encourages additional fragmentation will make the 
matter worse. In fact, the ideal would appear to be a single vertically 
integrated monopoly. Movements toward the competitive ideal are not 
desired, unless it is possible to go all the way so that r = 1 in every 
industry.* Thus, given monopoly elements that cannot be removed, the 
norms of general equilibrium are no longer to be desired. 
This conclusion has been made perfectly general by Lipsey and 
Lancaster (127). Given a constraint on the ability of the system to 
achieve one of the general equilibrium norms, the others no longer have 
normative significance. 
For example, consider the problem of decreasing cost industries. 
Costs may decrease because of economies of scale or because of techno­
logical innovation. Price cannot equal marginal cost (either the cost 
of the last unit produced in a decreasing cost industry or the cost of 
production of the most advanced firm in a technologically, advancing 
industry) or some firms will sustain continued losses. What, then, 
should be the pricing policy of constant - cost government controlled 
industry? 
The general equilibrium norms no longer apply. In fact, the best 
that such a government controlled industry can do may be to set its price 
above marginal cost by a proportion r less than that used by the decreas­
ing cost industry.** 
*For a more extensive treatment see McKenzie (136). 
**This conclusion follows from section y of the Lipsey and Lancaster 
article (127), but applies only to a rather simple model. 
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D. Summary 
In this chapter necessary conditions for defining and achieving a 
maximum of welfare position in,a very simple dynamic model have been 
examined. It has been noted that ordinarily no normative statements may 
be made. The achievement of a Pare to optimum is necessary but not 
sufficient for achievement of a maximum of welfare position. But a 
Pareto optimum"is neither necessary nor sufficient for an improvement 
in welfare. Consequently, the Paretian conditions are not adequate 
criteria (in an imperfect world) for normative judgments. 
It is possible to assume the existence of a social welfare function 
and to examine how certain external economies and diseconomies bring 
about failure to achieve the bliss position. But it is probably not 
very meaningful to assume the existence of an inter-temporal social 
welfare function. If not, the elimination of all unrewarded external 
effects cannot be recommended. By some hypothetical social welfare 
function an infinite number of points exhibiting externalities are 
superior to an infinite number of points exhibiting no externalities. 
True, if bliss is to be achieved by the system of laissez-faire it 
is ordinarily necessary to eliminate both external economies, and external 
diseconomies, just as it is necessary to eliminate Pare to sub-optima. But 
when everything is imperfect, the elimination of an external economy or 
external diseconomy, just like the elimination of Pare to sub-optima, 
does not necessarily imply an improvement. For this reason it is con­
venient to give the word externality only positive significance. 
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iv. definitions and a model 
A. Difficulties of Definition 
It has been demonstrated in chapter three that the practice of 
defining externalities with respect to normative general equilibrium is 
not satisfactory. It has broken down for two reasons: 1. the require­
ments of general equilibrium are unrealistic because they fail to make 
allowance for existent unalterable imperfections (this is the problem 
of the second best); and 2. because general equilibrium theory fails 
to include an adequate treatment of income distribution. 
The latter difficulty might not be too great in a society having no 
intermediate manufacturing. If some people get less than a subsistence 
wage, the social security system will look after them. And output of 
all final goods and services will adjust to the demand vector. But 
when intermediate producers are brought into the picture the situation 
becomes more complex. Adjustment to final demand may require output 
from an intermediate producer who cannot stay in business without a 
subsidy. If so, income distribution (among firms) can be ignored only 
at the cost of a good deal of realism. 
For these reasons, it is not useful to define externalities in 
relation to the general equilibrium norms. The alternative implicitly 
chosen by development economists is to relate externalities to profits. 
The following definitions are in that tradition. 
But before proceeding it is in order to repeat a word of warning. 
Non-constant returns to scale and fixed factor proportions give rise to 
difficulties in imputing the surplus, or deficit, product to individual 
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factors. There are no satisfactory solutions to this problem. For 
example, finding the value of land from its productivity is ordinarily 
not possible. The same difficulty arises when defining and attempting 
to measure externalities. Under non-constant returns to scale or fixed 
factor proportions the total value of an external influence on output 
cannot be found.* 
B. Definitions to be Used 
The following definitions and analysis are intended to prepare the 
way for the empirical work in subsequent chapters. The definitions are 
slanted toward pecuniary externalities because these are the easiest to 
quantify. It would be desirable to more extensively treat technological 
change, and problems of entry. But these effects are very difficult to 
quantify. They are studied in the literary and theoretical chapters two 
and five, but receive scant attention in this chapter, or in chapter six. 
It should be emphasized that the model developed here is based on effects 
that are thought to be important. But they are not thought to be the sole 
cause or even the most important cause of failure to achieve economic 
development. 
Let capital letters represent firms and lower case letters products. 
In the following, "externality" will mean: those changes in cost or 
revenue in aqy firm B, caused or made possible by a small change in out­
put undertaken by a firm A, when it would have been reasonable for B to 
have offered compensation (positive or negative) to encourage or prevent 
A's action, but when no such compensation has taken place. "Caused or 
*This important difficulty is not treated by Kahn (107) or by 
Fleming (66). 
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made possible", is to be interpreted as follows: If additional revenue in 
B is made possible by A1 s action, B may have to undertake some zero cost 
action in order to obtain the additional revenue. Where B's appropriate 
action has associated costs the externality is to be interpreted as net 
of such costs. Where B can avoid the cost increasing consequences of A1s 
action by some move having associated costs, then the externality is to 
be interpreted as equal to the cost of avoiding the consequences of A's 
action. However, "made possible" does not include an output change. 
It is convenient at this point to introduce two other terms. In 
the following, marginal revenue externality will mean that algebraic 
change in marginal revenue of firm A (at initial profit maximizing output) 
which is caused or made possible by a small change in output undertaken by 
another firm B. It will be convenient to use the symbol MRE^/g for the 
marginal revenue externality obtained by A due to the change in output of b. 
The term marginal cost externality will be used as the exact cost 
analogue of marginal revenue externality. The symbol MCE^yg means: that 
algebraic change in marginal costs of firm A (at the initial profit maxi­
mizing output) which is caused or made possible by a small increase in 
the output of b. Both MRE and MCE may be either positive or negative. 
It is possible to define average and total revenue (or cost) externalities 
in the same manner as the marginal cost and marginal revenue externalities 
defined above.* 
*T% = f(b) IRE^yg = aTR^ due to &b 
MRA ™ f^A MREû/d = idTRA 
da d. [_£_-)= AMRA due to &b 
db 
Measurement is clearly another matter (see chapter six). 
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These definitions still leave freedom to distinguish between the 
long and the short run, and they have the advantage of relating in a 
familiar manner concepts which it is desired to study, that is change in 
profit and externalities. Thus, seme Ab has as a consequence a TCEwn 
In general, the amount of the externality generated by any firm will 
be a function of that firm's output. Smoke nuisance is related to indus­
trial output, neighborhood enjoyment to the size of Smith's lawn, factor 
prices to the amount of derived demand, et cetera. However, the partic­
ular form of this function must vary a good deal depending on circum­
stances. Therefore, it is convenient to proceed by using an example. 
Cost externalities will be treated first, then revenue externalities will 
be considered, and finally both will be treated at once. 
As an example, think of the external-internal economy* (externality) 
in A which is involved when there are falling production costs and 
increasing merchandising costs. TCE^yg depends on the effect of A b on 
production and merchandising expenditures in A. Assume constant prices, 
a closed economy, two firms, perfectly elastic factor supplies, that 
both a and b are consumer goods, and that production functions are not 
interdependent. These assumptions make TCE^ • 0 as far as production 
costs are concerned, but merchandising expenditures in A may still be 
influenced by ûb because of income effects and because a and b may be 
*This term is attributable to Robertson (166) and is defined as the 
decrease in average costs (in a firm subject to' decreasing costs) attrib­
utable to an increase in the size of the market. 
and a TRE^yg so that profit is increased by at least (TRE^yg - TCE^) 
Then, 1. A, - (IRE.*, - TCE.m). 
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related in consumption.* If à  b moves national income over a relatively 
small range one would expect income effects to remain approximately con­
stant, that is, to be independent of b so long as investment is not too 
lumpy. Income effects bring about a downward movement in MC^. That is, 
MCE^g tends to be negative (provided a is not an inferior good). 
But, though income effects may be approximately constant, it is clear 
from the law of diminishing marginal rates of substitution, that, if a 
and b are complements or substitutes, TCE^y^ will not be linear when 
plotted as a function of b. If a and b are substitutes, TCE^yg will be 
concave, if complements TCE^yg will be convex from below.*"* 
Figure $, p. 71 is a graphical representation of the latter 
relation.*** In order to have B produce output OZ rather than zero or 
output ÛY, A would ordinarily be willing to pay a bribe per unit of time 
In this case the activity of B either reduces A's merchandising 
expenditure (costs) or increases demand for A's product (increases 
revenue). Thus revenue externalities and cost externalities are con­
founded, and this is one reason why the single term externality is prefer­
able to the two terms external economy and external diseconomy when deal­
ing with imperfect competition. 
Perhaps it is worth stressing that the purpose in this section is 
the development of a set of definitions and not the development of any 
solutions to externality problems. The example is convenient because 
it has already been extensively treated. 
***Were iso-cost curves (of a) drawn in a diagram with output of b 
on the ordinate and output of a on the abscissa, they might be cm cave 
to the ordinate. Iso-cost curves of b might be similarly drawn so that 
the Edgeworth box diagram could be used to provide an ideal (in the 
limited sense that advantage is taken of all cost externalities) price 
ratio of a and b, and output of b for any given output of firm A. 
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•H* just less than n dollars. And to keep B producing output OZ rather 
than some output larger than OY, firm B may be willing to pay much more. 
The line oyr (a mirror image of the total cost of output Qa curve) is a 
line such that its vertical distance from the abscissa provides the maxi­
mum bribe A might reasonably pay for any output b rather than have b - 0 
or b = oy.** This maximum bribe will be called pay-off. Note that MCE^ 
is given by multiplying the slope of the line oyr by minus unity. The 
reason is as follows: TCE^g is the difference made to total cost in A; 
the slope of TCE^g is therefore change in the slope of TC^ or, symbol­
ically, HCE^/g. 
But firm A might be a firm which would make continued losses were 
it not for the total externalities it receives. Then the bribe A could 
pay would not equal the pay-off.*** In the following, pay-off will only 
be considered potential if there are sufficient net revenues (in A) after 
the change in B that it could be covered. 
Potential pay-off will tend to be larger, then, if A produces the 
output corresponding to maximum net revenue; it will tend to decrease in 
both directions from this level of output. But net revenue may be large 
*The amount of this potential bribe will, of course, be tempered 
by conditions of profit in industry A. It may be that A would go out of 
business rather than pay any bribe at all. The bribe cannot be paid, 
however, or the situation would no longer be one to which the word 
"externality" could be applied. 
**It is possible to obtain a curve showing the maximum amount A 
might pay to have B produce output oz rather than any non-zero level of 
output q, by dropping the curve oyr until it intersects the abscissa at 
q, then taking the vertical height of oyr at oz. 
***Actually this provides a fundamental difficulty in determining 
pay-off. Either pay-off is dependent on profits or else it corresponds 
to no actual flow. 
Figure •$. Total costs compared to Figure 6. Pay-off and potential 
total cost externality pay-off functions 
Figure 7. Maximum profit locus 
Figure 8. Potential pay-off A to B Figure 9. Shifts in equilibrium 
output 
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enough that it does not (in any relevant range) constrain potential 
pay-off. Even in this situation, however, pay-off is a function of a 
output. For if A were a very large firm any change in unit selling costs 
would involve much larger shifts in profit than were A a very small firm. 
Figure 6, p. 71 illustrates how pay-off and potential pay-off may 
be related to output of a. 
In Figure 5 the potential pay-off was related to output of aj in 
Figure 6 it was related to output of b. Evidently potential pay-off is 
a function of both a and b, and it should be possible to show this in a 
three-dimensional diagram. This is done in Figure 7j p. 71. Here poten­
tial pay-off means the maximum amount A would rationally pay B to have 
B produce an output corresponding to the b axis rather than zero. 
A curve relating potential pay-off to the locus of maximum profit 
in A can be used. This locus P P (Figure 7) is defined as A's maximum 
profit expansion line over the range of variable output in B. That is, 
as b increases, A is assumed to produce its maximum profit output. Taking 
potential pay-off along A's maximum profit expansion line makes it possi­
ble to relate potential pay-off from A to B as a function of b. This is 
done in Figure 8, p. 71. 
Note that the line mm in Figure 8 differs from the line oyr in 
Figure £, since in Figure 8 A has adjusted to the maximum profit position 
after the change in b. It will be convenient to refer to pre-equilibrium 
and post-equilibrium potential pay-off. 
Where only two firms are involved and where all externalities are 
included in the calculation as functions of b and where pay-off is not 
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constrained by revenue, it is possible, in the general equilibrium tra­
dition, to obtain marginal social costs. Marginal social costs of b 
equal MC^  + MCE^ yg. It should be remembered, however, that MCE^ yg refers 
to the pre-equilibrium situation (that is to Figure 5). 
Is it correct to say that where the curve mm. (Figure 8) is a maximum 
the output of b is, as far as A is concerned, the ideal output? Clearly, 
the answer to this question must be in the negative, for while this is, 
as far as A1s cost is concerned, the ideal output of b, B's output also 
may affect A1s revenue, and nothing has been said about that. 
The procedure has been to obtain marginal social costs. Presumably 
marginal social revenue can be obtained in much the same way. Thus, out­
put in any firm.when marginal private cost equals marginal private revenue 
may be compared with the output which equates marginal social cost and 
marginal social revenue. 
If initially, MPC = MSG in both industries, and since MPC in A is 
shifted as a consequence of A b, MSG in A must be similarly shifted or 
in the final situation, MSG will not equal MPC. But MSG of a can be 
shifted only by an externality generated in A. Consequently (if MSG is 
to remain equal to MPC), MCE^ yg must equal MCEgy^ .* 
This approach may have some appeal to those used to general equili­
brium theory. But unfortunately pay-off in the general case is likely 
to be constrained by lack of revenue so that potential pay-off / pay-off. 
*This applies only when there are but two firms. Where there are 
more, the requirement that MSG equals MPC involvesS MCE.,. = S MCE. , 
for any firm A. However, whether this condition does or does not hold 
in any industry is likely to be extremely difficult to determine. 
Ik  
In this case marginal social costs and marginal social revenue cannot 
be found and. perhapsj;annot even be realistically defined. But this 
difficulty can be avoided, if one does not insist on obtaining social 
costs and revenue, because the largest change which is ever likely to 
be experienced involves the introduction of a new industry. When firm 
B enters into production in the economy there is caused or made possible 
in A changes in cost and revenue such that marginal revenue in A may be 
said to have changed from its original position by à vertical amount 
MREAyQ and marginal cost by a vertical amount MCE^ y^ . MRE and MCE vary 
with the level of output in A; they are schedules. Therefore, the new 
(post-B-entry) marginal revenue curve in A is the old marginal revenue 
curve plus MRE^ yg. The new profit maximizing output in A is given by the 
intersection of these two new curves. The situation is illustrated in 
Figure 9, p. 71. 
Profit maximizing output is originally 0 and finally F. In this 
case F represents a larger output than 0, but this clearly need not be 
the case because both marginal revenue and marginal cost may be either 
higher or lower than formerly. This is one way of relating externalities 
to output. 
It must not be concluded, however, that the intersection at F 
represents the general equilibrium ideal where MSC = MSR. Figure 9 
represents only the new equilibrium output of firm A. 
There is an alternative approach. The effect of £b on TCE^ yg and 
TRE^ yB could be measured if only all other firms would hold their output 
constant (so that they are not generating new externalities) until the 
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measurement is completed. But real situations must correspond, to this 
very roughly at best. Or, a system of equations might be set up and 
solved simultaneously for the TCE's and TRE's or for profit externalities. 
àb gives rise to &tl6Hc/B' "•* AÎI^/b' 
where, 
2. âni/B - TR£I/B - TCEI/B. ; 
Moreover, it is possible to think of a small change in output of each 
industry, A, B, .... N, giving rise to changes in profits in each other 
industry. Thus: 
A B C .... N 
A a — b/a ah c/a * ••• *nn/a 
6 b  
a/b - *nc/b • * n/b 
à  c 
-
a/c b/c - • Ahm/C 
An Afl A/w Aii b/n aîic/n ." • e — 
The elements of this matrix, the flj/j's are externalities. This 
completes the definition of externalities. Problems of measurement are 
treated in chapter six. 
C. A Model of Economic Development 
For the present it is desirable to formulate an extremely simple 
model of economic development. Choosing a useful and simple model is not 
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as difficult as it might seem because most models of economic development 
involve different functional forms of a fairly small number of variables 
which they have in common. One of these variables (investment) is usually 
required to carry a substantial share of the load. 
The Keynesian investment equations are interesting, but one of the 
reasons wfjy the Keynesian models are not as useful in studies of devel­
opment as elsewhere involves his treatment of investment (113). Keynes 
lets the amount of investment and the interest rate be determined by 
schedules of demand for and supply of investment funds. These schedules 
are presumed to be independent, one reflecting time preference of con­
sumers, the other anticipated yield on tangible capital. But when allow­
ance is made for saving by firms and for investment in knowledge (intang­
ible capital) the schedules lose their independence.* 
Actually, investment funds do not come entirely from the consumer 
sector. Businesses also save. To the extent that they do, investment 
and saving are not independent. Business savings increase when invest­
ment opportunities are good and decrease when investment opportunities 
are bad in a manner that has very little to do with the interest rate.** 
^Further, the marginal efficiency of capital depends on investment 
in two ways. First, investment opportunities once exploited may dis­
appear as Keynes noted, but second, investment funds may be devoted to 
research and invention. Thus, the marginal efficiency of capital may 
move up or down with additional investment. The manner of employment 
of the investment funds determines which will occur. 
**According to Meyer and Kuh (139, p. 189): "As with most previous 
regression analyses of investment behavior it was found that interest 
rates do not exert an important influence on the rate of investment." 
The regression coefficient between corporate income and corporate income 
retention in the U.S.A., 1915-1953» is reported by Dobrovolsky (ltf) to be 
as high as 0.97. But there was a good deal of variation among firms of 
various sizes, the smaller firms exhibiting more volatile changes in 
percent retention. 
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Businesses save out of profits, and business saving is substantial. 
It was natural perhaps that Keynes, a student of the stock market, 
would develop a theory so closely related to the proper functioning of 
that market. Actually, the stock market as a means for distribution of 
savings to positions of maximum yield is à most imperfect instrument. 
All small firms, and some whole industries (such as agriculture) which 
JOl. 
are made up of small firms, have virtually no direct access to it. 
1, Internal financing 
Table 8 provides information respecting saving in the American 
economy. It is evident from Table 8 that business saving provides a 
relatively large, though variable, fraction of gross saving. Internal 
funds are more important in some industries than others, as is indicated 
in Table 9« Data on the relative importance of internal financing during 
various phases of the business cycle is provided in Table 10. 
Denis on (ij6) reports that about 78 percent of gross investment is 
financed out of corporate income. Forty-three percent of gross invest­
ment is financed by capital consumption allowances and 35 percent 
by undistributed corporate earnings. 
** 
Indirect access through the banking system exists. But banks 
tend to be conservative lenders, suitable as a source of operating 
capital, but not very well suited to providing investment capital. 
In Ontario about SUOO millions are needed annually to make possible 
the normal succession of farm ownership. None of this comes from the 
stock market and no more than 25 percent is available from the banking 
system (152). 
Table 8. Sources of saving in the U.S.A., 1929-19573, 
Source 1929 1933 1939 19U6 1950 1955 1957 
(billions of current dollars) 
Personal saving 
(includes unincorporated businesses) 
U.2 -0.6 2.9 13.5 12.6 17.5 20.7 
Corporate saving 2.9 —U.6 0.5 2.1+ 8.6 10.1 , 7.9 
Net saving 7.1 -5.2 3.U 15.9 >21.2 27.6 28.6 
Govt, deficit -1.0 l.u 2.1 — U. l — 8.2 - 2.9 
- 7.7 
Statistical discrepancy 
-0.3 -1.0 -1.1 - 2.0 0.7 - 1.0 — 0.7 
Depreciation 8.6 7.2 7.8 10.7 19.1 32.0 37.7 
Gross saving 15.7 2.0 11.2 26.6 U0.3 59.6 66.3 
S^ource: Villard (227, p. 100). 
Table 9. Relation of internal sources of funds and new investment in physical assets by manu­
facturing industry U.S.A., 19U6-1953a 
Billion of 
dollars 
Ratio of internal 
funds to plant and 
equipment outlays 
Ratio of internal 
funds to plant and 
equipment outlays 
plus increase in value 
of inventories 
All manufacturing corporations 72.6 1.02 0.73 
Food 6.7 1.07 0.76 
Textiles U.3 1.17 0.88 
Paper 3.U 1.17 0.97 
Chemicals 7.2 0.87 0.71 
Petroleum 10.0 0.6U 0.58 
Rubber l.U 1.37 0.91 
Other nondurables u.u 1.57 0.8U 
Stone, clay, glass 2.U 1.10 0.90 
Basic and fabricated metals 12.5 1.05 0.80 
Machinery, excluding electrical 6.3 1.U3 0.78 
Electric machinery 3.2 1.2U 0.63 
Transportation equipment 6.5 1.07 0.63 
Other durables U.3 1.26 0.70 
Source: Duesenberry (U9, p. 10$). 
Table 10. Relative importance of internal financing in large manufacturing corporations U.S.A., 
1900-1954a 
Years 
Trough to 
trough 
Internal financing 
Undistributed 
profits Depreciation Total 
External financing 
Short Long 
term term Total 
(percent) (percent) 
1900-1910b 39.1 31.3 70.4 2.4 27.2 29.6 
1914-1919° 43.4 16.8 60.1 26.2 13.7 39.9 
1919-1921 57.2 41.7 98.9 -46.9 47.9 1.1 
1921-192ucjd 36.3 42.4 78.7 — 6.0 27.3 21.3 
192u-1927 47.2 44.1 91.3 
CO 0
 1 9.5 8.7 
1927-1932 33.6 79.7 113.3 -20.7 7.4 -13.3 
1932-1938 12.3 67.2 79.5 13.9 6.6 20.5 
1938-1946° 35.0 40.9 75.9 21.5 2.6 24.1 
1946-1949 42.0 26.3 68.3 15.0 16.7 31.7 
1949-1954° 35.2 30.5 65.7 23.3 11.0 34.3 
Source: Creamer et al. (40, Table 44). 
N^ot'necessarily the average over one cycle. 
U^nderlying data cover a somewhat different period. 
D^ata for the period 1920-1923 show total internal financing to equal 138.3 percent. 
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Finally, Table 11 provides evidence of correlation between invest­
ment and sources of internal funds. 
Table 11. Annual averages of partial correlations between investment 
and other variables3. 
Year Profits 
Depreciation 
expense 
1946 0.007 0.083 
1947 0.073 0.066 
1948 0.217 0.093 
1949 0.266 0.259 
1950 0.210 0.280 
S^ource: Meyer and Kuh (139, p. 118). 
Evidently there was, over the 1946-1950 period, a growing tendency 
toward internal financing as the correlation coefficients between invest­
ment and profits and investment and depreciation expense exhibit an appar­
ently steady increase. This trend is consistent with findings of Creamer 
et al. (40) that the amount of internal financing tends to move in the 
opposite direction to the business cycle. 
Profits then are associated with investment. In practice, this is 
not only because profits may be used to finance investment, but because 
profits enhance expectations and so encourage investment. It may also 
be because investment leads to profit. Thus, it seems reasonable to 
hypothesize that the relation between profits (/%) and investment (I) 
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may be put as: 
3. IA = f{/7AJ X^ , X2k .... X^ ), where X1 ... Xn are 
other unknown influences.* Conceptually, it is possible to find changes 
in A1 s output that are induced by those pecuniary externalities arising 
out of B's change in output. Thus: 
Lu a » g(la, E), 
where E includes the effect of capital intensity, degree of monopoly, 
relative flow of investment funds to output increasing as opposed to 
cost reducing investment, price elasticity of demand, et cetera. So 
that: 
5. a <m dla from equation k and, 
6. dl^  = from equation 3. 
Then the change in A's output that is a consequence of B's act is: 
7
-
This model is useful since it stresses the effect of externalities on 
investment. The matter is given empirical attention in chapter six.. 
2. Innovation 
Respecting investment and innovation,** there have been two major 
types of approachs so that the literature is discernibly bimodel. On 
*For a review of empirical evidence respecting the influence of 
profits on investment see Meyer and Kuh (139, appendix to chapter 2 and 
chapters 8 and 12), 
I^nnovation is the inauguration of a new process or product to­
gether with the invention of that process or product. 
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the one hand there is Adam Smith (196), Schompeter (166), and Carter 
and Williams (26). On the other hand, there is Ricardo and Halthus 
(Roll, 171), Keynes (113), and Jewkes et al. (105).* 
The former group treat innovation as important and endogenous. To 
Adam Smith the division of labor resulted in growth of both invention 
and science. Specialized philosophers who knew no single task well, but 
who stimulated the cross fertilization of ideas were present or antici­
pated. Their inventions encouraged expansion of output and instigated 
additional division of labor. 
To Schumpeter innovation was the cornerstone. Investment expendi­
ture might be important but it was not basic. Perhaps it is not too 
great an exaggeration to say that innovation was the cause of develop­
ment (189), its periodic difficulty resulted in business cycles (186), 
and its institutionalization doomed the capitalist system (187). 
Carter and Williams (26) empirically demonstrate how innovation is 
becoming institutionalized. The same institutional tendencies are noted 
by Jewkes et al. (105, p. 156 and 239) • Innovations to Carter and 
Williams are no longer the result of flashes of intuition. Firms invest 
in innovation. They have research departments, so that invention is both 
the product of investment and the stimulant to investment. This is not 
to say that all inventions are attributable to research departments of 
firms. Such is, in fact, far from the case according to Jewkes et al. 
(105). Meyer and Kuh (139), in turn, find that research departments and 
T^hese lists are certainly not exhaustive, J. M. Clark (37), for 
example, might well be included in the former group. 
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innovating firms may be starved for investment funds with which to carry 
•ft 
on their innovation creating processes. Typically firms and industries 
which are technologically the most progressive spend substantial sums 
on research and discovery. 
Some idea of trends in research expenditure within various indus­
tries is obtained from Table 12. 
It is, in practice, very difficult to separate research (towards 
invention) from development (towards sales) expenditure and most quoted 
figures, including those in Table 12, combine the two. 
Substantial sums are spent on "research" in the United States. 
Table 13 provides some idea of the magnitudes and trends involved. 
*Meyer and Kuh (139) found during the period of their study (1954-
1956) that about 14 percent of firms were handicapped in their full use 
of science and technology by lack of funds. These firms were typically 
growing so fast that they could not retain enough profits to finance 
their own expansion. Others have considered the profits of firms and 
the availability of funds closely related. Compare : "....it does not 
matter whether we speak of 'growth1 or 'profits' as the goal of a firm's 
investment activities." Penrose (157, p. 30). 
"Payout, under an ideal dividend policy in a growth situation, 
should not exceed the minimum amount necessary to maintain the market 
position and integrity of existing debt and equity issues and of issues 
contemplated in the near future." Quint on, quoted by Penrose (157, 
p. 30). 
"The earning of profits becomes the cause of increased costs, not 
only the fixed costs of expansion, but also of operating costs." 
Keirstead (110, p. 59). 
"This sum (funds to establish a research department within a firm) 
would have to come from trading profits, and be spent in the hope, a 
return would accrue from it at a later date." Carter and Williams 
(25, p. 48). 
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Table 12. Trends in industry research expenditure, U.S.A.a 
Research expenditure Rank by proportion 
Increase 1956-1960 of revenue spent 
Industry (percent) on research (1956) 
Aircraft and parts 103 1 
Professional and scientific 
instruments 79 5 
Primary metals 1+9 8 
Electrical equipment 62 2 
Machinery 39 3 
Stone, clay and glass 38 11 
Petroleum products 35 6 
Paper and allied products 3U 12 
Rubber products 30 10 
Fabricated metal products 27 7 
Food and kindred products 27 9 
Textiles and apparel 25 13 
Chemical and allied products 2k ii 
Other manufacturing 19 
Non-manufacturing 35 
aSource: Holland (97, p. 60). 
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Table 13. Research in the U.S.A., 194l-1956a 
1941 1946 1951 1956 
Total research expenditure 
(millions current dollars) 900 1,780 3,360 9,000 
Percent financed by: 
Government 4i 51 59 59 
Industry 57 47 39 38 
Colleges and universities 2 2 2 3 
Percent performed by: 
Government 22 26 21 16 
Industry*3 73 67 68 72 
Colleges and universities 5 7 11 12 
S^ource: Villard (227, p. 54). 
Only about 4 percent of research performed by industry was basic 
research (that is, unassociated with a specific product or process 
application). 
When innovation is endogenous, it is possible to examine the influ­
ence of various human elements that might otherwise be ignored. There 
can be a shortage of key personnel such as engineers, scientists or 
Schumpeterian entrepreneurs. Further, capital is not just in tangible 
things, but may include knowledge and invention—the product of invest­
ment in research and personnel. 
At the other pole (Ricardo, Maithus, Keynes, Jewkes), invention is 
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exogenous. It is something that occurs through insomnia to genius/* 
When invention is outside the system it becomes reasonable to ask what 
happens .when the rate of investment (invention use) exceeds the rate of 
invention. The answer is simple. There .will result a fall in the mar­
ginal efficiency of capital. And when the marginal efficiency of capital 
falls low enough (that is, to the interest rate), the inducement to 
invest will equal zero. The result is stagnation."** 
This is not only a logical possibility but an eventuality of some 
significance so long as invention and innovation are the products of 
accident or inspiration rather than calculation and investment. The 
Canadian economy since 1952 is an interesting modern-day example of 
tendencies toward stagnation. The Canadian government is committed to 
"This is not absurd. Probably considerable evidence could be found 
to support the hypothesis that ideas arise from environment and not from 
an effort to produce them. Alfred Russel Wallace who, independent of 
Charles Darwin, advanced a theory of natural selection (1859) is said 
to have had the basic ideas one evening as he lay on a cot reading 
Mai thus1 Essay on population. Archimedes is alleged to have discovered 
buoyancy in his bath and to have been so thrilled that he hastened home 
unclothed through the streets of Syracuse shouting "EurekaI I have found 
it." See (56, p. 168). Again the inventions that sparked the industrial 
revolution were made largely by artisans, although Watt's steam engine 
was the product of research and study (206). The anecdote connecting 
Newton and the apple is presumably apocryphal. 
This line of reasoning can lead to the conclusion that the stand­
ard of life may, over some range, be inversely proportional to the stock 
of capital. 
"The post-war experiences of Great Britain and the United States are, 
indeed, actual examples of how an accumulation of wealth, so large that 
its marginal efficiency has fallen more rapidly than the rate of interest 
can fall in the face of prevailing institutional and psychological fac­
tors, can interfere, in conditions mainly of laissez-faire, with a 
reasonable level of employment and with the standard of life which the 
technical conditions of production are capable of furnishing." Keynes 
(113, P 219). 
88 
a policy of full employment. But the rate of unemployment except for 
seasonal fluctuations has risen steadily for nine years to a level (in 
March 1961) of 13.1 percent. Thus, it is not surprising that the term 
"stagnation" is applied by Armstrong (2). 
Whether this tendency is attributable to the relatively low level 
of research is unknown. But it is significant that research expenditures 
in Canada are relatively smaller than in the U.S.A. or the U.K. (2i+). 
In terms of the percent of GWP, research expenditure in Canada is only 
about one-third that of the U.S.A., and between one-half and one-third 
that of the U.K. 
One would expect, too, that small firms would less frequently under­
take research than large firms. It is only when firms can anticipate a 
substantial share of the market that it pays to speculate in research.* 
Indeed there is very good evidence to indicate that relatively more 
research is done in large than in small firms. Table llj. provides evidence 
to this effect. 
Studies of returns from research are not easily or frequently made. 
Griliches (77) has estimated the social return from the development of 
hybrid corn at seven hundred percent or more. But if full benefits were 
appropriable by sellers of hybrid seed, firms with a relatively small 
share of the seed market (that is, competitive firms) would not be 
interested even in such a profitable venture, because all other sellers 
would share in the benefits but not in the costs. 
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Table 14. Concentration of research in large firms, U.S.A. 
Number Percentage of firms 
of employees undertaking research 
Up to 100 8 
100-499 22 
500-999 42 
1000-4999 60 
5000 or more 94 
S^ource: Villard (227). 
D. Summary 
In this chapter the definition of externalities has been examined. 
Because pecuniary externalities result in some redistribution of income 
among firms, a model of economic development stressing this aspect of 
economic development has been put forward. 
Internal funds, as has often been noted, are relatively important 
primarily because they are cheaper and do not involve risk of loss of 
control. No doubt, for some purposes, the distribution of income among 
individuals and among firms is of little importance. But the income of 
firms provides, among other things, a source of investment funds. Thus, 
rents and pecuniary externalities appear to be of some considerable 
importance in economic development. The general tendency to ignore 
income distribution among firms is apparently but one aspect of the tend­
ency to establish norms that relate only to the best of all possible 
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situations. When imperfections (for example, in the capital market) 
exist, a whole new range of norms becomes relevant, and a whole new 
range of questions must be asked. 
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V. EXTERNALITIES IN COMPARATIVE STATICS 
A. Types of Market Failure in Comparative Statics 
In the last chapter it was convenient to concentrate on pecuniary 
externalities because these are the easiest to quantify. But at least 
six other types of market failure are treated explicitly or implicitly 
in the development literature under the heading external economies and 
diseconomies (10, 13). Welfare implications of these types of market 
failure have already been considered in chapter four, but it remains to 
examine the manner in which such externalities influence parameters of 
development. Types of externalities most frequently mentioned are: 
1. factor indivisibilities, 2. non-appropriabilities, 3» irreversibilities 
and technological advances, U. non-convexity, 5» equilibrium difficulties, 
and 6. social goods. Brief definitions are in order before each of 
these is examined. 
Factor indivisibility, or lumpiness, is involved whenever factor 
increments are discontinuous in a manner that prevents equating the factor 
price to the MVP in competitive situations or to the MRP in imperfectly 
competitive situations. 
Non-approprlabilities are involved whenever costs of excluding the 
indirect beneficiaries of some action are greater than the revenue which 
could be derived from imposing a charge for the good or service indirectly 
provided. 
Irreversibilities and technological advances are involved whenever 
it is impossible or inexpedient to return to a production function or 
consumption pattern that existed during some previous time period. 
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The set S is a non-convex set if between any two points in S there 
exists some point which does not belong to S. 
Equilibrium difficulties are involved whenever some parameter of the 
system oscillates continuously or explosively about a fixed point or a 
trend. 
Social goods are products or services (such as clean roadsides) 
which can only be produced by the combined effort of a large part of the 
population, or goods (such as park space) which are consumed in common 
by all members of the area.* 
1. Factor indivisibilities 
Factor indivisibilities may be significant for either firm or indus­
try, or both, and may result in increasing or decreasing costs in either 
firm or industry, or both. When average revenue is falling and indi­
visibilities within the firm are significant in such a manner that average 
cost at the firm's level of output is falling even faster, then any out­
side influence which expands the market for the firm's goods will increase 
unit profits. In this case, an externality of at least short term dura­
tion exists. But if other firms are attracted by a high rate of profit 
and enter the industry, profits will be forced down (to the equilibrium 
level?) again. However, in the final situation as in the initial situ­
ation anything which enlarges the market causes unit profits to rise at 
least temporarily. Market failure is involved because activities which 
*This loose sort of definition is open to objections as has been 
noted by Cole (3$); a more precise definition is provided in what follows. 
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expand the market for the subject commodity are not sufficiently 
encouraged.* 
If indivisibilities are relevant to the industry but not to the 
firm (for example, where overhead costs of an indivisible factor are 
equally shared by all firms as in the water rate from an irrigation dam) 
each firm may be producing in a region of increasing costs while total 
output in the industry may be subject to decreasing costs. For example, 
according to Hoselitz (101) the breadth of skills available in a city 
tends to eliminate bottlenecks caused by shortage of a particular type 
of labor.** In this situation any outside influence which increases the 
rate of profit and so encourages the entrance of firms will result in 
the lowering of average costs in the industry. The extra-normal 
profits*** may eventually be eliminated because the product price is 
depressed by additional output. But falling industry costs may remain. 
If so, market failure still exists as there is too little incentive for 
additional output in the industry. Negative rents are not paid! But 
this situation cannot arise under strictly perfect competition because 
it implies the existence of factors not privately owned; or of a factor-
*Increasing returns implies the marginal value product of the fixed 
factor is negative; consequently it is impossible to equate the factor 
price (which is positive) with its MVP. But the criterion MVP = P 
derives from general equilibrium theory and is not necessarily relevant 
to imperfectly competitive situations. Lerner (122) is incorrect in 
treating the general equilibrium norms as absolute norms which are 
applicable in any situation. 
**Also see Marshall (13U, p. 265). 
***There is nothing particularly desirable about normal profits. 
The term is used merely as a basis for comparison. 
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selling firm which is subject to decreasing cost. This would lead to 
integration and the elimination of the decreasing costs or to monopoly. 
Indivisibilities have received most careful consideration in an 
extensive literature dating from a paper by Hotelling (102). But the 
essential problems remain. Whenever it is necessary to make recommen­
dations regarding whether a good should or should not be introduced or 
whether a given price should be lower or higher, or whether price dis­
crimination should or should not be allowed, the general equilibrium 
analysis does not provide a very satisfactory method of solution. It 
is therefore necessary to use either consumers' and producers' surplus 
or the consumers' ordinal preference field.*"* One is about as difficult 
to obtain as the other. 
There is, however, still considerable sympathy for the criterion 
which derives from Hotelling (102)» An investment should be made if a 
perfectly discriminating monopolist could cover full costs. 
Here it does not seem wise to give further consideration to such a 
well studied subject. But one thing is of importance. Indivisibility, if 
significant, appears to lead either to monopoly elements or to a partly 
*Lumpiness, of factors, products or processes (though not the time-
lump ines s of durability) is a familiar difficulty of welfare economics. 
It may involve failure to sustain a Pare to optimum because i 1. monopoly 
develops, or 2. profit-maximizing competitors produce an inappropriate 
quantity of goods, or 3. if the appropriate quantity of goods is pro­
duced, some producers sustain continued losses. 
**The theory of producers' and consumers' surplus was developed to 
deal with the problems of finite changes (that is, just this problem), 
but it has had a most checkered history. Hicks has worked out the impli­
cations but Samuelson has virtually denied its usefulness. Samuelson 
prefers the consumers' ordinal preference field. A bibliography is 
provided in Little (128). 
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social good. One has but to examine the examples of indivisibilities 
generally given—ocean liners, automobile assembly yards, invention—to 
obtain evidence of the social nature of many indivisible goods or indi­
visible processes. The tendency toward monopoly is too familiar to 
require reiteration, and since consequences of monopoly are avoided in 
this thesis, it is convenient to eliminate the direct consideration of 
indivisibilities. The subject has been extensively studied; its important 
aspects in what follows may be considered under the heading social goods. 
2. Non-appropriabilities 
Assume now that all relevant final and intermediate goods may be 
produced at constant returns to scale by applying fixed technological 
methods to scarce raw materials. Consumers' tastes are independent. 
Non-zero prices must exist by the duality theorem, for every factor or 
product of significance. It is immediately observable that though tastes 
are independent, consumer welfare is not independent. Smith's lawn is a 
free good of value to his neighbors. His hammering on Sunday mornings 
is a free good of negative value. 
There is also consumer-producer interdependence. Factory soot may 
dirty Smith's shirts or fumes may ruin his lawn* and architect's fees do 
not wholly reflect the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of those who 
observe the resultant buildings. One person's consumption of a mixture 
of driving and drinking increases everyone else's insurance rates. 
S^udbury, a nickel-mining city of 70,000 in Northern Ontario, has 
virtually no shrubbery and the surrounding countryside is denuded of 
former flora because of sulphur fumes from the International Nickel 
smelters. 
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Producer-producer interdependence may also exist. Bees collect free 
pollen and freely fertilize fruit crops. Crop spray does sometimes drift 
to, and damage neighborhood gardens. Poor cultural practices on farms 
and in suburbs encourage weeds (the seeds and pollen of which freely blow 
elsewhere). Road building sometimes causes harmful or helpful drainage 
or flooding. 
All such difficulties characterize competitive as well as imperfectly 
competitive situations. And such situations may exist in statics or 
dynamics. Fundamentally, the difficulty involves costs of engendering 
approprlability or culpability* which are greater than the worth of the 
presently free good. Smith, for example, could build a wall and charge 
people for a peek at his lawn, but such a procedure would not likely 
involve a significant increase in his income." 
When non-appropriable or non-culpable products result in a disturb­
ance of profit rates, do firms transfer their activities in such a manner 
that a normal rate of profit is returned? In general the non-appropriable 
product will be associated with some scarce factor (such as space) so 
that in a static sense changes in rents cause a return to normal profits. 
But this tends to conceal an important difficulty. Firms which generate 
such non-appropriable or non-culpable externalities will be too little or 
wIt is convenient to have a word for use in places when approprla­
bility is not satisfactory because the good is of negative value. When 
blameworthiness or censure can be established the product will be called 
culpable. For example, the law in some places provides that owners of 
cars with noisy mufflers may be ticketed. Thus, there is provision for 
at least partial culpability. 
**Ellis and Fellner (55) have gone so far as to attribute virtually 
all externalities that exist in competition to non-appropriabi1ity. 
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too much encouraged. When non-appropriable externalities exist, invest­
ment appears to remain too low. When non-culpability exists, investment 
in the externality-generating firm appears to be too high because the 
firm is generating a product of negative value to others. 
In order to fit this situation into an equal profit analysis, it is 
necessary to consider these externalities as external costs or revenues 
to the firm generating them. Then if internal profit rates are equal 
everywhere, total profit rates (internal plus external profits) will, 
except by chance, be unequal for any two firms if one or both generates 
externalities. Ad valorem taxes or subsidies are therefore required in 
order to achieve the ideal output. 
3. Approprlability, culpability and conditions of entry 
In the following, it will be assumed that firm B initiates production 
in an economy composed of an agricultural segment (characterized by dis­
guised unemployment and the absence of exchange) and a single monopolistic 
industry, C, producing only one product, c is exchanged for money, as is 
labor, the only factor of production. Firm B's choice-of-product decision 
will be considered. 
Beneficial effects available to B due to C's presence are attribut­
able to one or more of the following: 
1. Products c and b are related in consumption. 
2. The income elasticity of demand for b is other than zero. 
3. b, including appropriable by-products of b production, is 
a factor or substitute for a factor in c production. 
Is b likely to be chosen so that c and b are related in consumption, 
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and if so, would B prefer (C has no choice in the matter) the two products 
to be complements or substitutes? At first it seems that b will be chosen 
from among the c complements in consumption because such a choice involves 
an already large market.* That is, B's entrance would be easier (if b 
were chosen from among the c complements) because for any quantity of b, 
marketing expenditure would, ceteris paribus, be lower, or selling price 
higher or both. 
Thus, if C were large and well established and B were small and with­
out great liquid reserves, probably B would be content, at least ini­
tially, to choose a produce that complemented c. But if B were a power­
ful and growth-oriented firm, it might choose a product so as to maximize 
anticipated growth of sales, or maximize sales at some future date. This 
decision may not be compatible with choice of a product from among the c 
complements. 
Other things being equal, B presumably wishes to choose a product 
for which demand will expand. If an increase in national income is antic-
pated, this amounts to a desire1 for maximum income elasticity. But if 
one dollar of extra income is spent on b, it cannot be spent elsewhere. 
B then has incentive to choose a product which reduces the income elas­
ticity of demand of all other products.** Suppose national income is 
E^vidently there will be a market for many goods in the area if c 
production generates income, because people have diverse tastes. Not all 
these goods will be c complements. But the market for c complements will, 
ceteris paribus, be larger than the market for goods which are c sub­
stitutes or are independent of c in consumption. 
**Assume ^  is not, in the knowledge of B, dependent on the choice 
between complementarity and substitutability. 
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expected to change by AY under constant prices. The change in expendi­
ture on b may be larger than AY — ether goods are inferior; equal to 
à Y — the income elasticity of demand for other goods is zero; less than 
AY — the income elasticity of demand for other goods is positive; 
negative — b is an inferior good. Evidently this list is in order of 
b's preference. However, if production of b increases, causing a positive 
change in national income, and if c is an inferior good, c and b cannot 
be complements. Were they complements, increased consumption of b would 
increase the marginal rate of substitution of c for money and this would 
be associated with increased purchases of c. 
It is convenient to define three terms; completing entry, neutral 
entry, and aggressive entry. Completing entry involves choice of a prod­
uct complementary in consumption with the bundle of products already 
being produced in the area; aggressive entry involves choice of products 
intended to displace presently consumed products from the market; and 
neutral entry involves choice of products which are intended neither to 
be complementary with, nor to substitute for, but to add to, presently 
consumed products. 
a. Completing entry In the closed economy considered here, 
there are only two products exchanged, c and b. If b is chosen to com­
plement c, then c also complements b by definition. However, it is known 
that when there are only two goods they must be substitutes.1'-* Thus, b 
*After this was written a somewhat similar set of definitions was 
discovered in Carter and Williams (25). 
""See Hicks (92, p. 1*6). 
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can only enter in a completing manner when there exists some third good 
the ownership of which may be reduced. This third good can only be money 
since c and b include everything else. Completing entry therefore 
involves an upward shift to a steeper consumption function." The new 
consumption function is higher because an addition to national income 
takes place. It is steeper because complementarity of goods increases 
the marginal propensity to consume. 
b. Aggressive entry It may seem that C's activity would not 
have a beneficial influence on an aggressive entrant, since a substitution 
of c for money reduces the marginal rate of substitution of b for money. 
But this is true only in the short run. C's activity extended over some 
period has presumably resulted in an expanded market for product c. If 
b were a substitute (even a perfect substitute), it is possible that C's 
activity in developing the market would be more beneficial than its 
current competitive output would be harmful. But as mentioned in 
chapter four it is impossible to quantify the importance of any firm's 
existence, so that use of terms such as TRE^ Q would not be meaningful. 
While C's activity may have generated a market which is of benefit to 
"
/fThis is a somewhat succinct description because saving and invest­
ment have not been introduced. Alternatively, regard the complementarity 
of c and b as resulting in decreased demand for leisure or increased 
off-farm migration. 
•îBfr 
Suppose C's activity has increased c demand at a given price from 
10 to 100 units. If B produces a perfect substitute it would possibly 
get no more than one-half the clientele. But even at that, b sales will 
be 50 units while without C's activity they would only have been 10 units. 
There is reason (given some advances in technology) to suppose that B may 
do better than this, however. B may produce something the quality of 
which is superior to c or the price lower, and so displace c from the 
market altogether. 
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an aggressive entrant B, it is only by coincidence if B, on entering, 
produces a net positive revenue externality for C." Thus, entering 
firms with their product flexibility have advantages over existent firms 
which are committed to given production functions and types of product. 
In general it seems that aggressive entry is associated with a 
beneficial effect on entering firms and a negative revenue externality 
to existing firms.*** There is an interesting parallel with motives 
given by firms for or against undertaking research. These include, 
according to Jewkes et al. (lû£, p. 175): 
1. Fear of being supplanted—if they do not engage in research. 
2. Fear of loss of their own developed ideas to others may 
lead to failure to do research. 
3. Hope of expansion of the market through the generation 
of ideas. 
"B's investment will result in an increase in real income if less 
than full employment prevails, so that, if c is not an inferior good 
there is likely to be some tendency for benefit. C's revenue externality 
will depend on the income elasticity of demand for c and on the elasticity 
of substitution of b for c. However, by definition of aggressive entry, 
b is intended to displace c; consequently net revenue externality in C 
is likely to be negative. 
"**It has been suggested that aggressive entry may result in develop­
ment without growth. Each entrant may offer a preferred commodity selling 
at the same price as some product presently consumed. Existing firms and 
their products will continually be displaced by new firms with new prod­
ucts. This is development because consumers obtain increasing satis­
faction from their purchases. It is not growth because GNP does not 
change. (J. J. Hollenhorst, Instructor, Iowa State University. Ames, 
Iowa. Private communication. 1959.) 
***According to Clark (37, p. 86): "The most basic security it 
(business) needs is protection against predatory tactics." 
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Competitive firms will be strongly motivated by 1., weakly motivated by 
2., and strongly motivated by 3« 
c. Neutral entry Neutral entry involves production of a new 
product for which tendencies toward substitutability and toward comple­
mentarity with the presently consumed bundle just balance. Output of the 
new commodity involves income generating effects. And some of this extra 
income will be spent for the new commodity, some for the old commodities. 
On the other hand, some expenditure which formerly was channeled to old 
commodities now finds its way to the new commodity. But were the latter 
tendency to dominate, aggressive entry would result, and if the marginal 
propensity to consume increased, completing entry would result. Conse­
quently, neutral entry involves moving to the right along the old con­
sumption function. This, in the model economy described here, involves 
a shift of resources out of the non-commercial agricultural segment. 
To summarize: aggressive entry involves development as new products 
replace old ones. It may not result in growth of total value of output. 
Completing entry involves a shift to a new steeper consumption function. 
Neutral entry involves an upward shift along the old consumption function. 
Consequently, neutral entry need not involve positive net revenue exter­
*The following examples are illustrative: 1. After introduction 
of the rotary kiln used in making Portland cement, the output of Portland 
cement increased (1880-1881*. to 1910—191U) at an annual rate of 26.3 per­
cent. Output of non-Portland cement increased from 1880-188U to 1898-1902 
at an annual rate of 5*9 percent, but from 1898-1902 to 1910-191U de­
creased at an annual rate of 16,7 percent. 2. In 1893 the Bethlehem Iron 
Co. designed and built a 125 ton steam hammer that was rendered obsolete 
within three years by the hydraulic forging press. 3. By 1895 the 
Northrop loom, after ten year's use, had displaced practically all other 
looms, lu The Curtiss screw.making machine (1871) was rendered obsolete 
within five years by the automatic turret lathe. All examples are 
attributable to Strassmann (206). 
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nalities» Completing entry implies that total revenue externalities to 
the existent firm and total beneficial effects to the entering firm are 
positive, and aggressive entry implies that TRE^ O^, but that the exist­
ence of C is beneficial to B, It seems clear that when entry is rela­
tively easy there is a danger that entry will tend to be too aggressive. 
d. Cost externalities and the choice of product Cost exter­
nalities, as well as those revenue externalities which operate through 
factor markets, are attributable to one or more of the following: 
1. b (including appropriable by-products of b production) is 
a factor, or substitute for a factor, or complement in pro­
duction with a factor, used in c production. 
2. Income effects influence factor prices. 
Some entering firms introduce new production functions rather than 
new products, while others use factors in the same proportion as existing 
processes to produce different products. Naturally entering firms use 
the least cost proportion of factors which the existent state of tech­
nology allows. Consequently, any changes in technology operate in favor 
of entering firms and to the relative disadvantage of existent firms. 
The introduction of a new production function is likely to cause a shift 
in factor prices and this tends to make all existent processes archaic. 
Existent firms can only counterattack by modernizing their facilities-
updating their plants. This involves a cost to which there corresponds 
no increase in returns.* 
R^eturns are increased only in the sense that updating the plant 
results in higher net revenues than if the plant is not modernized. 
loi*. 
Entry in a technologically advancing society is likely, therefore, 
to be associated with positive cost externalities among existent firms. 
These externalities are likely to be larger when entry is aggressive, 
than when entry is completing or neutral because aggressive entry involves 
similarity of products and this in turn is likely to be associated with 
similarity of factors. 
In the two product economy under consideration, none of the three 
categories of entry above, could involve b (product of the entering firm) 
as a factor in c. But this is obviously a possibility and would involve 
a negative cost externality in C, for otherwise firm C would not pur­
chase b. It is possible, too, that c will be a factor in b, and this 
might provide C with a positive revenue externality. 
e. Entry and non-appropriabilities It would be possible to 
proceed with this type of analysis by introducing additional firms and 
specifying production functions. But that is not intended. The general 
type of interdependence of profits has been shown to result in a possible 
asymmetric transfer of costs or benefits when changes such as entry take 
place in imperfect competition. But it has been established in chapter 
three that an asymmetric flow of externalities results in failure of the 
marginal private cost-benefit analysis to correspond to marginal social 
cost and benefit. Consequently the pecuniary type of non-appropriabilities 
or non-culpabilities which are here discussed appear to lead to external 
economies and diseconomies in the traditional sense. That is (except 
when the revenue and cost influences of C on B are balanced by an equal 
and opposite flow from B to C) they lead to failure in achieving necessary 
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conditions for a Pareto optimum. 
The argument can be put in more practical terms. Extremely free 
entry may result in too much aggressive entry and a consequent tendency 
toward an extremely high rate of product change and an unnecessarily 
wasteful rate of obsolescence of capital equipment. The more difficult 
is entry, (the more power existent firms have to resist aggressive entry) 
the more likely is entry to be neutral or completing. This may result 
in a technically stagnant society—in growth without technical develop­
ment. Apparently either extreme is undesirable. 
U. Irreversible externalities and technological advances 
Ellis and Feliner (55) believed externalities to be typically of an 
irreversible nature, that is, they believed external economies to be 
primarily dynamic phenomena.^  Irreversible externalities will be con­
sidered by using an example. The envelope of the average cost curve of 
either firm or industry, given enough time for a long-run adjustment, 
might look like the curve in Figure 10. Figure 10 is based on data pro­
vided in Table 15. This data was chosen because it exhibits an unusually 
large fall in real costs. No doubt the fall in real costs is partly 
attributable to technological improvements so that it is quite clear that 
the curve depicted in Figure 10 is not a supply curve. It is the envelope 
of a series of average cost curves each drawn at a different time for a 
different scale of output. 
"*It is possible that capital accumulation by individual firms is 
a nearly irreversible phenomenon. Large firms can compete with small 
firms but the reverse is not the case. See Hahn (81). Schumpeter, 
too, regards externalities as irreversible: "They depict historical 
processes in generalized form." (168, p. 995). 
Figure 10. Real cost 
Ordinate: 
Abscissa: 
of cotton, U.K., 1865-1915 
index of real costs (191U 
year 
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Table 15. Indexes of real cost and of output, cotton yarn in Manchester, 
l85U-l9lUa 
Index 
Index real cost, seven-year' 
Year no. active spindles moving average 
165U Ik.k 181 
1859 15.8 193 
1865 18.1 206 
1669 2U.8 170 
167b 36.5 1L8 
1879 U0.2 131 
18814. 1:8.6 120 
1889 55.1 119 
1699 73.7 101 
190k 79.6 102 
1909 88.7 101 
1911 100.0 100 
aSource: Clark (36, p. 352). 
The great fall in real costs in Figure 10, it might be argued, is 
attributable to economies of scale. But Kuznets (117), after presenting 
the similar data of Table 16, argues that the fall in real costs is 
attributable to improving technology over time and not to expansion in 
the scale of output. 
The fall in costs of yarn exhibited in Table 15 and Table 16 was 
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Table 16. Cost of yarn in Britain, 1779-l882a 
Yarn Uo hanks to the pound Yarn 100 hanks to the pound 
Year Shillings Pence Year Shillings Pence 
1779 1U 0 1786 3U' 0 
178U 8.76 11 1796 15 6 
1799 U.lt2 2 1806 U 2 
1812 1.00 0 1812 2 10 
1830 0.# 6.75 1830 2 2.75 
1860 0.52 6.25 1860 1 5 
1882 0.28 3.375 1882 1 0.375 
S^ource: Kuznets (117, p. 262). 
associated with an expansion in output, but it seems unlikely the fall 
in costs was brought about exclusively by expansion of scale. Rather, 
it seems likely that expansion in scale was a contributing factor in 
technological developments. These technological developments brought 
about the fall in real costs. The technological changes may have been 
encouraged by expanding scale of output. But it seems likely, that were 
the scale to be reduced, the technological developments would not have 
to be given up. Again referring to Figure 10, average costs initially 
are d, costs fall as more output is sold, given time for adjustment to 
the new situation. Costs may fall to e, whereupon any diminution in 
quantity produced causes costs to move leftward along the different 
(hypothetical) path e-f or e-g. 
It is not possible that the situation exists in statics, for if costs 
could be made to fall without the elapse of time, then line segment d-e 
would not be part of the envelope as every firm would have immediate 
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access to costs e-f or e-g. If technological advances are ignored, then 
this ratchet cost curve may be due to either an improvement in the quality 
of the labor force through training, or on-the-job education, or to the 
more exact adjustment of factor suppliers to the needs of the industry. 
Neither of these can be considered to be of modest dimensions. 
It is not clear, in this situation, what the supply curve looks 
like because of imperfect competition and because there is no way of 
knowing if the firms concerned understand the workings of their own cost 
curves. Indeed, it is not even clear that producers will be unwilling 
to sustain a temporary loss at outputs as large as e in order to have 
access to line segment e-f or e-g. But it is possible to outline cir­
cumstances in which the low cost region e-f or e-g is never reached, and 
such circumstances generally must discourage growth. 
It is also possible that the envelope of the cost curve increases 
to approach a high level e'-f', and fails to return to lower levels when 
output is decreased. This might happen for example when an industry 
becomes large enough to attract a union which wins certain irrevocable 
benefits such as coffee breaks, extra pay for overtime, and seniority 
promotion. Ordinarily such a cost-increasing situation would be regarded 
as basically different from the cost-reducing situation, because of the 
presence of rents on intramarginal units. But the present situation 
does not involve rents. Rents are reversible phenomena rising from 
scarcity. That is not the case here. 
Again, the number of firms each having fixed costs may increase 
irreversibly as demand for the industry's product expands. Any decrease 
Ill 
in demand will involve a movement leftward along a new, higher average 
cost curve. Costs of production in the large number of cafeterias located 
beside former army barracks provides an example. 
Perhaps the most important source of positive irreversible exter­
nalities involves technological developments. If Smith's dictum (that 
the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market) has any 
validity, costs in any one industry, given time for adjustment, may fall 
irreversibly. Improved machines, processes, and factor combinations are 
searched out because large scale output makes innovation worth while. 
And once found or invented new methods are not forgotten even when the 
industry shrinks to a fraction of its former size. Arndt (3) has hypoth­
esized that the rate of invention is not exogenous; it increases with 
increased output. And Schumpeter (188, p. 228) believed innovation made 
subsequent innovation easier. 
Evidence respecting the influence of changing technology on produc­
tion costs is really quite convincing. Solow (199), in a study using 
American data for the period 1909-19U9, concludes that gross output per 
man has doubled over the interval, with 87% percent of the increase 
attributable to technical change and the remaining 12% percent to increased 
use of capital. 
Fabricant ($8) has reported, for the period 1871-1951 that about 
90 percent of the per capita increase in output was attributable to 
technical progress or productivity change. Some of the results of 
various studies are summarized in Table 17. 
But, the rate of invention may not have kept up. Thus, while Solow's 
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Table If. Shifts in productivity that are attributable to technological 
change 
Source Years 
Change in productivity 
percent 
Solow3 1909-1919 1.5 per year 
Valavanis-Vail^ 3 1869-19U8 0.75 per year 
Fabricant0 1889-1953 1.6-2.0 (labor) per year 
0.7-1.2 (capital) per year 
Fabricant1^  1889-1953 90 
Schmookler6 I90I1-I913 to 
1929-1938 
36.5 
S^ource: Solow (199, p. 316), excludes agriculture. 
V^alavanis-Vail (22U, P. 217). 
F^abricant (58, p. 5) 
• 
F^abricant (60). 
S^chmookler (183, p. 226). 
index of technological change appears to increase in a manner that might 
best be approximated by a logarithmic function ( AA/A = 0.015 on the 
average) the same cannot be said for the number of patents. 
It is quite possible, however, that there has been an improvement 
in the quality of patented ideas. But Kuznets (117) believes that tech­
nology is subject to a decreasing rate of improvement, and this is con­
sistent with a relative decrease in the nui&er of patents. A decline, 
after 1919-1921, in the number of patents relative to the number of 
workers, is indicated in Table 18. 
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Table 18. Number of patents and designs issued per 10,000 workers, 
U.S.A.3, 
Years Number 
1899-1901 968.1* 
1919-1921 109k.0 
1929-1931 837.2 
19U9-1951 781.9 
A^dapted from Schmookler (I8I4, Table U, p. 327). 
Tables 15 through 18 and Figure 10 serve to prove what is common 
knowledge: technological innovation involves irreversible change. But 
this change does not take place at the same rate in all industries so 
that investors who concern themselves only with the short run, and only 
with their own small part of an industry, are not likely to be led to 
so invest that a maximum rate of technological expansion is realized. 
Only investors having monopoly in all alternatives, and having the same 
time horizon as the society will always be led to choose the course of 
action that maximizes technological progress. 
a. Non-convexity The reason why so much space has been devoted 
to technological change is that this very central aspect of development 
may lead to market failure. It is possible, in fact it is even likely, 
that the cost-reducing consequences of technological change will result 
in non-convexities in the time path of production functions. (See Solow's 
index of technology which increases in a non-convex manner (199).) This 
liU 
has a familiar and devastating effect on duality.* For present purposes 
it implies that even when the time path of costs in all industries is 
known in advance, profit maximizing firms may not be led to invest in 
appropriate enterprises. 
If resources are allocated according to incremental net returns by 
myopic competitors, and if one industry is subject to increasing and 
another to decreasing returns, the former will receive no resources unless 
its incremental P-HC is greater than P-HC for the decreasing cost indus­
try. But under increasing returns incremental P-HC can be negative. 
In this case only firms with a large lump of resources will consider 
investment in the industry of increasing returns. But this static case 
has been extensively studied. 
If there are non-convexities in the time path of costs in one indus­
try, but not in an alternative industry, the difficulty resolves itself 
into a problem of planning horizon. No individual has a planning horizon 
as distant as the normative planning horizon of the society. Thus, some 
activities should perhaps be carried on (even at a short-term loss) by 
government intervention because only in this way will technology in that 
industry be developed to the point where the industry can make its 
* Recent treatment of non-convexity by Rothenberg (175) appears, 
however, to indicate the difficulty has been exaggerated in application 
to competitive situations. When there are only a few firms, non-
convexity will remain troublesome. Non-convexity in time paths of costs 
will also provide difficulty, no matter how many firms there are. 
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contribution.""" The situation is analogous to the protection by tariffs 
of an infant industry. But in this case it is the infant technology 
that requires protection—and development. 
5» Equilibrium difficulties 
Scitovsky (192) has mentioned the possibility that firms inter­
related through the market mechanism will be a source of waste to them­
selves and uncertainty to other investors while they are in a process of 
adjusting to each others' level of output. It is also possible that the 
result will be completely unstable or continuously oscillating. The hog-
cycle (cobweb theorem) provides an example of the sort of difficulty that 
-V-V-
can arise. When unintegrated interdependence exists, risks are greater 
and plans less efficient than appears necessary. Presumably failure of 
growth can result. This matter may be examined using a difference 
equation model. 
Assume there are n industries. Of these, a fraction, a, are capital 
goods -industries that sell produce to other capital goods industries and 
to consumer goods industries. The latter sell only into final consump­
tion. There are a*n capital goods industries and (l-a)n consumer goods 
industries. 
A pecuniary externality exists in some capital goods industry A, when 
,rTiribergen (213, p. 32), for example, claims in connection with 
social goods: "...the activities to which transportation facilities and 
power are complementary cannot themselves be accurately foreseen: total 
production of the region may still be a highly uncertain entity. This 
sometimes is the very reason why private investment in transportation 
and power is not forthcoming and why public investment is the only 
practical possibility." 
""Buchanan (21) is incorrect in stating that there are no examples. 
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another capital goods industry (which sells to A) is induced to change 
its product price because of a shift in profits in a previous time period 
(call this backward linkage for A). Alternatively, pecuniary exter­
nalities exist in A,. if some consumer goods industry or some capital 
goods industry shifts demand for A's product (forward linkage in A) 
because such industries experienced a shift in profits during a previous 
time period. 
Assume constant returns to scale and fixed factor proportions. Then: 
1. AK-(t) = mpAKj(t-l) 
where AKj(t) is the percent change in industry i's profits during period 
t, m is the elasticity of the price that affects i with respect to profis 
in industry j (factor price if i sells to j; product price times-1 if i 
buys from j), p is the proportion of industry j1 s output which is taken 
by industry i or (forward linkage for i) the proportion of i's output that 
is taken by j. aKj(t-l) is the percent change in industry j's profits 
during period t-1. Further assume: 
2. AKj(t) • mpACj(t-l). 
Now drop the i's and j's so that AK(t) and AK(t-l) are percent change in 
profits in each capital goods industry as well as capital goods industries 
in general and C(t) is the percent change in profits in all or any con­
sumer good industry. Let the elasticity of price with respect to profits 
be the same in all industries and a constant. Then: 
3. AK(t) "«(AK(t-l) + ^&C(t-l). 
But ^C(t) is only subject to backward linkage so that: &C(t) =#&K(t-l) 
or: 
It. AC (t-1) n<3&K(t-2) 
117 
Substitute equation 1*. into 3 to obtain: 
5a. &K(t) =c<^ K(t-l) + ^tf&K(t-s), or: 
5b. 0 « -AK(t) +=(AK(t-l) +^ K(t-2). 
Now in order to specify a{+ @ it is useful to examine equation 3 
more carefully. If profit in period t-1 in all capital and consumer goods 
industries changed by some percentage, then: 
6. AK(t) • m(an-l}^ ~ ùK(t-l) + AK(t-l) + mn(l-a)~-A£(t-l). 
and simplifying: 
7. AK(t) = m(an *n"2) Alt(t-l) + mn^ 1"a) (t-1) 
n-l n-l 
In equation 6, m is the elasticity, (an-l) is the number of capital goods 
industries affecting every other capital goods industry, and is the 
proportion of purchase from every other capital goods industry by any 
capital goods industry. The second element m(an-l)~j is the elasticity 
times the number of capital goods industries (an-1) to which each capital 
goods industry sells, times the proportion of total sales of any 
capital goods industry that go to any other industry. The C(t-l) 
coefficient is simple because only one way linkage is involved. It con­
sists of the elasticity times the number of consumer goods industries, 
n(l-a), times the proportion of output of each capital goods industry 
that goes to each other industry. 
Now comparing equation 7 with equation 3: 
m^an+n-2) and. 
n-l 
9. B -i n-l 
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In a manner similar to the way in which equation 6 was derived, 
obtain: 
10. à C(t) « m(an)^  M(t-l) and comparing equation 10 to equation U: 
11. 3^  = m. 
It is interesting to note that none of the three parameters ,"Zf) 
is very sensitive to shifts in n. All respond monotonically to shifts in 
m. 
Comparing equation 3 with equation U note that if oOTT the profit 
expansion induced by an increase in AK(t-l) will be greater in the capital 
goods sector than in the consumer goods sector provided ^ >0. A sufficient 
condition for of > is >1 or a>— . That is, so long as there 
n—l n 
are two or more capital goods sectors, there will be a tendency for profit 
expansion in the capital goods industries to outstrip profit expansion in 
the consumer good industries. 
The questions of primary importance are: is the system stable, and 
does the system oscillate. Equation 6 is a second order difference 
equation, the solution to which takes the form: 
13. AK(t) = C + ajXj^  + agXg^  
where C, a% and a^  are constants, x% and x2 represent the solutions to 6. 
Then M(t) is stable if (xji ) and (x2)<l. And AK(t) will be non-
oscillating if Xj_ and xg are real and not negative numbers. 
Solving equation 5b yields: 
iu. x, ~ ^ 
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The system will be stable (the largerlx| is less than one) if (simplifying 
the larger x value in equation lU): 
15. or if, 
16
' TE>-S 
Thus, for large n, the system will be stable if m <"%. This is not a very 
difficult requirement to meet. The elasticity must generally be a small 
fraction and frequently must be zero. K(t) will oscillate since x values 
are negative, m has been assumed > 0. 
The model appears to suggest that inter-fina action and reaction will 
not lead to instability in the rate of profit. But the assumptions are 
fairly unrealistic. In particular the assumption of a single m value that 
applies to all firms seems unrealistic. The possibility remains (even 
without oscillations or instability) that as unintegrated interdependent 
firms adjust to new levels of output.(in the absence of a perfect system 
of forward prices), there will be uncertainty and mal-planning among 
firms which buy from 0t sell to them. 
6. Social goods 
A product X is a social good if additional consumption X1, by some 
individual i, fails to reduce the total remaining for others. Then: 
17. X - X1 » x-i - ... =Xn. 
Social goods may be contrasted with private goods, (goods for which total 
consumption equals the sum of all individual's consumption). A private 
good Y may be defined by the equation: 
n 
18. Y = ZI (Y*). 
i-1 
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Samuelson (179, 182), Musgrave (lU3), and Bowen (18) have elaborated 
some of the welfare implications of this case in recent years. But much 
remains to be done; in particular the case has not been.satisfactorily 
related to economic development. 
Some examples will be useful. Ice cream is a private good. Total 
consumption equals the sum of consumption by individuals. Knowledge, 
however, is a social good. After consumption by n-1 individuals there 
still remains the original total available for the consumption of the 
nth individual. Other examples of social goods include: national 
defense, resource conservation, law enforcement, public health, moderate 
-ÏK 
as opposed to extreme business cycles, economic growth and power 
development. 
Yet the definitions are polar and extreme so that it is convenient 
to thing of every good as spotted somewhere along a continuum from pure 
social good to pure private good. When a book, for example, is borrowed 
from a library the amount of knowledge available to other borrowers is 
temporarily reduced; and when ice cream is bought, more retail outlets are 
*The word "consumption" may seem inappropriate. Yet factors are 
used up in the production of such social goods as knowledge and national 
defense. This justifies use of the word. 
It is clear that a rapid rate of national economic growth is 
desired by many persons. One person's consumption of such a rate of 
growth does not reduce the amount remaining for others. 
***Tinbergen (213, p. 6) speaking of power, water, and land reclam­
ation projects notes: "Usually such investments cannot all be made by 
private individuals, since their yields spread through the community and 
do not readily take the form of income to the investor." For a defini­
tional statement see Musgrave (li*3, p. 108). 
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encouraged so that ice cream may, after a while, be rather more than less 
available to other consumers. 
Unfortunately, it is not clear simply from the nature of an object 
whether or not it is a social good. A highway, for example, is not 
noticeably consumed as one drives on it. It is there for others to use 
before, during, and after any individual's use. But during rush hours 
it may be congested and then one auto reduces the road available for 
another. A traffic jam may be well described by equation 18, though 
equation 17 is more appropriate at other times. Thus, roads may be close 
to the polar social good at 2 p.m. and on virtually the other end of the 
continuum by 5:30 p.m. 
While social goods are generally of rather large dimension and are 
generally more or less indivisible like national defense, the important 
point is this: Smith's national defense is Brown's national defense. 
There is no way of dividing it up so that one person obtains more and 
another less. This property might be called non-consignability. It is 
different from non-appropriability, because where non-appropriabi1ity 
involves the absence of feasible rationing (because of absence of control 
over product flows), non-consignability involves the impossibility of 
rationing. Smith's consumption is Brown's consumption, so neither of 
them would save his ration book. 
Knowledge is an interesting case. One person can have more and 
another less. And it would be rational of an individual to buy learning 
for himself (though he might not buy as much as the social welfare func­
tion indicates is desirable); but it would not be rational for him to buy 
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additional basic research. Basic research unlike applied research is 
not consignable. Smith's atomic physics is Brown's atomic physics 
whether he likes it or not.* 
Highways, streets, and bridges have many social good characteristics. 
True, non-payers of tolls could be excluded if this were feasible so 
that the situation at first seems to involve non-appropriability. But 
as Hotelling (102) has pointed out in connection with his bridge example, 
benefits accrue to an extremely large and diverse group of non-users 
(who are also non-payers). Even if primary indirect users could be 
charged for use of the bridge (by increased cost of the transported item) 
it would not be possible to reach secondary and tertiary indirect users 
unless perfect price discrimination were achieved in setting tolls. Road 
and bridge effects are, in fact, so general that it appears appropriate 
to apply the term social good. But roads and bridges are not pure social 
goods like national defense; they are perhaps better described as partly 
social goods. 
These examples are by no means exhaustive. Samuelson (162) offers 
the opinion that the propriety of any government activity directed toward 
a non-social good should be questioned. But he thinks most government 
activities probably are Concerned with the provision of social goods."** 
*Some large firms do basic research. These include firms in elec­
tronics, chemistry, and engineering. See chapter four. There is a high 
correlation between size of firm and amount expended on research. This 
suggests that there are degrees of consignability, and that the amount 
of consignability is a reflection of firm size. 
**In underdeveloped countries there is increasing recognition of the 
importance of social goods. In nineteen underdeveloped countries during 
the eight year period 1950-51 to 1957-58, government investment increased 
at an annual rate of 11.7 percent while private investment increased at 
only lu7 percent according to tables in World economic survey, 1959 (215). 
It appears possible that there are social evils (social goods of 
negative value), If an educated populace is a social good, then a mis-
educated populace is a social evil. Industrial effluent, city sewage, 
soil erosion, and malarial swamps are other candidates. In what follows 
social evils will be treated as social goods of negative sign. 
Social overhead capital is closely related to social goods and has 
been extensively treated by economists concerned with development. It 
is alleged (see Higgins, 93) that social overhead capital must be provided 
by government because of the large indivisible nature of investment 
requirements and because of the historically low rates of return in such 
industries. 
This approach, unfortunately, hides one important attribute of social 
goods. Namely, that market failure is involved and that government must 
provide such services or the area will do without them. The invisible 
hand does not work for social goods' The reason follows from the defini­
tion: private purchases of social goods, because of non-consignability, 
result in no greater contribution to the purchaser's welfare than to the 
welfare of anyone else. Then each person will avoid purchases in the 
hope that some other person or government will provide the social good.* 
Private purchases of social goods are like voluntarily paying taxes. The 
social results may be desirable but the private motives are absent. 
In connection with social goods market failure can occur in four 
ways: 1. too little is produced; 2. too much is produced; 3. the 
This, in fact, makes the definition depend on expectations regarding 
government activity. Unfortunate as this may seem, it appears to conform 
to reality. 
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production is poorly allocated;^  and, it. costs are poorly allocated. It 
is possible here to examine whether failure of the first or second type is 
more likely, and to say something about failure of the last type. 
In this section assume the existence of two goods, X (a social good) 
and Y (a private good). X and Y are produced and used under conditions 
of diminishing returns. There are two firms, A and B. Under what con­
ditions will the ideal quantities of X and Y be produced? 
Suppose some transformation function T-T and some MRS function for 
firm A as indicated in Figure 11, p. 126. Let Abe at any position ol on 
the MRS curve. 7he,social good X, of quantity x, obtained by A is, by 
definition, also obtained by firm B. Then Figure 11 provides in curve 
y-y the amounts of commodity Y available for consumption in B at each 
given x consumption in A. This is. obtained from Figure 11 by a vertical 
subtraction of MRS from T-T. The following property obtains on y-y; any 
position on y-y represents a combination of X and Y in firm A which is 
as good as, but not better than, any other position on y-y. 
There is, in firm B some family of MRS curves and one of these must 
be tangent to y-y at ai , or else it would be possible for firm B to pro­
duce more under a different combination of X and Y. The tangency con­
dition is familiar enough, what is unfamiliar is the requirement that 
tangency occur on This is necessary because the quantity of social 
goods x must be the same for both firms. 
These requirements define necessary but not sufficient conditions 
for a Pare to optimum. The criterion is Z MRS = MRT. This is shown in 
*Strotz (209) has made the interesting point that, within limits, 
public goods may be regarded as a means of redistributing income. 
Figure 11. A Pareto optimum when there is one social and one private 
good 
Figure 12. A Pareto optimum when there is one partly social and one 
private good 
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Figure 11 at the point$ . 
Bowen (18) has been able to demonstrate that a voting procedure 
combined with government activity may, under certain circumstances, be 
able to satisfy the ZMRS = MRT criterion.* 
However, while difficulties and inadequacies of government finance 
and administration are related to development, it is not the purpose here 
to consider such problems. Market failure is always involved respecting 
social goods in the sense that the system of laissez-faire does not pro­
vide the desirable combination of goods. But failure of development may 
not follow if government acts in an appropriate manner. Further, govern­
ment will presumably treat polar social goods as a first challenge because 
such goods will not be supplied without government activity. 
Thus the interesting case, in western capitalism, to not pure social 
goods but goods which have a fairly large social content. These may be 
defined as goods for which the sum of individual consumption is greater 
than production, because, in effect, consumption by one person or firm 
provides satisfaction to some other persons or firms. The following 
inequality provides an alternative definition. 
19. Z(Zi + ZJ + Zn<nZ. 
It is possible that the provision by private industry of some considerable 
quantity of such a commodity will result in failure to recognize the 
partly social nature of such goods. 
*These conditions involve, besides necessary information and that 
everyone votes, the condition that X be produced under constant or 
decreasing cost. The Arrow conditions are not fulfilled. 
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Consider the completely heuristic example below. There are two 
individuals, i and j, and two goods 2 and Y. The transformation function 
is: 
20. Z + Y = 10. 
Let U stand for an ordinal index.of utility and, as usual, let the indi­
vidual be denoted by a superscript." Suppose, further, that the indivi­
duals have identical tastes, and that income distribution is equal. 
Table 19 indicates a possible utility system. 
Utility may be maximized using columns $ and 9 (the marginal utility 
columns) and the transformation function. Ideally, Y = 6 (3 each), Z = U 
(2 each), utility = 2? x 2 + 22^  x 2 = 99. However, each individual is 
insensitive to how his own consumption affects others. Consequently, if 
left alone, each will consume one unit of Z and four units of Y so that 
total utility will be a suboptimum 98. Too little of the partly social 
good, Z, is purchased. 
Alternatively i and j may be regarded as firms, Y and Z as factors 
and U as factor value product. Conclusions are the same. 
Here i's consumption is not j's consumption as with a social good; 
rather, one half of i's consumption is j's consumption. The situation 
may be illustrated using Figure 12, p. 126. 
Any position z on OZ occupied by individual i corresponds to a 
position z/2 occupied by individual j. Let the abscissa in Figure 12B 
be stretched so that any number of units is represented by a distance 
trZ1 is utility obtained by i due to own-purchase of commodity 
Z. U^ZJ is utility obtained by i due to j's purchase of Z. 
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Table 19. A possible utility system 
(2) (3) (4) 
Quantity of Z 
purchased by l^ Z1 U£zj u1 
both i and j 
1 10 5 15 
2 15 7i 22^  
3 20 10 30 
4 25 121 37i 
5 30 15 45 
MU] 
1 
(6) 
Quantity of Y 
purchased by 
both i and j 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
(7) 
lvl U Y 
(8) (9) 
uiyj mu1 
10 0 10 
19 0 9 
27 0 8 
34 0 7 
4o 0 6 
twice as great as in Figure 11. Let i be given some consumption level. 
Proceed, as before, to find the necessary conditions for a Pareto optimum. 
T-T minus MRS1 is given by t-t. It is necessary that some MRS^  be tangent 
to t-t at oC for other wise some different combination of Y and Z which 
makes i no worse off, would increase j's welfare (output). 
The Pareto criterion involves as a necessary, but not sufficient 
condition that the sum of the two MRS curves depicted equal the MRT. But 
observe that while MRS1 » AY/^ Z, MRS^  - AY/2 A2. The criterion therefore 
is MRT = MRS1 + 1 (MRSJ). 
Iteration may be used to demonstrate that in general, for any number 
n of individuals having like utility functions in which the partly social 
good Z consumed by individual i enters in some fractional manner 
(intensity) l/zf into the utility functions of all other individuals, a 
Pareto optimum requires: 
21. MRT =» (1+ MRS. 
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Thus, in the case of the polar social good the criterion becomes MRT 
= (1 + n-1) MRS = n(MRS), and in the case where intensity = MRT 
= 2MRS« 
If partly social goods are treated as private goods each individual 
will equate MRS and MRT. The difference which results from using this 
criterion as opposed to 21 may be treated as due to an externality. 
The utility analysis appropriate to consumers may be abandoned in 
favor of an externality analysis appropriate to firms. If Z is a partly 
social factor of intensity l/?f and there are n typical firms, and one of 
these finds it profitable to buy ten dollars worth of Z, there is gen­
erated a negative total cost externality in each other firm of S10/Z2T. 
This analysis may be extended at will. 
For the moment it is important to examine whether partly social 
goods correspond to any real phenomena. Is there such a thing as partial 
consignability? Candidates are highways, bridges, education (as opposed 
to knowledge), applied research (as opposed to basic research), the 
railways, swamp drainage and soil conservation. In each case rational 
individuals would pay some charge based on their own consumption. Yet, 
in a sense, Jones' bridge is White's bridge, Jones' educated children 
elevate White's ignorant children, and swampbred mosquitoes bite everyone. 
When one looks at the matter in this way the question of existence 
appears to be more pointedly applied to social than to partly social 
goods. Most cases of the former appear to exhibit partial consignability 
rather than absolute non-consignability. 
When market failure results from the existence of social goods it, 
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therefore, appears reasonable to conclude : 1. without government inter­
vention too little of the social or partly social good will be produced, 
and, 2. in the case of privately purchased partly social goods, benefits 
will fail to correspond to payment. 
B. Summary 
It is convenient to terminate this chapter with an anatomical sum­
mary. Externalities may arise in imperfect competition under two con­
ditions. 
1. Scarce goods or overly abundant goods, having a non-zero 
influence on some individual's welfare, may fail to exchange 
at a non-zero price. 
2. The ideal configuration of goods fails to correspond to a 
positive, equilibrium rate of profit for each producer 
because some prices, though non-zero, are inappropriate, or 
because no appropriate set of prices exists"'! 
Such externalities arise due to six causes. 1. Factor, product, 
or production process indivisibilities, such as give rise to non-convex­
ities, may lead profit maximizing producers away from the optimum 
position. 2.. Non-appropriability of a given product results in the 
production of that product being too little encouraged. Non-culpability 
of a given product results in the production of that product being too 
"These two modes might be consolidated. On the other hand Bator (10) 
provides (for static competition) five modes. These are: a. Failure by 
existence—no prices exist; b. Failure by incentive—negative profits 
accrue to some firm at the ideal output; c. Failure by signal—profits 
are not a maximum for some firm at the ideal output; d. Failure by 
structure—the system is not self-policing and monopoly results; e. 
Failure by enforcement—legal imperfections. 
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little discouraged. 3. Irreversible changes in cost structure, if 
unknown in advance, result in obvious if unavoidable difficulties. But 
if known in advance, they may be externally beneficial or harmful. This 
is because of other imperfections, such as capital rationing in monopoly. 
Alternatively the form of competition may make any one individual's action 
toward a cost goal pointless, as it does, for example, with respect to 
research under competitive conditions. Technological advances may involve 
known non-convexities in time, irreversibilities, or they may involve 
inter-temporal welfare considerations where inter-temporal over­
compensation is impossible. U. Production functions may be non-convex 
over some range of output or over some range of time. $. Market inter­
dependence in the absence of a complete system of forward prices is 
associated with insufficient information regarding the plans made by 
interdependent firms. This may lead to equilibrium difficulties. 6. 
Social goods imply the impossibility of any price system which would 
satisfy Pareto optimum conditions but may not result in failure of devel­
opment if government acts in an appropriate manner. 
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VI. AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
A. The Externality Matrix 
An externality matrix is a list of changes in net revenue in each 
sector that arises as a consequence of a one dollar change in the sales 
and therefore output of any other sector. These changes in net revenue 
derive from changes in demand under constant selling price (assumed) and 
a variable cost increment (to be empirically obtained). For example, if 
there is a one dollar expansion of demand for agricultural products when 
initially all receipts are disbursed, and if it is known from the agricul-
, „ ,% increase in costs x . 
tural cost function that E -(%, ^ crease in output} then costs 
increase by SO.93, revenue increases by $1.00, and a $0.07 pecuniary 
externality exists. This seven cents may be treated as an increment of 
profit or an increment of saving. This type of situation was called an 
external - internal economy by Robertson (166) and a pecuniary external 
economy by Viner (228). 
In order to compute the pecuniary externality matrix, it is necessary 
to know what changes in intermediate demand arise as a consequence of a 
one dollar increase in final demand for the product of each sector. This 
is the information provided by an input-output study. But in the ordinary 
input-output model MC » AC. (Intermediate use plus final demand = total 
output for the average dollar and the marginal dollar.) Moreover total 
gross output in each sector may be interpreted as equal to total gross 
inputs, so there is no residual saving—no pecuniary externality. It is 
necessary to alter these assumptions. 
If each sector is assumed to have some MPS, there will be a 
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corresponding sector multiplier. Each sector multiplier conceptually 
is similar to the Keynesian multiplier; the primary difference being that 
Keynes imputes all savings to consumers and so is able to obtain a single 
multiplier, whereas in this computation, savings of each sector are not 
imputed to any other sector. The matrix of multipliers obtained is 
closely related to the matrix multiplier of the Leontief system. But 
the elements will all be slightly different because MC / AC in the present 
model; that is, incremental disbursements do not equal average disburse­
ments. Thus, on the average, one dollar's exogeneous expenditure by 
consumers on commodity x is associated with some level of demand for x 
as a factor. Factor use plus final use equals total output. But at the 
margin, a one dollar change in exogeneous expenditure may be associated 
with changes in factor demand and changes in total output that are not 
indicated by average factor requirements. 
The primary use of this matrix multiplier in the present calculation 
is in obtaining the externality matrix. The multiplier provides inputs 
required from each sector which result from a one dollar increase in 
demand (exogeneous expenditure) for the product of any other sector. 
But there is also available a system of coefficients relating incremental 
costs to incremental demand. And it is possible to use these coefficients 
to adjust the elements of the matrix multiplier. In this way, an incre­
mental cost matrix (the elements of which are the extra costs in any 
sector that arise as a consequence of a one dollar increase in demand for 
the product of any other sector) can be obtained. Alternatively, it is 
possible to obtain a matrix, the elements of which are the extra savings 
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(profits) that accrue in any sector as a consequence of a one dollar 
increase in demand for the products of any sector. The latter is the 
pecuniary externality matrix. It is a description of the extent and 
location of some of the potential investment funds in an expanding 
economy. 
Consider an example. Extra output in some sector may he worth one 
dollar and extra costs may be SO.93 so that savings of seven percent of 
increments to sales accrue in the sector. Do these savings correspond 
in any way to extra capital required in order to produce the extra output? 
Suppose capital worth $100 will produce $14.25 worth of product per year 
for ten years. Then $100 worth of capital will produce (ignoring time 
discounts) $142.50 worth of product. Or seven cents worth of capital, 
employed for its ten year life, would produce a product of $1.00. Thus, 
ignoring indivisibilities of capital and time, a one dollar increase in 
demand gives rise to seven cents profit which is just sufficient (when 
added to the capital of the sector) to enable output to be expanded by 
one dollar's worth. 
This simple example illustrates one use of the pecuniary externality 
matrix. If some sectors, by this calculation, have an accumulation of . 
pecuniary externalities that are more than sufficient to finance addi­
tional investment, the capital market will be called upon to redirect 
investment funds. Failure to satisfactorily do so is likely to be asso­
ciated with failure to achieve maximum economic growth. 
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1, Data 
a. Data requirements The computations require data of several 
kinds. First production functions or cost functions for each sector are 
required. Ideally, these would specify the amount by which each factor 
must be increased in order to expand the product of the industry by one 
dollar's worth. For example, production functions of the form 0 » aB& 
(where 0 is output, B is an index of inputs, a and E are coefficients) 
might be fitted for each indsutry. This function is homogeneous of 
degree E, that is, expanding B by one percent will expand 0 by E percent. 
Under constant prices E obtained in this way estimates: (the percent 
change in costs) / (the percent change in output). 
It should be noted that this is not the information provided by a 
Leontief input-output matrix. (Factor requirements for production of a 
marginal unit are not, ordinarily equal to average factor requirements 
as is generally assumed in the input-output system. ) 
The second data requirement involves a transactions matrix. These 
two sets of data are sufficient for calculation of a matrix multiplier 
and an externality matrix in the event that constancy of prices may be 
assumed. 
Further investigation (comparison of externalities with capital 
requirements) involves finding, for each sector, the capital-output 
coefficients and the durability of capital. 
Unfortunately, even such complete data as this involves using assump­
tions respecting factor supplies that are, in the short run, quite 
extreme. It is necessary to assume that factor prices are constant. If 
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output in any industry expands it must follow that all or at least some 
factors are present in supplies greater than those presently utilized, 
or alternatively that all changes are incremental. 
In the long run, elastic factor supplies are probably more realistic 
than in the short run because new methods of using previously useless 
materials are discovered. (For example, Taconite msy be enriched to re­
place higher grade Mesabi ores.) But in the long run, production func­
tions are likely to change a good deal and this makes use of a transaction 
matrix risky. In the short run, factor supply elasticities appear to 
imply unused capacity, and if this is the case, production functions may 
not appropriately describe factor requirements. This is an important 
difficulty as Furtado (68) has pointed out in another connection. 
b. Available data There are available a relatively large number 
of cost studies.* These studies generally indicate either the propor­
tionate increase in costs as output is expanded by one unit or provide 
an equation relating costs and outputs, or inputs and outputs. 
Transactions matrixes are available. Here the input-output study 
completed for Canada, 1949 (22) will be used. Capital-output coefficients 
may be derived from data published by Hood (99). Unfortunately, infor­
mation on capital longevity is scarce and of poor quality, but some data 
is available in Hood (99). 
Most of the cost studies previously completed must be reworked to 
provide the information needed. Frequently equations of the form desired 
(linear in logarithms) are found to fit the data tolerably well, but 
*Most of the cost studies used here are derived from U.S.A. data but 
some use British, French, or other information. 
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almost all the studies examined used equations linear in natural data. 
Unfortunately, the latter type does not provide a unique value of the 
elasticity relating costs and output so the equations must be refitted 
in logarithms. Such a procedure may result in lower values. This is 
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not particularly disconcerting in practice, as R does not often drop 
very much and the procedure is superior to calculating elasticities at 
mean values in natural data. 
c. Deficiencies of data It is unlikely that mn elasticities 
(one for each factor in every sector) would be available; a rather more 
reasonable goal is to seek n elasticities—one for each sector—and assume 
that factor substitution does not take place. This assumption is likely 
ho bias costs toward the high side, but it may be set against the assump­
tion of constant prices which biases costs toward the low side. 
Again most studies relate to firms and not industries (though studies 
based on cross-sectional data do not necessarily relate to any one firm). 
Such cross-sectional studies are probably as descriptive of the industry 
as they are of the firm; though the cross-sectional data is usually used 
for studies of cost structure of firms. Using cross-sectional data to 
estimate cost curves for the industry leads to some important diffi­
culties: 
1. Factors may be unique to individual firms on the envelope. (The 
envelope is not a valid LAC curve.) 
2. The industry may confront factor shortages not felt when any 
single firm expands so that the assumption of constant prices is more 
extreme when dealing with the industry. 
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3. Costs to the industry depand on how extra business is distributed 
among firms. 
It. ' Costs to the industry also depend on the amount and location of 
excess capacity which, in turn, reflects error, anticipated expansion in 
demand (which tends to make plants too large), anticipated technological 
advances (which tend to make plants too small), and cyclical phenomena. 
5. Cost to the industry reflects location of increments in demand 
relative to location of excess capacity. 
6. Costs in the industry reflect the amount of time allowed for 
adjustment of firm sizes and the amount of pressure put on firms by 
competition. 
7. The industry may, given time, generate service subsidiaries or 
a trained labor force or research teams (and a more rapid development 
of technology) or political power which would not be available to expand­
ing firms. That is, technological externalities may exist. But these 
difficulties are no greater than difficulties involved in obtaining the 
LAC curve in the first place. 
The problem of estimating LAC curves has received a good deal of 
attention. There are two primary methods ; Use of cross-sectional con­
temporaneous data, and use of data from a single firm which has grown or 
decreased in size. The latter procedure is subject to all the exigencies 
of time-series analysis. Technology changes, products and factors change, 
prices change and demand conditions change. In particular costs must be 
intertemporal!/ allocated. Yet use of cross-sectional data yields a 
strange hybrid. Do cost curves fitted to cross-sectional data describe 
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how costs change as some one firm expands? Do they describe how costs 
in the industry change as the whole industry expands? Evidently they 
are not a very accurate description of either. There are a number of 
other difficulties in estimating LAC curves. Some of these involve: 
1. Failure of some firms to operate efficiently (that is, on the 
LAC curve). 
2. Prices change during the period of observation (in time series) 
or between firms (in cross section) because of locational advantages or 
marketing advantages. Marketing advantages tend to systematically inter­
fere in fitting cost functions because large firms typically have more 
bargaining power. All price changes necessitate the use of cost indexes, 
but since factor substitution takes place, cost indexes are likely to be 
biased upward except during the base period. 
3. Observations generally are in terms of totals for a year, quarter 
or month, but when cost functions are not linear and there is a seasonal 
variation in output, this introduces a bias so that choice of different 
periods leads to different conclusions. Moreover, there may be seasonal 
variation in both costs and output so that results show spurious rela­
tions. 
ii. Capital inputs are conceptually very difficult to deal with. 
For example, if capital is measured by stock prices it is not independent 
of profits, and efficiency (198). 
5. Accounting methods vary from one firm to another so that some 
items may be allocated to costs in one firm but elsewhere in other firms. 
6. Large firms apparently tend systematically to use more capital 
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intensive methods than small firms (67). This implies that errors in 
factor cost allocation (because of accounting techniques or inappropriate 
capital values) may lead to spurious economies or diseconomies of scale. 
7. Firms produce different products and most firms produce several; 
therefore, it is difficult to compare costs or production functions in 
different firms. Is detergent soap? Do jets and propeller-driven planes 
provide the same product? 
8. If selling and transportation are included as costs, then geo­
graphic dispersion of the market will tend to limit scale advantages of 
manufacturing in any one plant (67). 
9. How can the economies of multi-plant firms be compared with the 
economies achieved by large plants? 
10. Technology continually changes as do prices, market size, et 
cetera, yet LAC is a static concept. Therefore trying to find LAC through 
observing actual cost structures of plants built at different times is 
likely to prove misleading. Wiles' (231) concepts of partial and total 
adaptation appear more meaningful. 
But it will not do to let these objections inundate the study. There 
is a good deal of evidence to support the hypothesis of scale advantages. 
Compare the productivity of U.S.A. and other economies (155). Note the 
failure of steel rolling in Chile (167), and the opinion of business 
people, engineers and economists (231, 106, 82, 9U). Examine evidence 
that economies are provided not only in the scale of plant but in having 
several plants under the management of one firm (67). 
As pointed out by Robinson (167) in connection with Bain's (7) work 
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the advantages of scale are far more ramifying than might be first 
supposed. Even if the most efficient scale of plant could produce only 
ten, twenty, or thirty percent of the U.S.A. requirements, the size of 
the markets implies competition between firms so that: 
"firms and plants can and do specialize more narrowly and 
concentrate their efforts on a more limited range of products. 
At the same time the addition of an efficient unit of produc­
tion to the market required less growth of the market to justify 
it, risks were to that extent reduced, and confidence in neces­
sary minimum of expansion more readily created" (167, p. xvii). 
The assumption of increasing productivity with larger scale is more 
likely to be realized as the size of the subject nation decreases. In 
Canada, increasing productivity should be the rule to judge from Robinson 
(167, P xviii): 
"It is not going too far, perhaps, to say that it seemed 
to be our general impression that most of the major industrial 
economies of scale could be achieved by a relatively high income 
nation of fifty million: ..." 
2. The productivity vector 
What is required for every industry is a coefficient of elasticity 
which relates the percent change in inputs to the percent change in out­
puts. That is, for every industry it is desirable to have an E = ^  • -j : 
where i = input and o = output. This is, in fact, the information which 
is provided by a cost function of the form: 
1. 0 = a(i)^ , or by a Cobb-Douglas function of the form: 
2. 0 = aL^ Cc, under constant price. (Here E = b + c.) 
One would expect, if the LAC or the cost under total adaptation is 
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L-shaped,^  that a curve fitted to the logarithm of i (on the ordinate) 
and the logarithm of o (on the abscissa) would be a convex (from below) 
curve having a slope at large outputs approaching one, (Marginal cost 
is constant.) But for most of the scatter diagrams this tendency does 
not appear. A straight line on double logarithm paper fits very well 
indeed. Its slope (with cost on the ordinate) is generally less than 
1.0. (There are economies of scale.) The same is generally true for 
diagrams that have not been presented here. 
When a single economies-of-scale coefficient adequately describes 
the differences in efficiency at various levels of output of the firm, 
the same coefficient may be used to describe differences in efficiency 
at various levels of output of the industry. But if used this way, it 
is necessary to assume that increments or decrements in volume are dis­
tributed among firms so that the relative volume done by each does not 
change. It is further necessary to assume there are no inter-firm tech­
nological externalities, and that the total cost curve satisfactorily 
describes costs in each firm. 
Because of the relatively high cost of graph drawing, empirical work 
is not presented in full. The following tables and graphs represent only 
summaries and conclusions. Discussion is kept to a minimum. Moreover, 
the material on which these tables and charts are based is of highly vari­
able quality so that it has been thought necessary, in many cases, to in­
dicate a subjective evaluation of the original data. In some cases tests 
"*See Salter (177), Wiles (231), Johnston (106). Also see Schuman 
and Alpert (18$) for an expression of engineers' opinion. In a study by 
Eiteman and Guthrie (53)# 366 replies to a questionnaire sent to business­
men were almost 2:1 (203.113) in favor of an average cost curve that fell 
throughout the range of output. 
ihk 
of significance are not useful because the available data represent 
averages. Still, best estimates of E are given by a regression estimator. 
3. Summary of previous studies 
Table 20 provides a summary of cost studies published elsewhere. In 
all cases, the data have been refitted using logarithms. In almost all 
cases E<1.0 and in several cases the hypothesis: E = 1 is rejected. 
Generally the number of observations is too small to adequately test 
this hypothesis. No attempt has been made to test whether or not resid­
uals are randomly distributed. Again an E less than one in Table 20 
indicates that average costs fall as output expands. 
Haldi (82, pp. 36-50) has considered evidence on increasing returns 
in various manufacturing processes. He uses the equation C = ax*3 where 
C = cost, X = capacity, a and b are coefficients obtained by the method 
of least squares. It is evident that if b> 1 there is decreasing returns 
to scale; if b <1 there is increasing returns to scale. The smaller is 
b, the more important are scale advantages (or the less important are 
scale disadvantages). Table 21 provides a summary of results. 
In part A of Table 21, scale factors are given for total instal­
lation costs of various types of equipment. Information on number of 
observations, range in size of equipment, and significance of the coeffi­
cients has been suppressed. In part B scale factors for construction 
costs of total plants are presented; again information is suppressed. 
Part C provides scale factors for operating costs. Data on operating 
costs is not as complete, and appears less accurate than data in parts 
A and B. 
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Table 20. Estimates of E obtained from refitting secondary data using 
the equation cost = a (output)^  
Industry 
Description of data 
Standard 
E error Source 
1-Bus passenger transport 0.7138*" 0.031$ 
2-Gas production 0.973U 0.05k2 
3-Gas production 0.90k6 0.079b 
it-Gas production 0.9029 0.1093 
5-Steel production 0.7825* 0.0762 
6,Steel production 0.72k7^  0.0237 
7-Cement production 0.8058*"~ 0.0222 
8-Banking 0.8757* 0.0129 
9-Industrial assurance 0.960kt 0.0172 
10-Industrial assurance 0.9285f 0.0199 
11-Building societies 0.93k5f 0.012$ 
12-Steam railways 0.88^  0.03L2 
13-Leather belts 0.9588* 0.0092 
lk-Coal mining 0.9782 0.0129 
15-Grude petroleum l.lOBO^  0.0627 
16-Coal mining 0.9023*"" 0.0078 
17-Coal mining 0.8300* 0.0261 
18-Coal mining 0.9o5k 0.0258 
19-Automobiles 0.9101* 0.0181 
20-Newsprint 0.8228* 0.0830 
21-Fir lumber 0.9520 0.0k6l 
22-Clay products 0.9520 0.0338 
23-Cigar production 0.8816* 0.0161 
2i|-Food products 0.9010* 0.0322 
25-Restaurants 0.8359 0.1391 
26-Baking O.98U8 0.0656 
27-Butcher shops 0.7056 0.1179 
28-Butcher shops 0.7231 0.6616 
29-Wholesale trade 0.8179" 0.0299 
30-Wholesale trade 0.8671* 0.0199 
31-Department stores 0.9813 0.0129 
32-Department stores 1.0371 0.0177 
33-Clothing retail 0.9803, 0.0230 
3U-Tire & rubber production 0.9291* 0.0181+ 
35-Factory construction O.66OT* 0.0856 
36-Electrical products 1.0533* 0.0152 
37-Food processing 0.938Il 0,0361 
Johnston (106, p. 80) 
(àribbin (76, p. 206) 
Verhulst (226, p. 29$) 
Verhulst (226, p. 29$) 
Wylie & Ezekiel (232) 
Yntema (237, p. 36 ) 
Wiles (231, p. 
Wiles (231, p. 
Wiles (231, p. 
Wiles (231, p. 
Johnston (106, v. 10U) 
Wiles (231, p. 239) 
Dean (kk, chart $) 
Johnston (106, p. 101) 
Wiles (231, p. 
Wiles (231, p. 
Wiles (231, p. 
Wiles (231, p. 
Wiles (231, p. 
Wiles (231, p. 
Wiles (231, p. 
Rautenstrauch (I63, p. 
Rautenstrauch (163, p. 
Rautenstrauch (163, p. 
Rautenstrauch (163, p. 
Wiles (231, p. 
Wiles (231, 
Wiles (231, 
Wiles (231, 
227) 
2k0) 
237) 
237) 
236) 
237) 
237) 
239) 
23k) 
229) 
239) 
Wiles (231, 
Wiles (231, 
P. 
P. 
P. 
P. 
P. 
P-
23$) 
230) 
230) 
23k) 
23k) 
231) 
231) Wiles (231, 
Rautenstrauch (163, p. 
Rautenstrauch (163, p. 
Markham (133, p. $2) 
Rautenstrauch (163, p. 
Johnston (106, p. 9$) 
33$) 
32k) 
320) 
320) 
33$) 
3ko) 
320) 
hypothesis that E = 1 is rejected at $% level. 
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Table 20. (Continued) 
Description of data 
Quality Type of observation3. N Place Date 
Very high Single firm; it week time series 33 U.K. 19L9-1952 
High Cross sectional 20 U.K. 
High Cross sectional 10 France 19k5 
High Cross sectional 15 France 19h5 
High U.S. steel, time series 11 U.S.A. 1929-1939 
High U.S. steel, time series 12 U.S.A. 1927-1938 
Good Cross sectional data u Ik U.S.A. 1929 
Good Cross sectional o = deposits d 7 U.S.A. 1939 
Good Cross sectional 8 U.K. 1912-1917 
Good Cross sectional 8 U.K. 1937-1910 
Good Cross sectional averages 1$ U.K. 1953 
Good Cross sectional averages u 9 U.S.A. 19U5 
Very high Time series hh U.S.A. 1935-1938 
Good Cross sectional averages 7 U.K. 1950 
Fair Cross sectional averages u 12 U.S.A. 1929 
Fair Cross sectional averages (613) u 10 U.K. 192$ 
Fair Cross sectional averages (653) 7 U.K. 1923 
Fair Cross sectional averages (68) h U.S.A. 1917 
Poor Costs assumed equal to price 13 U.S.A. 1953 
Fair Cross sectional averages (33) 6 U.S.A. 1913 
Fair Cross sectional (28 and U9) 6 U.S.A. 1918 
Very poor Break-even chart, time series data 15 U.S.A. 181*9-1929 
Very poor Break-even chart, time series data 13 U.S.A. 1928-193U 
Poor Time series 18 U.S.A. 1919-1933 
Fair Branches of one company 13 U.S.A. 
Good Cross sectional u Ik U.S.A. 1922-192$ 
Poor Cross sectional unknown numbers 5 U.K. 1936 
Poor Cross sectional unknown numbers d 5 Holland 1932 
Poor Cross sectional unknown numbers d 7 U.S.A. 1929 
Poor Cross sectional unknown numbers d 8 U.S.A. 1939 
Poor Cross sectional unknown numbers d h U.S.A. 1935-1937 
Poor Cross sectional unknown numbers u k U.K. 193$-1937 
Poor Time series ll U.S.A. 190W933 
Poor Time series 10 U.S.A. 192$-193k 
Very poor Time series 8 U.S.A. 192$-1939 
Poor Time series 30 U.S.A. 1899-1936 
Very good Time series 37 ? 1950-1951 
%hen only the lower limit of the final class size is given, it is 
necessary to exclude that class from the study. This is indicated by a 
u if average costs go up, d if they go down. 
W^hen cross sectional averages are used the number of items in the 
class is given in brackets if known. 
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Table 21. Scale factors for various pieces of industrial equipment , 
and plants3, using the equation C = a(X)b, Cost - a(capacity) 
b value 
A. Installed equipment 
Agitated vessels 0.1+7 
Autoclaves 0,26-0.1+6 
Compressors 0.54-0.87 
Condensers 0.51-0.5Û 
Construction and mining machinery 0.60 
Continuous thickeners 0.60 
Cross country pipelines O.67 
Demineralized water systems 0.90 
Electric motors 0.36-0.82 
Evaporators 0.54-0.80 
Furnaces 0.1+3-0.85 
Gas holders, gas producers 0.1+3-0.60 
Heat exchangers 0.54-0.60 
Kraft paper mill boilers 0.69 
Liquid filters 0.1+3-0.60 
Liquid pumps 0.33-0.60 
Refrigeration units 0.30-0,78 
Tanks 0.1+5-0.73 
Towers 0.31-1.00 
Average (all operations) 0.59 
B, Plant construction costs 
Non-petroleum chemicals; butadene except 
butylenes; high purity oxygen; synthetic 
rubber (Buna S) and T.N.T. 1.01-1.39 
Metals : aluminum extrusions, aluminum 
sulphate from bauxite 1.00-4.2 
S^ource: A - adapted from Haldi (82, Table 1, pp. 36-38); B -
adapted from Haldi (82, Table 2, pp. 1+5-1+6; C - adapted from Haldi 
(82, Table 3, p. $0). 
bWhere more than one "b" value is given, information on one or more 
different types of equipment has been suppressed. 
Table 21. (Continued) 
1U8 
b value 
The remaining 1+3 types of plants have 
"b" values below 1.0. Average of 
total is 0.?6. 
C. Plant operating costs 
Liquor evaporation in paper mills 0.60 
Electrolytic evaporator for NaOH 0.53 
Low temperature dehydration 0.66 
Petroleum refining 0.50-0.73 
Spin bath evaporation for rayon mills 0.68 
Pig iron 0.50 
Steel ingots 0.37 
Finished steel 0.50 
Tonnage oxygen 0.66 
Average 0.57 
Cross-sectional scatter diagrams were prepared from Haldi1 s data. 
No hypotheses were suggested by the scatter diagrams relating size of 
equipment installed and b values or by the data on operating costs. But 
there does appear to be a tendency (see Figure 13) for scale factors to 
approach the value 1.0 as plant size become larger. That is, the larger 
the plant, the more likely it is that plant construction will be subject 
to neither economies nor diseconomies of scale. A regression equation 
was fitted by least squares to this data with b value as dependent vari­
able and mean construction cost in millions of dollars as independent 
variable. German data included by Haldi were excluded in order to 
increase homogeneity. The result is: 
Figure 13. Economies of scale in plant construction 
Ordinate: 'b1 value m equation cost = a(scale)D 
Abscissa: average plant scale used in the equation above n millions of dollars 
Source: Haldi (82, pp. 45, 46) 
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3. b = 0.6123 + 0.00$$97C 
(0.00108?) 
n = 45, t = 5.137, = 0.3749. The standard error of the 
. regression coefficient is in brackets. 
An engineering study of costs done by Schuman and Alpert (185) for 
a water pumping plant, using the equation Cost = k (size)^  is of interest. 
Table 22 provides an.extract. 
Table 22. Values of b for costs of water pumping equipment 
Flow g.p.m. b 
1 0.3 
10 0.3 
100 0.4 
1,000 0.7 
10,000 0.9 
100,000 1.0 
1,000,000 
This data was drawn up by design engineers. It has two important 
advantages over Haldi1 s data. First, output changes by one million fold, 
and second, this is the sort of ex ante cost information that management 
has to deal with/' It may be wrong, it cannot be irrelevant. However, 
Haldi1s data is superior for most uses because it reflects ex post 
phenomena. 
A^pparently engineering useQ0^  0.6 factor rule is quite common. The 
formula is as follows: a(_i) * where Ci_ is the cost of a piece of 
%2 
equipment of size = X-^ , and Cg is the cost of a piece of equipment of 
size Xg. (Xg>X^ ). 
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There are a number of studies or bits of information which for one 
reason or another did not warrant fitting an equation by least squares. 
These have been plotted on double logarithm paper, lines have been fitted 
visually, and slopes evaluated. The following graphs (Figure 11 to 
Figure 31) resulted. Slopes and sources together with other information 
is provided on the facing page. These self-explanatory graphs will not 
be discussed further. 
A further source of information is related to pecuniary external­
ities. It is the rate of change of profit with increased scale. This 
unfortunately has only indirect bearing as large firms are presumably 
able to charge higher prices for their products and pay lower prices for 
their factors. Nevertheless, studies appear to indicate that higher 
profits accrue to large firms. Table 23 summarizes material prepared 
by Crum (l|.l). Unfortunately, the data is old and refers to an unusual 
period. 
It should be noted that when all firms are divided into two groups: 
those exhibiting profits, and those exhibiting losses, the results are 
quite different. Profit rates among those firms exhibiting a profit 
tend to decrease as firm size increases. 
In general, industries exhibiting rapid technological change presum­
ably have higher values of E than others.* Indexes of output and 
""Assume: T = g(t,q) where T = an index of technological contribution 
to output, t = time- q = output. 
1 §' is partly a reflection of . 
Figure lit. 
Iron ore mining U.S.A., 
190? 
No. of observations = ? 
Mesabi open E = 0.51 
Mesabi underground 
E = 0.82 
Old range E = 0.85 
Wiles (231, p. 227) 
Figure 17. 
Crude petroleum 
1+6 small, 42 medium, 
10 large companies 
E = 0.78 (1914); 0.61 
(1915); 0.73 (1916); 
0.67 (1917); 0.71 
1918 and 1919 
Wiles (231, p. 2ill) 
Figure 15. 
Copper mining U.S.A., 
1918 
(a) Lake Co's. E = 0.59 
(b) Porphyry Co's. 
E = 0.82 
(c) Others E = 0.85 
Wiles (231, p. 2iU) 
Figure 18. 
Oil refineries U.S.A., 
1939 
Engineer's estimates of 
Costs independent of 
location E = 0.72 
Wiles (231, p. 232) 
Figure 16. 
Bituminous coal U.S.A. 
1917 
68 producers 
E = 0.95 
Wiles (231, p. 239) 
Figure 19. 
Milk evaporation U.S.A. 
1918 
28 small 
9 large companies 
E = 0.9k 
Wiles (231, p. 2iil) 
Figure 20. 
Milk dealers W. Va., 
1933 
No. producers = ? 
E = 0.94 
Wiles (231, p. 228) 
Figure 21. 
Creameries U.S.A., 
1920; Canada, 1933 
1 creameries in U.S.A. 
78 creameries in Canada 
E = 0.73 (U.S.A.) 
E = 0.80 (Canada) 
Wiles (231, p. 233) 
Figure 22. 
Fish canning U.S.A., 
1916 and 1917 
17 small plants 1916 
40 small plants 1917 
52 large plants 1916 
41 large plants 1917 
E = 0.93 
Wiles (231, p. 229) 
Figure 23. 
Wheat flour milling 
U.S.A., 1913-1918 
17 small, 
14 large companies 
£ = 0.97 
Wiles (231, p. 241) 
Figure 24. 
Iron U.S.A., 1909 
21 Bessemer pig iron 
(lowest cost) 
13 Bessemer (2nd high­
est cost) 
15 Basic pig iron (2nd 
lowest cost) 
22 open hearths (high­
est cost) , 
E = 0.69-0.80^ 
Wiles (231, p. 228) 
Figure 25. 
Farm and industrial 
machinery U.S.A., 
1924-1934 
1 producer 
E = 0.70-0.99 
Rautenstrauch (I63, 
P. 337) 
aThe d superscript indicates average costs in an excluded observation 
are below previous average costs. 
iSh 
1919 
1918 
1917 
1916 
1914 
'1915 
US. A., 
C A N A D A  
Figure 26. 
Construction costs rayon 
plants U.S.A., 1925-1935 
8 observations 
E = 0.75 
Markham (133, p. 52) 
Figure 29. 
Electrical products 
U.S.A., 1899-1936 
1 Producer 
E = 0.96-1.20 
Rautenstrauch (163, 
P. 315) 
Figure 27. 
Shoe retailing U.S.A., 
1937 
53 observations 
E = 0.78 
Dean and James (45) 
Figure 30. 
Fertilizer U.S.A., 
1941-1942 
No. producers = ? 
E = 0.99 (mixed 
fertilizer) 
E = 0.91 (bulk super­
phosphate ) 
Wiles (231, p. 236) 
Figure 28. 
Retailing U.K., 1931-
1937 
E = 0.83 
Plant and Fowler (162, 
Table 8) 
Figure 31. 
Beet sugar U.S.A., 
1917-1918 
56 units 
E = 0.81 
Wiles (231, p. 229) 
Figure 32. 
Operating costs 
railways U.K., 1928 
1937 
E - 0.31 
Broster (20) 
Figure 33.a 
Ce-op grocery stores 
U.K., 1930 
Number = ? 
E « 0.78 
Wiles (231, p. 230) 
a 
The d superscript indicates average costs in an excluded observation 
are below previous average costs. 
1# 
Table 23. Met profits as apercent of equity, unweighted averages, U.S.A., 1931-1936a 
Type of enterprise Corporation size interval in thousands of dollars assets*3 
0 5o 100 250 500 1,000 5,000 10,000 50,000 
All corporate industry -16-.3U k.73 -2.6k -l.ko -0.80 -0.03 0.38 l.k5 2.78 
All manufacturing -17.2k - 5.21 -2.36 -0.67 0.60 1.56 2.5k 2.k8 3.88 
Metal manufacturing 
-19.17 - 5.85 -3.19 -1.65 -o.5k 3.05 0.89 0.56 n.a. 
Food group -11.08 - 2.71 -0.79 2.08 3.22 3 • kk S.k8 n.a. n.a. 
Chemicals -15.U8 - 1.U8 1.37 3.68 5.00 6.13 8.k6 5.22 2.k6 
Textiles -23.86 7.6k -3.7k -0.73 0.01 0.38 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Printing -13.8k - 3.k9 -0.33 2.37 3.06 k. 77 8.33 n.a. n.a. 
Paper -11.67 - 1.6k 1.U2 2.88 3.36 2.30 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Forest products -20.06 11.61 
-7.1k -5 «ko -3.83 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Stone, clay, glass 
-17.k3 - 6.67 -k .99 -3.37 -1.06 -1.01 1.15 n.a. n.a. 
Liquors 3.83 k.07 5.96 6.3k 7.87 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Tobacco 
—Ik.58 - 3.0k O.kB -1.69 -I.07 n.a. n.a. n.a. n. a. 
Leather -22.80 - 7.k3 —2. kk -1.89 -1.57 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Rubber n.a. - 2.85 -1.16 3.23 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Misc. manufacturing -21.29 7.3k -2.97 -1.00 -0.56 1.18 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
S^ource; Adapted from Crura (kl, Tables 2 - 26). Total assets as given by balance sheet on 
tax returns. Rate of return = ratio of profit or loss after taxes to estimate average equity. 
Lower limit of the class interval is given. Note that intervals are not of equal size. 
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technological change for the period 1939-1950 have been published for 53 
industries by the U.s.a. Department of Labor (220). Multicollinearity 
interferes with attempts' to obtain for any one industry. But a cross 
sectional approach yields the equation: 
il. A (Productivity index) = K + 0.41974 A (Output index). 
t - 4.4912, n = 53. 
Consequently an array of industries by the historic index of technological 
change should approximately correspond to an array of industries according 
to values of E. 
Two roughly correspondent arrays of industries by order of historic 
technological change are provided in Tables 24 and 25. 
lu Economies of scale vector 
The cost and production functions, and indexes of technological 
change presented above are of uneven quality. Moreover, comparison of 
the sectors in the available input-output model with the cost information 
above indicates that for some sectors, there is very little information. 
These difficulties stand as barriers to the general use of an index number 
in computing E for each sector. Approximations and rough estimates have 
been used where there was not enough information for an accurate estimate, 
or where estimates of E for single industries were thought to be in error. 
Details regarding the classification (numbers refer to the standard 
industrial classification, 1948 (23)) and the estimation of E for each 
sector are provided in Table 29 of the Appendix. Estimates of E involve 
judgment rather than calculations from the data. In general estimates 
tend to be conservative (that is, tend toward the value 1.0) in order to 
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Table 21*. Indexes of output per man-hour in 27 industries, U.S.A., 1950a 
k Index Index 
Rank Industry number Rank Industry number 
1923= 100 
1 Rayon and allied products 1,217 15 Pulp and paper mills 181* 
2 Ice cream 31*1 16 Paint and varnishes 183 
3 Electricity 33$ 17 Non-ferrous metals 180 
1* Rubber tires and tubes 312 18 Hosiery 172 
5 Petroleum refining 290 19 Footwear 168 
6 Tobacco products 289 20 Bit. coal 167 
7 Iron and steel 273 21 Leather 161* 
8 Confectionary 2# 22 Cane sugar refining 158 
9 Glass products 238 23 Clay cons, products 15H 
10 Cement 231 21* Coke 131 
11 Woolen and worsted 211* 25 Flour, etc. 130 
12 Cotton goods 203 26 Meat packing 125 
13 Canning and preserving 200 27 Bread, etc. 117 
11* Fertilizers 198 
BSource: Salter (177, p. 161*). 
Ranked by size of index number, from largest to smallest. 
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Table 25. Indexes of productivity in U.S.A. industries, 1950a 
Index Index 
Rank Industry number Rank Industry number 
1939" 100 
1. Electric light and power 1,761 18. Telephone 307 
2. Manufactured gas 1,176 19. Natural gas 296 
3. Rubber products 878 20., Misc. manufacturing 292 
4. Tobacco manufacturing 620 21. Fab. metals 291 
5. Transportation cost 608 22. Primary metals 284 
6. Oil and gas 501 23. Telegraph 263 
7. Chemicals 435 24. Non-electric machines 251 
8. Printing and publishing 432 25. Apparel 246 
9. Stone, clay, glass 412 26. Farming (gross income) 244 
10. Railroad 390 27. Foods 241 
11. Won metals 390 28. Beverages 238 
12. Local transit 372 29. Bit. coal 230 
13. Paper 359 30. Furniture 208 
llu Petroleum and coal 338 31. Leather production 198 
15. Electric machines 338 32. Farming (net income) 184 
16. Textiles 325 33. Lumber products 177 
17. Metals 317 34. Anthracite coal 147 
aSource: U.S. Department of Labor (220). 
R^anked by size of index number from largest to smallest. 
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provide an opposite bias to that involved in assuming constance of 
prices. The E values estimated in Table 29 of the Appendix are presented 
in tabular form in Table 26. 
Table 26. The E vector3. 
Sector E value Sector E value 
1 Agriculture 1.00" 22 Furniture 1.00 
2 Forestry 0.9$ 23 Other wood 1.00 
3 Fishing and hunting 1.00 24 Paper 0.9$ 
4 Metal mining 0.90 2$ Printing 0.80 
$ Coal and petroleum 0.6$ 26 Iron and steel 0.80 
6 Non-metal mining 1.00 27 Agricultural implements 0.90 
7 Meat products 1.00 28 Iron n.e.s. 0.90 
8 Dairy products 0.96 29 Transport equipment 0.93 
9 Fish processing 0.9$ 30 Jewelery 1.00 
10 Fruit and vegetables 0.90 31 Non-Fe. metal n.e.s. 0.90 
11 Grain mill 0.97 32 Elect, apparatus 1.00 
12 Bakery products 0.98 33 Non-metallic minerals 0.9$ 
13 Carbonated bev. 1.00 34 Products of oil 0.9$ 
14 Alcoholic bev. 1.00 3$ Chemicals 0.90 
15 Conf. and sugar 0.89 36 Misc. manufacturing 1.00 
16 Misc. foods 0.90 37 Construction 0.8$ 
17 Tobacco 0.88 38 Transportation, trade 0.80 
18 Rubber 0.93 39 Communication 0.9$ 
19 Leather 0.96 40 Power, gas and water 0.80 
20 Textiles 0.80 41 Finance 0.9$ 
21 Clothing and furs 1.00 42 Service 0.9$ 
aSource: Table 29 of the Appendix. 
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5. Summary of calculations 
Using the E vector and a transactions matrix, it is possible in the 
manner already described, to compute a pecuniary externality matrix. This 
has been done. The results are presented in Table 30 of the Appendix. 
The procedure is as follows : Obtain a set of equations in the usual man­
ner of input-output analysis. 
5. fx] + [y] « [x*]. That is, 
[interindustry use"} + [direct consumption^  = [total outputij 
xi i Then, obtain an a matrix, the elements of which are a-j = —and write 
6. [a][x]- [y] . 
Equation 6 is thought inaccurate when applied at the margin due to scale 
economies. Next, modify the a^ j values so they express estimated factor 
X  *  •  
requirements at the margin. That is, a- = = -~tl (E.). Invert the 
- - j 
matrix. resultant |a 
Here M 
-i 
M - [*]• 
is the matrix multiplier. Premultiply the | aj by a vector 
obtained by subtracting each value of E from one. 
-1 
i. [ i - # ] '  - [ t ] .  
Here T is the pecuniary externality matrix. T^ j is the extra profits 
or savings or undisbursed funds available in industry i which arise as a 
consequence of a one dollar expansion in industry j. 
An example of the use to which this matrix may be put is provided 
by Table 27 and the subsequent discussion. Unfortunately Table 27 pro­
vides a contrast with the E vector and the externality matrix, rather 
than a test of the accuracy of the externality matrix. No method of 
Total 27. Investment required per dollar's worth of output3. 
Longevity^  Investment 
Net capital*5 Cap ital Weighted per dollar 
Sector Const. Eqt. Total Output0 output Const. Eqt. longevity output^  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
560.5 1351.3 1911.8 1601 
91.3 58.1 lU9.il 316 
148.3(e) 67.3 215.6 81 
486.1(E) 295.5 781.6(e) 665 
99.9(e) 126.7 226.6 247 
128.4(E) 122.8 251.2 304 
45.8(e) 43.8 89.6 18$ 
1.19 
0.47 
2.66 
1.18 
0.92 
0.83 
0.48 
4o 
21 
13 
9 
6 
30(e) 16 
50 
50 
50 
18 
14 
16 
20.9 
16.3 
1 ' 
24.7 
32.10 
32.4 
33.4 
0.057 
0.02? 
1  
0.048 
0.028 
0.026 
0.014 
S^ource: Calculated from tables in Hood (99, Appendix to chapter 6). 
C^apital is divided into two categories which correspond to buildings (construction) and 
equipment and machinery (equipment). 
c0utput is in terms of gross domestic product in 1949. 
dLife expectancy (years). 
W^eights are values of construction capital and equipment capital. 
f n  Column 5 divided by column 8. 
Total 27. (Continued) 
Longevi tyb d Investment Net capital c Capital Weighted per dollar 
Sector Const. Eqt. Total Output6 output Const. Eqt. longevity output*-
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (6) (9) 
20 159.4(E) 152.4 311.8 239 1.30 50 21 26.6 0.049 
21 U9i7(E) 47.6 97.3 290 0.34 50 16 33.4 0.010 
22 77.0(E) 22.9 99.9 72 1.39 35 18 31.1 0.045 
23 118.3 70.0 188.3 245 0.77 35 18 29.7 0.026 
24 374.7 ' 273.8 648.5 407 1.59 5o 21 37.8 0.042 
25 62.1(E) 59.4 121.5 189 0.64 5o 17 33.9 0.019 
£0 
27 
Ofi 
289.0(E) 276.3 565.3 619 0.91 50 16 33.4 0.027 
29g 
on 
78.7(E) 75.2 153.9 454 0.34 50 19(E) 34.9 0.009 
JU 
31 
32 
107.0(E) 102.3 209.3 305 0.69 50 20 33.8 0.020 
33 
34 
86.1(E) 109.1 195.2 197 0.99 50 21 33.8 0.029 
35 134.3(5) 106.4 240.7 199 1.21 50 20 36.7 0.033 
36 23.2(E) 22.2 45.4 82 0.56 50 15 32.9 0.017 
37 59.6 205.6 265.2 1090 0.24 25 9 12.6 0.019 
38 
39 3835.8 1630.3 5466.1 3353 1.63 50 16 39.9 0.041 
4o 1505.8 438.5 1944.3 277 7.02 55 30 49.4 0.142 
41 304.1 30.6 334.7 1183 0.28 5o 15 46.8 0.006 
42 371.2 218.8 590.0 2296 0.26 50 13 36.1 0.007 
Subtotal 9196.3 5906.9 15103.2 
Error 749.6 790.9 1540.5 
Total econ. 9945.9 6697.8 16643.7 14885 1.12 35.2 . 0.032 
T^he method of evaluating capital does not seem appropriate in this case. 
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testing the validity of the pecuniary externality matrix has been devel­
oped. 
6. Requirements of investment funds 
If Table 30 of the Appendix provides a description of the manner 
in which potential investment funds accrue as^ ihe Canadian economy grows, 
is there some measure of whether or not such funds accrue in an appro­
priate manner? The calculations in Table 27 have been undertaken in an 
attempt to provide such a criterion. The data, especially that on capital 
longevity, must be regarded as of extremely poor quality. Nevertheless 
such detailed information as is provided in Table 27 is not available 
in many countries. It is interesting to compare Table 30 of the Appendix 
(the externality matrix) with column 9 of Table 27. 
The absolute level of the figures in column 9 must be regarded as 
approximate. Capital longevity figures are not very accurate and the 
level of capital values depends on the deflators used. But the relative 
values of these figures are presumably much more satisfactory. Probably 
it does take about twice as much capital to produce one dollar's worth 
of agricultural products as it takes to produce one dollar's worth of 
fishery products. Again observe that column 9 of this table abstracts 
from time considerations. 
If additional output must be obtained immediately, column 5 is the 
relevant column. Columns 5 and 9 may be compared with the pecuniary 
externality matrix [t] (Table 30 of the Appendix). Naturally, it is 
necessary to simplify somewhat in order to make this comparison. 
The method of rank correlation has been used to compare the pecuniary 
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externality matrix with columns S and 9 of Table 27. 
Unfortunately the interpretation of this test is not unambiguous. 
If the correlation is low it may be because of the crude nature of the 
data, or it may be because profits accrue in an inappropriate manner. 
The coefficient of rank correlation is unlikely to be very meaningful 
for this reason. If the coefficient is high it means both that the data 
is tolerably accurate and that pecuniary externalities accrue in an 
appropriate manner. 
Rank correlation between the pecuniary externality matrix (appro­
priately collapsed into a vector by assuming a one dollar expansion in 
every sector) and column 5 Table 27 is only 0.007, p = 0.468. Rank 
correlation between column 9 of Table 27 (capital output ratio where 
capital is adjusted for longevity) is 0.802, p = 0.198. 
The coefficients of rank correlation are not large enough to lead 
to rejection of the hypothesis that there fails to be a correspondence 
between the accruals of pecuniary externalities and the need for invest­
ment funds. However, the hypothesis that pecuniary' externalities accrue 
to those industries which most need investment funds cannot be accepted. 
There may be some tendency in this direction (as is indicated by the 
relatively low probability of obtaining a rank correlation of 0.802 by 
chance alone) but the model here used is not adequate for testing this 
hypothesis. 
When the capital market is imperfect, economic development may fail 
to be a maximum because pecuniary externalities accrue in an inappropriate 
manner. 
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B. Summary 
In this chapter an attempt is made to quantify pecuniary exter­
nalities. in the Canadian economy. To the author's knowledge there has 
been no previous attempt to measure the importance of externalities. 
This is partly because the influences of an outside action on any one 
firm are extremely complex. The direct effect of firm A's action on firm 
B's profits tells only part of the story. Firm A's action stimulates 
action on the part of other firms, C,D,E, and their reactions in turn 
have secondary effects on Firm B. A's action affects B in both a direct 
and an indirect manner. In this chapter an input-output model of the 
economy is used as a framework for studying the complex nature of action 
and reaction. 
Using an estimate of the cost function in each sector, it is possible 
to modify the input-output matrixes to obtain a matrix multiplier that 
is consistent with economies or diseconomies of scale. But as this 
involves a fairly expensive matrix inversion, and may not greatly alter 
the Leontief input-output matrix, it could be avoided for many purposes. 
The cost functions may be used, under the assumption of constant 
prices, in combination with the matrix multiplier to compute the amount 
of undisbursed funds accruing in each sector as a consequence of a one 
dollar expansion in output in any other sector. A table of such values 
has been computed and is presented in the Appendix (Table 30). 
Such a table may be used to study the question whether, in a growing 
economy, funds accrue in industries which most need them. By way of 
example, a brief study is made (see Table 27) of accrual of undisbursed 
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funds in the Canadian economy. An attempt is made to see if such funds 
accrue in those sectors which most need capital investment. Although no 
definite conclusions can be reached it seems likely that, there is little 
tendancy toward correspondence between sources of investment funds (in 
pecuniary externalities) and funds required for capital expansion. 
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VII. SUMMARY AMD CONCLUSIONS 
A. Purpose 
This is a study of the manner in which external economies and dis­
economies influence economic development. External economies and dis­
economies comprise a rather old subject, but unfortunately, there are 
still many ambiguities and confusing passages in the voluminous liter­
ature on the subject. Moreover, there has been comparatively little 
attention devoted to the manner in which external economies and dis­
economies influence economic growth and development. It is not clear, 
for example, whether the presence of external economies acts to promote 
or to retard the rate of economic development. In fact, it is not even 
clear that the terms external economy and external diseconomy can be 
meaningfully defined. What is by now clear, is that economists writing 
about economic development impart a different meaning to these words than 
that which was spelled out by Alfred Marshall (13U) when he hirst defined 
them. 
This study is therefore a part of a broader question: does the in­
visible hand work to promote economic development in modern mixed econ­
omies containing government and monopoly elements: Dorfman, Samuelson 
and Solow (I4.8) have put forward a dynamic invisible hand formulation. 
It appears that a correspondence between the results of the freely oper­
ating price system and a Pareto welfare criterion exists, provided that 
time rates of change of all money prices are perfectly known to all 
marketers. This requirement is never met in practice. Moreover, it is not 
clear that a dynamic Pareto optimum can be satisfactorily defined. Still 
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the practical question is: does the invisible hand provide an approximate 
model of reality? 
Practical limitations have forced the all-encompassing problems into 
the background in this study. More limited and specific questions, such 
as the following, have been considered. What market imperfections inter­
fere with duality? What types of market imperfections may be called 
external economies? How can external economies be defined? And, should 
external diseconomies always be avoided? 
B. Definitions 
In this thesis the terms external economy and external diseconomy 
are collapsed into the single term externality.,r This is a convenience 
that simplifies exposition. Moreover, in situations that involve im­
perfect competition it is not altogether clear how economies can be 
separated from diseconomies. For example, were a firm to undertake 
additional expenditure in order to obtain advantages from a market en­
larged by a second firm, it may be difficult to determine whether an 
economy or a diseconomy is involved. This dilemma can be circumvented 
by using the word externality. 
There are three difficulties which must be overcome before a mean­
ingful definition of externalities is available. The first problem is 
one of relating externalities to welfare norms when these norms (for 
example, the ideal rate of capital formation) are unknown. The second 
"""This term was first used by Bator (9). 
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problem is one of obtaining a quantitively meaningful definition (in 
terms of money values) even though external influences are not exchanged, 
in the market place, and when, under non-constant returns to scale, 
external influences cannot be evaluated using productivity theory. This 
difficulty in evaluating externalities is called the problem of impu­
tation. The third problem involves obtaining a definition which has 
value for policy decisions. When the business world is imperfect (that 
is, not perfectly competitive) it is not valid to make policy recom­
mendations which are oriented toward competitive norms. This is called 
the problem of the second best. Thus, although an external influence 
obviously interferes with perfectly competitive norms, it may be undesir­
able in an imperfect world, to recommend the removal of such an external 
influence. 
There is a temptation to define externalities as a deviation from 
the MPC equals MSC criterion. But such a definition is not useful because 
the meaning of MSC is by no means clear. In fact use of the term MSC 
presupposes an ability to measure externalities. 
Here externalities are defined in two ways. If socially relevant 
information is ignored by decision makers because their incentives are 
not identical with those of society in general, an externality may be 
said to exist. This definition is rather relaxed and imprecise. A more 
exact definition and the one most frequently used in this study is as 
follows. When some firm A takes some action that influences B in such a 
"*MSC = MPC + externalities, where externalities are appropriately 
defined. Obviously, this equation does not define externalities unless 
MSC is known or can be obtained, from some other source. 
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way that B's profits are increased or reduced, but when A receives or 
pays no compensation for this action, an externality may be said to exist. 
The ramifications of this definition received extensive treatment in 
chapter U. The definition is used as a tool of positive economics. This, 
unfortunately, is not in the tradition of Marshall and Pigou who were able 
to relate external economies and diseconomies to norms of public welfare. 
But until more satisfactory intertemporal welfare models are available, 
it seems wise to take a positive rather than a normative approach. 
Positive rather than normative usage also avoids problems of the second 
best, but unfortunately this means that very little may be said about 
the policy implications of externalities. The problem of imputation is 
avoided, as far as possible by considering only incremental changes. 
Thus it is unnecessary (as well as impossible) to evaluate a total exter­
nal influence. It is not possible to say anything about how much A's 
presence is worth to B — but it still may be possible to say something 
worthwhile about how much it is worth to B if A increases its output by 
one percent. 
A number of other terms have been defined in this study. Concepts 
such as economic growth, economic development, invention, and innovation 
were defined and considered in context. 
C. Historical Development 
The classical economists apparently treated most or all industrial 
pursuits as subject to falling average costs. Only agriculture was sub­
ject to increasing costs. Marshall had a more refined view. Some firms 
were subject to increasing, others to decreasing costs, moreover, some 
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whole industries were subject to increasing, and others to decreasing 
costs. This was because of such phenomena as falling industrial demand 
schedules, general progress of the environment, or scarce skilled labor, 
and technological progress. The last two, when generated in one firm, 
might be used by another. Thus, to Marshall (13U), external economies 
and diseconomies were partly a means of treating the problem of imperfect 
competition. 
Pigou (159) attempted to relate external economies and diseconomies 
to welfare economics. His statements, while intuitively plausible, lacked 
theoretic rigor, so that Allyn Young (236), Robertson (166), Clapham (35»), 
and Knight (116) were able to find fault with his models. However, there 
were by- this time sufficient examples of externalities that the subject 
remained of interest. One particularly intriguing example involved 
financing a subway. The subway would be profitable if the financing firm 
owned contiguous real estate because such real estate would appreciate 
in value due to presence of the subway. But the subway would be unprof­
itable if the financing firm did not own the contiguous real estate. 
Moreover, the financing company might not be able to purchase the appro­
priate real estate without a prohibitive inflation of real estate values. 
It was thought that appreciation in values of contiguous real estate 
would, so far as the whole society was concerned, be negated by depre­
ciation in values of non-contiguous real estate. But the present study 
appears to indicate that where the subway generates growth rather than 
-just movement, there is no necessity for a depreciation of any non­
contiguous real estate values. However, subject matters such as this 
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received comparatively little attention in Marshall's time because eco-
nonists were working out the welfare implications of perfect competition. 
Economists at this time were handicapped by a lack of a theory of 
imperfect competition. If there were economies of scale it seemed that 
individual firms must expand until either monopoly resulted or the 
economies of scale were completely utilized. About this time, following 
the pioneer effort of Douglas and Cobb, a fairly large number of empir­
ical studies purported to show that increasing returns to scale was not 
a particularly important phenomenon. Rather, approximately constant 
returns to scale appeared to be the rule. These empirical findings dis­
couraged the study of economies of scale whether these be internal or 
external to the individual firm. 
Welfare economists continued to investigate the consequences of 
increasing returns but were unable to overcome the problem of income dis­
tribution. Under increasing returns, if factors are paid their MVP, 
firms will disburse more in factor payments than they receive for the 
product. 
Income distribution is a similar problem (though not as pressing) 
when there is decreasing returns to scale. Unfortunately, contemporary 
welfare theory still is unable to tell us very much about normative income 
distribution. 
Because most of the study of income distribution was done by welfare 
economists, the orientation of such studies was toward income distribution 
among ultimate consumers. Implications of income distribution among 
intermediate manufacturing firms was frequently ignored. The means to 
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this end was simply the assumption of a perfect capital market. Only in 
comparatively recent times have the implications of this assumption been 
seriously investigated. It is, for example, now clear that a large part 
of the capital expansion of most firms is internally financed. Similarly, 
technological development upon which economic growth so greatly depends, 
is largely a product of research and development work undertaken by large 
corporations and financed out of internal profits. 
Moreover, it has now become clear that earlier empirical studies 
which concluded that most industries were subject to approximately con­
stant returns to scale, were not the last word. It appears that most 
firms are subject to gradually falling costs throughout a great part if 
not all of their feasible output range. It also seems likely that many 
industries are subject to increasing returns to scale, but that the 
limited size of the market prevents such industries from expanding into 
the lowest-cost output range. 
D. Types of Market Failure 
By market failure is meant the failure of the mixed economy to pro­
duce results in correspondence with an arbitrary set of conventional wel­
fare norms. But, economists concerned with economic development have 
defined external economies and diseconomies in such a way as to relate 
these concepts to profits within the firm and not to welfare norms. The 
above definition of externalities is in the more recent tradition: 
externalities are related to profits. But it seems wise to follow 
Marshall, and direct most of the study towards problems of scale; that 
is, the relation of A1s changes in scale to B's profits. 
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Economies of scale may be internal or external. They may not result 
in market failure. But there are various types of situations which relate 
to externalities, and which do exhibit tendencies toward market failure. 
It is appropriate to consider these one by one. 
1. Factor indivisibilities 
Factor indivisibilities may give rise to non-constant returns to 
scale. The indivisible factor may be privately owned or publicly owned. 
Especially in the latter case there arises the problem of pricing. It 
may not be possible to set price equal to MVP or MRP. The same price 
may not be appropriate on both sides of the market. This is a rather 
old problem that has been extensively treated elsewhere. 
2. LI on-c onvex i ty 
It may happen that technological developments give rise to non-
convexity in the time path of cost functions. An example may be useful. 
An economy which makes use of blacksmiths for a comparatively long period 
of time may result in a generation of blacksmiths and blacksmiths' sons 
who are extremely inventive and therefore who develop new technological 
methods of forging iron, stamping metals and machining hard substances. 
These inventions may be of such great importance that costs fall a good 
deal. But costs may fall even farther when those who become skilled and 
knowledgeable in the new machines in turn invent better machines and 
improve the old machines. But an alternative procedure may make use of 
blacksmiths for such a short period of time (for example, because of the 
opportunity to borrow technology from a neighboring economy) that 
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blacksmiths1 skills and innovating ability are not developed. The latter 
economy may continue to borrow technology and never develop its own. As 
a consequence of this, if it has different factor endowments and different 
technological problems, its costs may forever remain high relative to 
what they might be, paradoxically because of its very anxiety to obtain 
the latest technological equipment. The matter is extremely complex, and 
has received little study. It is possible that an economy must remain 
in a given technological situation, using given (perhaps archaic) produc­
tion functions for a comparatively long period of time before the 
technology-creating process becomes self-sustaining. There may be a 
take-off into self-sustaining technology as well as a take-off into self-
sustaining growth. 
3. Mon-appropri abilities 
When activity of one firm creates an economy in a second firm, (as 
when the bees from an apiary fertilize an orchardist's fruit blossoms), 
and when the economy creating activity is not rewarded by the firm which 
receives it, a non-appropriabi1ity is said to exist. However, when such 
activity is harmful, (without retribution) the activity is said to be non-
culpable. (For example, air pollution increases the corrosion rate of 
exposed metals.) In either case duality fails, and the market system 
apparently does not provide the ideal allocation of resources. 
U. Irreversibilities 
A great part of economic theory is based upon the assumption that 
changes are not irreversible. But, in fact, soils do erode and certain 
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economic institutions (old age pensions and children's allowances, for 
example) appear to be politically irrevocable. In such situations the 
process of tâtonnement does not work. Intervention by government may be 
required! Government, for example, may have to prevent individual persons 
from following policies that erode soils or reduce the reproductive 
ability of forests. Such people may be acting rationally given their 
time horizon, but the time horizon of society is longer than that of 
any individual, so that it is not appropriate to allow individuals to 
commit society to an irreversible course of action. If this is allowed, 
market failure may result and the rate of economic developments may be 
less than the possible rate. 
5. Equilibrium difficulties 
The hog-cycle is an example of market failure due to interdependent 
anticipations. It is evident that such situations involve interdepend­
ence of profits. There is presumably no reason to assume that when 
equilibrium difficulties confront an economy, profits will accrue to, 
those firms which are particularly in need of funds for expansion. It 
seems, in fact, as likely that windfall gains and losses will occur in 
a more or less random fashion. This is not serious where the capital 
market is perfect, elsewhere it may result in failure of economic 
development. 
6. Social goods 
When consumption by any one individual of a given commodity does 
not reduce the amount of that commodity remaining for others to consume, 
the commodity may be termed a social good. Perhaps the best example is 
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national defense. But there are other similar situations—road side 
parks, clearing malarial swamps, highways and roads, good health, and 
economic development. By the very.nature of a social good, individual 
purchases are inappropriate. Private police protection as well as private 
defense against an attacking country is absurd. Similarly most indi­
viduals working alone cannot drain a malarial swamp, bring about economic 
development, or reduce the hazards of communicable diseases. 
But there are all grades of social goods from the purely social, 
through the partly social to those having very small social contents and 
finally to purely private goods. And whether or not a good is a social 
good depends partly on whether or not individuals would rationally pur­
chase such a good. Individuals can do something about communicable 
diseases — they may avoid other people. Individuals also may do some­
thing about national defense — they may volunteer for dangerous military 
service at low rates of pay. But in general, these things must be forced 
upon individuals who realize that their own action comprises but a tiny 
fraction of the resources needed for accomplishment of the goal. Thus 
it is, that rumors of government activity in any area which has hitherto 
been a subject for private individual responsibility tends to discourage 
such private responsibility. Individuals expect the subject good to 
become a social good. But such expectations reduce private purchases so 
that, if the good is really needed by the society, government finds after 
a while that it must provide such services or they will not be provided. 
The good becomes a social good solely because it is expected to become a 
social good. 
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Health insurance may be a case in point; individuals can purchase 
health insurance, but they are not likely to do so if they believe the 
government will soon provide a health insurance scheme. And, the fact 
that individuals fail to look after themselves in this manner may force 
the government to provide a health scheme. 
All these difficulties may involve market failure of a type that 
leads to sub-optimum economic development. It is reasonable to suppose 
that at times each type of market failure acts to reduce the rate of 
economic growth. 
E. The Question of Entry 
Entry represents what is perhaps one of the more important types of 
externalities. Establishing firms may, of course, provide either sub­
stitute or complementary goods. They may also use the same factors as, 
or factors that are complementary in some production process with, those 
used by the affected firm. It is possible to define three types of 
entry: neutral, completing, and aggressive. 1. Neutral entry involves 
establishment of a new firm, B, in an area in such a way that firm A's 
profits are not positively or negatively affected. B!s entry does not 
cause an externality in A. 2. Completing entry involves establishment 
in an area of some firm, B, which produces a good which firm A may use 
as a factor, or which is complementary with firm A's product. Therefore, 
completing entry involves a positive externality in firm A. 3» Aggres­
sive entry involves establishment of some firm, B, in an area serviced 
by firm A in such a way that A's business (profit) is reduced by B's 
entry. For example, if firm B produces the same or a competing product, 
181 
there will be a negative externality in firm A. These cases are all 
possible although they are perhaps not all equally likely to happen. 
Neutral entry would seem rather unlikely and completing entry must gen­
erally involve factor suppliers. In the modern oligopolistic situation 
aggressive entry appears to be the general case. 
It is possible that economic development might be promoted in some 
situations by a device intended to protect existent firms from the pred­
atory tactics of entrants. The fact is that western capitalism provides 
more protection for the developer of a technical device than for the 
developer of a market; more protection for an invention than for a product. 
Indeed, market size and power or monopoly is one of the few effective 
defenses against predatory tactics. There is no reason to assume that 
the right amount of protection is offered to either inventors or devel­
opers. Perhaps inventors obtain too much protection and developers too 
little. 
F. Quantification of Pecuniary Externalities 
An attempt was made to provide some measurement of externalities in 
the Canadian economy. The Canadian economy has been characterized in 
recent years by a tendency toward stagnation and a high level of unemploy­
ment, as well as by a vast increase in some industries in the flow of 
investment funds from other countries. It is therefore thought that a 
study of the generation of pecuniary externalities (loosely, profits 
caused by the activity of other firms) would be of some use in examining 
the reasons for these two tendencies. 
The effect of any one sector of the economy on any other sector is, 
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of course, extremely complex and to attempt to quantify this effect and 
to measure it in terms of profits caused cannot be undertaken with a 
simple model. It is not possible to examine only firms A and B and to 
say that if A increases its output by one percent then B's profits will 
be changed by x percent. Rather, A's action will affect all the other 
industries in the economy; they will in turn react, and all these re­
actions will influence B's profits. In this study a modified input-
» 
output model was used. The input-output coefficients were modified by 
estimates for each sector of the cost function that was applicable to 
that sector. 
Unfortunately, while the data are relatively good, they are not of 
sufficient accuracy to make estimates of pecuniary externalities very pre­
cise. Perhaps the weakest link in the data is the estimates of cost 
functions. Despite the enormous amount of work that has been done in 
estimation of cost functions there is still great doubt respecting the 
shape of the cost functions for any firm and any industry. 
In this study, estimates of cost functions for the sector were 
obtained by estimating the elasticity of costs with respect to output. 
That is, a single coefficient for each sector was obtained; this coeffi­
cient represents the percent change in costs divided by the percent 
change in output. Inter-firm data were used in obtaining these elas­
ticities. It should be noticed that such cross-sectional data are fre­
quently used as the basis for estimates of LAC curves within firms. But 
such cross-sectional data are just as valid a source of information 
respecting the cost function for the whole industry. It is necessary to 
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assume that increments in output are distributed among firms in pro­
portion to output of firms in the previous time period, that is, firms 
having i percent of the total output in the initial time period obtain 
i percent of the increment in output. Constant prices are assumed. 
Proceeding in this mannc the modified inverse is a matrix multiplier 
having properties analogous to the Keynesian multiplier. This multiplier 
indicates the change in demand for the product of each sector that derives 
from a change of one dollar in the exogenous expenditure on any other sec­
tor. It is possible to combine this multiplier with the cost function 
for the industry in order to obtain estimates of pecuniary externalities. 
For example, if sector A expands by one dollar's worth and this gives 
rise to a derived demand for the products of sector B of SO.LS, and if 
we know that one percent increments in the output of sector B may be had 
for an additional expenditure of only 0,8 percent, there will arise in 
sector B a pecuniary externality of SO.09. (That is, 1-0.8 = 0.2 X SO.LS 
equals $0.09.) 
This procedure has been followed and the pecuniary externality 
matrix presented in Table 30 of the Appendix is the result. 
Conclusions that follow directly from the multiplier or externality 
matrix are as follows. 1. Making allowance for a cost function in each 
sector results in a matrix multiplier with some elements in common and 
some elements smaller than the Leontief matrix. That is, elements exhibit 
more dispersion than the Leontief matrix; they are in general smaller. 
They are sufficiently similar to the Leontief interdependence matrix that 
for many purposes the two are interchangeable. 
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2. A $1.00 expansion of every sector of the Canadian economy would 
produce undisbursed funds of '2$ to cents in textiles, printing and 
publishing, primary iron and steel, construction, electric power, gas 
and water utilities. But a similar change leads to less than one cent 
undisbursed funds in agriculture, fisheries, forestry, mining, meat 
products, carbonated beverages, alcoholic beverages, tobacco, clothing, 
furniture, wood products, jewelery and silverware, electric appliances 
and supplies, and miscellaneous manufacturing industries. The latter 
industries are, in general, those industries subject to roughly constant 
returns to scale. 
3. Undisbursed funds in sector i that result from a *1.00 expansion 
in output in sector j are generally of rather small magnitude. Only about 
H percent involve sums larger than one cent. But a large number (about 
23 percent) involve sums larger than one tenth of a cent. 
Comparison of externalities created by expansion of all sectors with 
funds needed for investment to facilitate that expansion is useful. 
Undisbursed funds resultant from an expansion of *1.00 in every sector 
of the Canadian economy range from zero dollars in agriculture and fish­
eries to Si.13 in the transportation sector. Thus, even though the 
transportation industry is relatively capital intensive (Capital output 
ratio = 1.63) it appears that this sector could easily be self-financing. 
In Table 28 pecuniary externalities are presented for each sector. Again, 
these are the undisbursed funds which arise in each sector following a 
Sl*2.00 expansion (one dollar for each sector) in the Canadian economy. 
Capital output ratios are also presented in Table 28 for comparison. 
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Table 28. Pecuniary externalities and capital output ratios following 
one dollar expansion in every sector of the Canadian economy 
Sector 
Externalitya Capital'3 
(dollars) Output 
(1) (2) 
1. Agriculture 0.000 1.19 
2. Forestry 0.090 0.L7 
3. Fisheries 0.000 2.66 
Li. Metal mining 0.153 
5. Coal mining 0.202 1.18 
6. Non-metal mining 0.000 
7. Meat products 0.000 
8. Dairy products 0.021 
9. Fish processing 0.051 0.92 
10. Fruit and vegetable preparation 0.220 
11. Grain mill products o.oLL 
12. 'Bakery products 0.020 ' 
13. Carbonated beverages 0.000 
lu. Alcoholic beverages 0.000 0.83 
15. Confectionery and sugar 0.039 
16. Miscellaneous foods 0,123 
17. Tobacco and products 0.000 
18. Rubber products 0.082 0.L8 
19. Leather products o.oUl 
20. Textile products 0.311 1.30 
21. Clothing 0.000 0.3b 
22. Furniture 0.000 1.39 
23- Wood products 0.000 0.77 
2h. Paper 0.088 1.59 
25. Printing, publishing 0.252 0.6U 
26. Iron and steel 0.295 
27. Agricultural implements 0.101 0.91 
28. Iron and steel n.e.s. 0.238 
29. Transportation 0.112 0.3L 
30. Jewelery 0.000 
31. Non-ferrous metal 0.122 0.69 
32. Electrical apparatus 0.000 
33. Non-metallic minerals 0.010 
0.99 3U. Products of petroleum and coal 0.100 
35. Chemical and allied products 0.159 1.21 
36. Miscellaneous manufacturing 0.000 0.56 
37. Construction 0.302 0.21* 
38. Transportation, storage, trade 1.130 
1.63 39. Communication 0.067 
ho. Electric power, gas, water 0.293 7.02 
14. Finance o.ioU 0.28 
h2. Service 0.089 0.26 
^Source : from column h3> Table 3 0 of the Appendix. 
bSource; from column Table 27 . 
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The rank correlation between the pecuniary externalities in the 
first column and the capital output ratios in the second column is 0.802. 
A rank correlation this high occurs with probability 0.1?8, or about one 
time in every five. The hypothesis that pecuniary externalities fail to 
accrue in an appropriate manner can therefore not be rejected. 
G. Suggestions for Further Research 
The quantitative section of this study suffers from use of imprecise 
data and rather poor estimates, especially of cost functions. The situ­
ation is, in fact, something of a paradox, for in a modern capitalist 
country where data is abundant the capital market is relatively good. 
Thus, if it were possible in such an economy to demonstrate that pecuniary 
externalities did not accrue in an appropriate manner, the results might 
be largely irrelevant because of the excellence of the capital market. 
In an underdeveloped economy the capital market is likely to be most 
imperfect and failure of development may accompany inappropriate profit 
accruals. At the same time, in an underdeveloped economy, the sources 
of data are likely to be so imperfect that no one can find out very much 
about pecuniary externalities. Thus, results may only be obtained where 
there is little point in obtaining them. The whole subject is one rather 
well suited to investigation in a relatively small, relatively under­
developed economy such as is Canada's. It is to be hoped that the matrix 
of pecuniary externalities developed in this study can be checked against 
data on changing profits in Canadian industries. 
The cost structure of industries is worth investigating for its own 
sake. But unfortunately, production costs in firms still get most of the 
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attention. 
Much more study should be made of the income of firms and industries. 
It is not really possible to take shelter behind the assumed perfection 
of the capital market. For even a perfect capital market would not allot 
funds to an elixir manufacturer, if the preparation proved non-appropri-
able. The general tendency to ignore income distribution among firms may 
be a carry-over from the failure of welfare economics to satisfactorily 
treat this problem in consumption. If so, the tendency is both unfor­
dinate and based on a false premise, for income among firms is very in­
timately a production problem and only remotely a welfare problem. 
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IX. APPENDIX 
Table 29. Estimation of the economies of scale vector 
Description of 
relevant information Coefficient 
Classification of 
industry and source 
of data 
1. Agriculture 
Iowa crop farms 1.06 
000 to 079 
Heady (8k, p. 359) 
Iowa hog farms 1.03 
Iowa dairy farms 1.22 
Iowa general farms 1.06 
Iowa large farms ..... 1.03 
Iowa small farms 1.23 
Southern Iowa 0.90 
Central Iowa 0.91 
Iowa crop production ...... 1.23 
Iowa livestock production -, 0.90 
United States 1.82, 1.18, 1.15, 0.27 Table 2 
Rank » 25/3U (gross income) and 3l/3k (net income) Table 25 
E = 1.00 
2. Forestry 
Fir lumber production 0.9520 
Lumber products Rank = 32/3k 
E - 0.95 
3. Fishing, hunting and trapping 
No information 
E - 1.00 
k. Metal mining, smelting and refining 
Iron ore mining 0.51-0.85 
Copper mining 0.59-0.8k 
Pig iron (operating costs) 0.50 
Agitated vessels (installation)... O.k7 
Furnaces (installed) 0.k3-0.85 
Metals Rank » 17/3k 
Iron and steel Rank = 7/27 
E - 0.90 
060 to 069 
Eq. 21, Table 20 
Table 25 
091 to 097 
101-119, 3k5 
Figure 12 
Figure 13 
Table 21 
Table 21 
Table 21 
Table 25 
Table 2k 
20$ 
Table 29= (Continued) 
Classification of 
Description of industry and source 
relevant information Coefficient of data 
$. Coal mining, crude petroleum and natural gas 121-126 
Coal mining U.K 0.9762 Eq. Ik, Table 20 
Coal mining U.K. 0.902] Eq. 16, Table 20 
Coal mining U.K « 0.8300 Eq. 17, Table 20 
Coal mining U.S.A 0.96$k Eq. 18, Table 20 
Coal mining U.S.A. 0.9$ Figure lk 
Crude petroleum....O.78, 0.61, 0.73, O.67, 0.71 Figure 1$ 
Pipe lines O.67 Haldi (82, p. 36) 
Bituminous mining Rank = 29/3k anthracite 
Rank = 3k/3k Table 2$ 
Oil and gas Rank = 6/3 k Table 2$ 
Petroleum and coal Rank = 1U/3U Table 2$ 
Bituminous Rank = 20/27 Table 2k 
E = 0.8$ 
6. Non-metal jaining, quarrying and prospecting 131-133, 139-179 
See coal mining data in sector $. 
See metal mining data under sector lu 
Non-metal mining Rank = ll/2k 
E = 1.00 
7. Meat products 
Refrigeration ( installed) 0.68 
Meat packing Rank = 26/27 
E = 1.00 
8. Dairy products 
Ice cream Rank = 2/27 
Food products 0.9010 
Food processing 0.938k 
Heat exchangers 0.$k-0.60 
Liquid filters (installed......... 0.ii3-0.60 
Liquid pumps (installed) 0.33-0.60 
Refrigeration units (installed)... 0.68 
Tanks 0.k$-0.73 
Milk evaporation 0.9k 
Milk dealers 0.9k 
Creameries 0.73-0.80 
E = 0.98 
Table 2$ 
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Haldi (62, p. 37) 
Table 2k 
201-209 
Table 2k 
Eq. 2k, Table 20 
Eq. 37, Table 20 
Table 21 
Table 21 
Table 21 
Table 21 
Table 21 
Figure 17 
Figure 18 
Figure 19 
Table 29. (Continued) 
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Description of 
relevant information Coefficient 
9. Fish processing 
Fish canning .» 0.93 
Refrigeration units (installed)... 0.68 
2 = 0.9$ 
10. Fruit and vegetable preparation. 
Food products 0.9010 
Food processing..... 0.938k 
Low temp. dehydration(Fruit juices 0.66 
Foods Rank = 27/3U 
Canning and preserving Rank = 13/27 
E = 0.90 
11. Grain mill products 
Wheat flour milling... 0.97 
Soybean extraction plants 
(construction) 0.70 
Flour, etc Rank = 25/27 
E = 0.97 
12. Bakery products 
Baking ' E = 0.98k3 
Bread, etc Rank = 27/27 
E = 0.98 
13. Carbonated beverages 
Beverages Rank = 28/3 k 
Demineralized water systems O.k7 
Pumps (installation) 0.k7 
Agitated vessels (installation) 0.k7 
Refrigeration units (installation)... 0.68 
E = 1.00 
liu Alcoholic beverages 
See under sector 13. 
Condensers (installation) 0.51-0.5k 
E = 1.00 
Classification of 
industry and source 
of data 
210 
Figure 20 
Haldi (82, p. 27) 
212 
Eq. 2k, Table 20 
Eq. 37, Table 20 
Haldi (82, p. 50) 
Table 25 
Table 2k 
213-216 
Figure 21 
Haldi (82, p. k6) 
Table 2k 
218-219 
Eq. 26, Table 20 
Table 2k 
220 
Table 25 
Haldi (82, p. 37)" 
" (82, p. 36) 
A' (82, p. 36) 
" (82, p. 37) 
221-22k 
Haldi (82, p. 36) 
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Table 29. (Continued) 
Description of 
relevant information Coefficient 
1$. Confectionery and sugar refining 
Sugar beet refining 0.8907 
Sugar beet refining... 0.81 
Confectionery Rank = 8/27 
Cane sugar refining Rank = 22/27 
E = 0.89 
16. Misc. food preparations 
See under sector 10. 
6 = 0.90 
17. Tobacco and tobacco products 
Cigar production E = 0.8816 
Tobacco manufacturing Rank = k/3k 
Tobacco products Rank = 23/3k 
E = 0.88 
18. Rubber products 
Tire and rubber production.... E = 0.9291 
Rubber tires and tubes Rank = k/27 
Rubber products Rank = 3/3k 
E = 0.93 
19. Leather products 
Leather belts 0.9588 
Footwear Rank = 19/27 
Leather Rank = 21/27 
Leather products Rank = 3l/3k 
E = 0.96 
20. Textile products except clothing 
Spin bath (rayon) E = 0.68 
Textiles.. Rank = l6/3k 
Cotton goods,. Rank = 12/27 
Rayon and'allied products Rank = l/27 
E = 0.80 
Classification of 
industry and source 
of data 
22$, 227 
Wiles (231, p. 228) 
Figure 29 
Table 2k 
Table 2k 
2 2 6 -
230 
Eq. 23, Table 20 
Table 2$ 
Table 2$ 
236, 239 
Eq. 3k. Table 20 
Table 2k 
Table 2$ 
2kl-2k9 
Eq. 13, Table 20 
Table 2k 
Table 2k 
Table 25 
2$l-269 
Haldi (62, p. 50) 
Table 25 
Table 2k 
Table 2k 
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Table 29. (Continued) 
Description of 
relevant information Coefficient 
21. Clothing (textiles and fur) 
Apparel Rank = 25/3L 
Hosiery Rank = 18/27 
Woolens and worsteds ,... Rank = 11/27 
3 = 1.00 
22. Furniture 
Furniture Rank = 29/3k 
See under sector 23 
E = 1.00 
23. Wood products except furniture 
Fir lumber E = 0.9520 
E - 1.00 
2it. Paper products 
Paper mills E = 0.80 
Newsprint E = 0.8228 
Kraft paper mill boilers E = 0.69 
Black liquour (sulphate 
operating).... E = 0.60 
Liquid filters (installed).... E = 0.5L 
Liquid pumps (installed)...... E = O.k7 
Paper Rank = 13/3U 
Pulp and paper mills Rank = 15/27 
E = 0.95 
25. Printing, publishing, etc. 
Printing and publishing Rank = 8/3I4 
E = 0.80 
26. Primary iron and steel 
Steel production 0.7825 
Steel production 0.72H7 
Iron production 0.69-0.80 
Pig iron (operating) E = 0.50 
Steel ingots (operating) E = 0.37 
Finished steel (operating) ... E = 0.50 
E = 0.80 
Classification of 
industry and source 
of data 
270-279 
Table 25 
Table 21;, 
Table 2k 
266 
Table 25 
281-285, 287-289 
Eq. 21, Table 20 
292-299 
Haldi (62, p. I46) 
Eq. 20, Table 20 
Haldi (82, p. 37) 
Haldi (82, p. 50) 
Haldi (82, p. 37) 
Haldi (62, p. 37) 
Table 25 
Table 21; 
301-309 
Table 25 
325 
Eq. 5, Table 20 
Eq. 6, Table 20 
Figure 22 
Haldi (82, p. $0) 
" (82, p. 50) 
" (82, p. 50) 
Table 29. (Continued.) 
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Classification of 
Description of industry and source 
relevant information Coefficient . of data 
27. Agricultural implements 
Farm and industrial machinery ... E = 0.70-0.99 
e = 0.90 
28. Iron and steel products n.e.s. 
Stainless plate E = 0.6] 
Construction and mining machinery E = 0.60 
e = 0.90 
29. Transportation equipment 
Automobiles E = 0.9101 
Tire and rubber production E = 0.9291 
Transportation equipment E = 5/3U 
E = 0.93 
30. Jewelery and silverware 
E = 1.00 
31. Non-ferrous metal products n.e.s. 
Construction costs metal plants . E = 1.01 
Copper condensers E = 0.$b 
See items under sector 28. 
e = 0.90 
32. Electrical apparatus and supplies 
Electrical products E = 1.0533 
Electric machines Rank = 15/3 k 
Electric motors (installed) 
(small motors) E = 0.36 
(large motors) E = 0.82 
E = 1.00 
325 
Figure 23 
312-j2k, 326-329 
Haldi (82, p. 38) 
Haldi (82, p. 36) 
330-339 
Eq. 19, Table 20 
Eq. 3b.) Table 20 
Table 25 
3k3-3k6 
3U, 3k2, 317, 3k9 
Haldi (82, p. L5) 
Haldi (82, p. 37) 
351-359 
Eq. 36, Table 20 
Table 2$ 
Haldi (62, 0. 36) 
Haldi (82, p. 36) 
Table 29. (Continued) 
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Description of 
relevant information coefficient 
33. Non-metallic mineral products 
Clay products E = 0.9520 
Cement plants (construction) E = 0.77 
Cement .. .. Rank = 10/27 
Clay products Rank = 23/27 
Glass products Rank = 9/27 
Stone, clay, glass Rank = 9/3 k 
E = 0.95 
3b-. Products of petroleum and coal 
Oil refining E = 0.72 
Petroleum refining (operating) E = 0.50 
Coke plant (construction) E = O.oO 
Petroleum and petro-chemicals 
(construction). E = 0.66 
Natural gas Rank = I9/3U 
Petroleum refining ...; Rank = 5/27 
Coke *. Rank = 2h/27 
E = 0.95 
35. Chemical and allied products 
Chemical plants (construction) .... E = O.69 
Oxygen plants (operating) E = 0.66 
Electrolytic evaporator (installed) E = 0.53 
Sulphur from HgS (installed) E = 0.73 
Gas production E = 0.90l|6 
Gas production E - 0.9029 
Gas production E = 0.973k 
Storage tanks (installed) E = 0.57 
Chemicals' Rank = 7/3 k 
Fertilizers Rank = lk/27 
E. = 0.90 
36. Misc. manufacturing 
Misc. manufacturing Rank = 20/3k 
Non-electric machines Rank = 2k/3k 
E = 1.00 
Classification of 
industry and source 
of data 
137, 361-369 
Eq. 22, Table 20 
Haldi (82, p. k5) 
Table 2k 
Table 2k 
Table 2k 
Table 25 
373 -3 79 
Figure 16 
Haldi (62, p. 50) 
Haldi (62, p. k5) 
Table 25 
Table 2k 
Table 2k 
380-369 
Haldi (62, p. k5) 
" (82, p. 50) 
11 
11 
Eq. 3 ,  Table 20 
Eq. k, Table 20 
Eq. 2, Table 20 
Haldi (82, p. 38) 
Table 25 
Table 2k 
391-399 
Table 25 
Table 25 
Table 29. (Continued) 
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Classification of 
Description of industry and source 
relevant information Coefficient of data 
37. Construction UoU—Ù39 
Factory construction E = 0.6607 Eq. 35, Table 20 
Construction of plants E = 0.6850 
(Estimated at mean value) Eq. 1, Chapter 6 
Construction and mining machinery... E = 0.60 Haldi (82, p. 36) 
Construction costs rayon plants .... E = 0.75 Figure 2k 
E = 0.85 ' 
.38. Transportation, storage.and trade 501-527, 701-799 
S team railways E = 0.88i|2 Eq. 12, Table 20 
Railway operating costs E = 0.31 Figure 30 
Bus transport • E = O.7138 Eq. 1, Table 20 
Wholesale trade •.... E = 0.8179, 
E = 0.867k Eq. 29, 30, Table 20 
Department stores E = 0.9813, Eq. 33, Table 20 
1.0371 
Clothing stores E = 0.9803 Eq. 33,  Table 20 
Local transit Rank = 12/3U Table 25 
Railways Rank - IO/3U Table 25 
E = 0.80 
39. Communications 5k3-5k9, 91k 
Telegraph Rank = 23/3k Table 2$ 
Telephone Rank = l8/3k Table 25 
E = 0.95 
kO. Electrical power, gas and water utilities 
Gas production E •- 0.973k Eq. 2, Table 20 
Gas production E = 0.90k6 Eq. 3, Table 20 
Gas production E = 0.9029 Eq. k, Table 20 
Electricity Rank = 3/27 Table 2k 
Electric light and power Rank = l/3k Table 25 
Pipelines E = 0.67 Haldi (82, p. k5) 
E = 0.80 
Table 29. (Continued) 
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Description of 
relevant information Coefficient 
^1. Finance, insurance and real estate 
Banking £ = 0.8757 
Industrial assurance E = 0.9ô0it 
Industrial assurance .£ <= 0.9265 
Building societies (service) £ = 0.60 
E = 0.95 
i|2. Service industries 
Industrial assuran.ce E = 0.960b. 
Industrial assurance E = 0.9285 
Building societies E = 0.93^5 
E = 0.95 
Classification of 
industry and source 
of data 
802-609 
Eq. 6, Table 20 
Eq. 9, Table 20 
Eq. 10, Table 20 
(Estimated from Monthly 
Review 61, p. 5) 
901-911, 916-919 
Eq. 9, Table 20 
Eq. 10, Table 20 
Eq. 11, Table 20 
1 
2 
3 
• k  
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
lb 
15 
16 
Î7. 
16 
19, 
20 
21,  
22 
23, 
2U. 
25, 
26, 
27, 
28,  
29, 
30, 
31, 
32, 
33. 
3k, 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38, 
39. 
U0. 
la. 
U2. 
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30. The pecuniaiy externality matrix 
1 2 3 k 
0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
0.000128 0.05005k 0.000152 0.00022k 
0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
0.000067 0.000118 o.ooookk 0.100069 
0.00102k o.ooo6ko 0.000825 0.000692 
0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
0.000003 0.000000 0.000000 0.000001 
0.000033 0.000001 — —  0.000001 
0.000001 —  —  — —  0.000001 
o.oo2kk5 0.000030 0.000002 0.000005 
o.oooo$6 0.000001 0.000001 0.000002 
0.000067 0.000002 0.00000k 0.00000k 
0.000585 0.000059 0.000060 0.000163 
0.000019 0.000001 0.000006 0.000002 
O.OOlk78 0.000620 0.006280 . 0.000306 
0.00030k 0.000053 0.000082 0.000107 
0.000k20 0.000122 0.000163 0.0003k9 
0.000713 0.000970 0.00ûk26 0.000706 
0.00020k 0.000003 —  —  0.000001 
0.001939 0.00322k 0.00073k 0.001913 
O.OOOBkO 0.000977 0.001766 0.001226 
0.000127 0.000351 0.000070 o.oooik5 
0.000090 o.ooooki 0.000153 0.000218 
0.002552 0.001699 0.002161 0.000767 
0.0020k8 0.0001k2 0.000kl6 0.0020k9 
0.00k933 0.002k9k 0.000077 0.002256 
0.016873 0.007275 0.009676 0.0098kl 
0.000113 o.ooooki 0.000062 O.OOOlkO 
0.00095k 0.000290 0.000k76 0.00876k 
0.0020k3 0.000326 0.000766 0.00068k 
0.000369 0.000117 0.000158 0.000522 
Table 30. (Continued) 
21k 
1. 
2. 
3. 
k. 
5. 
6. 
7, 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12 
13 
lk. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
2k. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
3k. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
ko. 
kl. 
k2. 
6 7 8 9 10 
0.000000 0.000000 
0.000381 0.000176 0.00026k 0.000231 0.000k86 
0.000000 0.000000 — —  — —  
O.OOOkBS 0.000092 0.000080 0.000106 0.000177 
0.002598 0.000972 0.001161 0.001056 0.0007kl 
0.000000 0.000000 — —  — —  — —  
0.000000 0.000000 — —  — — —  —  
— —  0.000003 0.02000k 0.000001 0.000091 
0.000001 0.000158 0.000021 0.050000 0.000011 
0.000001 0.000001 0.00002k 0.000001 0.100006 
o.oooook 0.001533 0.001508 0.000005 0.000k98 
— —  — -
0.000001 
0.000001 0.000089 0.000695 0.000001 0.005277 
0.000003 0.000167 0.000170 o.oooook 0.000897 
0.0002k0 o.oook6i 0.000k7k 0.000286 0.000167 
0.000003 0.00001k o.ooooik 0.000005 0.000007 
0.000226 0.0010k6 0.001032 0.002837 0.000529 
0.000721 o.oook5o 0;000837 0.0003k6 0.001183 
0.000719 0.00079k 0.000902 0.000977 0.001k63 
0.0009k2 0.0009k6 0.000688 0.001600 0.0030k7 
- - 0.000128 0.000126 0.000001 0.000037 
0.001687 0.002827 - 0.002566 0.005k78 0.011179 
0.003668 0.000976 0.001039 0.001383 0.001071 
0.000167 0.000160 0.000151 0.000152 0.000226 
0.000076 0.000160 0.000501 0.000338 0.001929 
0.001366 0.001961 0.002162 0.00186k 0.001109 
0.000939 0.003071 o.ooi55k 0.00032$ 0.00073k 
0.003816 0.00k723 0.00k5k7 0.002k83 0.003138 
0.013780 0.0k0927 0.029100 0.028361 0.028517 
0.000231 0.000319 0.000357 0.000686 0.000273 
0.003366 o.ooikoo o.ooi7kk 0.001269 0.001759 
0.000993 0.00l8k3 0.001671 0.001391 0.00153k 
0.00052k 0.000656 0.000651 0.000876 o.ooik56 
1 
2 
3 
il 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
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12 
13 
111 
15 
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17 
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23 
2k 
25 
26, 
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37, 
38, 
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ill, 
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30. (Continued) 
11 12 13 111 15 
0.000178 
0.000091 
0.000961 
0.000037 
o.oookio 
0.103098 
0.030929 
0.000001 
0.000329 
0.000797 
0.000309 
0.000013 
0.003070 
0.001987 
0.0018kl 
0.000639 
0.000076 
o.ooi$55 
0.001099 
0.000186 
o.oooiL$ 
0.001L83 
0.003038 
0.00k929 
0.073617 
0.000512 
0.002222 
0.001795 
0.001596 
0.0006L6 
0.000072 
0.000699 
0.000290 
0.000070 
0.015539 
O.OOL662 
0.020001 
o.oo55ko 
0.002761 
0.000301 
0.000007 
0.000866 
0.0029I10 
0.001782 
o.oook5k 
0.000027 
0.001007 
0.00096k 
0.000162 
0.0001L6 
0.001587 
0.001L78 
0.00371k 
0.037605 
0.000651 
0.0027L6 
0.001795 
0.001630 
0.000k8l 
0.00010k 
0.000953 
0.000038 
0.000003 
0.0002L5 
0.00007k. 
0.000001 
0.01330k 
0.006L80 
0.000680 
o.oooool 
0.000553 
o.ooi5k9 
0.002018 
0.001089 
o.oooook 
0.035700 
0.000618 
0.000211 
0.000123 
0.00216Ô 
0.001656 
0.006518 
0.019357 
0.000689 
0.001638 
0.001917 
0:002833 
0.000582 
0.000066 
0.000636 
0.000005 
0.000003 
0.000L63 
o.ooom5 
0.000001 
0.000662 
0.009159 
0.000186 
o.oooook 
0.000261 
0.002k67 
0.001171 
0.000707 
0.000007 
0.002237 
0.000671 
0.000116 
0.000697 
0.000983 
0.000k82 
0.001867 
0.01k280 
0.000357 
0.001992 
0.0011|70 
0.001617 
0.000370 
0.000099 
0.000592 
0.000282 
0.000037 
0.000688 
0.000206 
0.011050 
0.00169k 
0.000100 
o.oooook 
o.ooikk6 
0.001716 
0.001053 
0.000252 
0.000013 
0.00060k 
0.000kk2 
o.ooo3kk 
0.0000k8 
0.0006kl 
0.000582 
0.001723 
0.011926 
0.000296 
0.000990 
0.000992 
0.000763 
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30. (Continued) 
16 17 18 19 20 
0.000337 
o.ooook8 
0.000L20 
o.ooo5ko 
0.00023k 
0.000637 
0.000159 
0.000136 
0.000L52 
0.000L21 
0.000061 
0.000338 
0.000158 
o.ooookB 
0.000320 
0.000032 
0.000010 
0.000173 
0.000677 
O.OOOOOl 
0.000003 
0.000012 
0.000003 
0.00083k 
0.000001 
0.000002 
0.000003 
0.000002 
0.000010 
0.000001 
0.000001 
0.000060 
0.000001 
o.oooiki 
0.000001 
0.000001 
0.000011 
0.001761 
0.100065' 
0.000131 
0.000005 
0.000356 
0.000022 
0.000027 
0.000275 
0.000009 
0.000663 
0.00005 
0.000017 
0.070056 
0.00013k 
0.023359 
o.oooook 
o.ooooik 
0.000551 
o.okooo5 
0.002k83 
0.000003 
0.000081 
0.000123 
0.000051 
0.200109 
0.001510 0.002085 0.000577 0.000772 0.000500 
0.001299 0.001288 0.00112k 0.000972 o.oooki3 
o.oookk9 0.000k96 0.000513 0.000710 0.000250 
0.000023 0.000070 0.000001 ' 0.000012 0.000001 
o.ooi35k 0.001288 o.ooiki5 0.002350 0.000616 
o.oook5i 0.000707 0.000689 0.000553 0.000k22 
o.oooo9k 0,000861 0.000128 0.000105 0.000106 
0.000288 . 0.000070 0.000067 0.000101 0.000050 
0.000732 0.001352 0.000861 0.000560 0.000228 
0.000786 0.001321 0.00k996 0.000676 0.00161k 
0.00126$ 0.000k83 0.002098 0.001808 0.000672 
0.022710 0.020612 0.013996 0.02L808 0.008560 
0.000k22 0.000161 0.000699 0.000603 0.00022k 
0.001268 0.001251 0.002070' 0.001335 0.001617 
0.00lk29 0.001838 0.002kll 0.00128k 0.000739 
0.001127 0.002253 0.001367 0.000799 0.000313 
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5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
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13 
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15 
1.6 
17 
18 
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26, 
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32, 
33. 
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35. 
36, 
37. 
38, 
39. 
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30. (Continued) 
21 22 23 2L 
o.oooiLi 
0.000037 
0.0002L2 
0.000001 
0.000001 
0.000001 
Q.OOOOlL 
0.000002 
0.000026 
0.000112 
0.000023 
0.060356 
0.000500 
0.000922 
0.000187 
0.000001 
O.OOOL22 
0.000336 
0.000075 
0.000036 
0.000218 
0.P0075L 
o.ooi$L9 
0.009573 
0.000602 
0.001167 
0.000950 
O.OOOL95 
0.001L23 
0.000391 
0.000397 
0.000001 
0.000002 
0.000001 
0.000012 
0.000003 
0.00001L 
0.000316 
0.000203 
0.017933 
0.000L30 
0.00101L 
0.001113 
0.000001 
0.003872 
0.000638 
0.001L22 
0.000058 
0.00067L 
0,00189k 
0.002L83 
0.020686 
0.000727 
0.001955 
0.001L00 
0.0009L9 
0.0153kl 
0.000095 
0.000606 
0.000001 
0.000001 
0.000001 
0.000065 
0.000003 
0.000036 
0.000067 
0.000003 
0.000718 
0.000217 
0.000616 
0.00086L 
0.000006 
0.002608 
0.00108L 
0.00022L 
0.00006L 
0.001225 
0.000876 
0.003L33 
0.025L1L 
O.OOOL77 
0.001575 
0.001152 
0.0006L0 
0.010157 
0.000221 
0.001151 
0.000001 
0.000001 
0.000001 
0.0000L7 
0.000003 
0.0000L2 
0.000068 
0.000036 
0.001901 
0.050126 
0.000762 
0.000725 
o.oooooL 
0.001782 
0.001217 
0.00053L 
0.000181 
0.001221 
0.001365 
0.003066 
0.016032 
0.000L91 
0.00L866 
0.001135 
0.000650 
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h  
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7 
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9 
10 
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12 
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30. (Continued) 
26 27 28 29 
0.000010 
0.002321 
0.002028 
0.000302 
0.000L77 
0.000509 
.0.000210 
0.001156 
0.000627 
0.000198 
0.000601 
0.000W1 
0.000001 
0.000002 
0.000001 
0.000001 
o.oooooà 
0.000001 
0.000001 
0.000001 
0.000003 
0.000001 
0.000001 
0.000001 
0.000003 
0.000001 
0.000002 
0.000123 
0.000002 
0.000615 
0.000001 
0.000003 
0.002282 
0.000109 
0.001597 
0.000002 
0.000003 
0.000130 
0.000003 
0.000172 
0.000001 
0.00000L 
0.001350 
0.000033 
0.001890 
0.000162 
o.oooàn 
0.200L78 
0.001057 
0.001001 
0.000150 
0.000199 
0.00L27L 
0.000W9 
0.003511 
O.Ol68à7 
0.000170 
0.006925 
0.000671 
0.000à06 
0.000223 
0.0001:76 
0.022310 
0.100000 
0.016773 
n=0021àà 
0.000I41 
O.OÔOlOit 
0.000962 
0.0009W: 
0.002139 
o.oiôàlà 
0.000208 
0.002039 
0.000716 
0.000Û71 
0.000285 
0.00068L 
0.025580 
0.100607 
0.002723 
0.000870 
0.000156 
0.001167 
0.000500 
0.002620 
0.01L797 
0.000L37 
0.002528 
0.001377 
0.000902 
0.0002L9 
0.000L89 
0.010397 
0.006786 
0.070397 
0.001L9L 
0.000352 
0.000857 
0.001018 
0.001398 
0.013763 
0.000267 
0.0016L5 
0.00081:5 
0.000576 
3 
a 
s 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
lit 
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16. 
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16, 
19 
20 
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2 k  
25 
26, 
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30. (Continued) 
31 
0.000160 
0.02356Q_ 
0.000606 
0.000001 
0.000001 
0.000001 
0.000003 
0.000001 
0.000003 
0.000088 
0.000002 
0.000176 
0.000226 
0.00120k. 
0.00110k 
0.0016k0 
0.001112 
0.100165 
0.000136 
0.000870 
0.000672 
0.00L287 
0.02936k 
0.000268 
0.003800 
0.000958 
0.000785 
32 
0.00026k 
0.00278k 
0.000373 
0.000001 
0.000001 
0.000001 
0.00000k 
0.000002 
0.000005 
0.000290 
0.00000k 
0.001635 
0.000k93 
0.000620 
0.00kk30 
0.000001 
0.003099 
Oc000689 
0.006757 
0.00027k 
0.00065k 
0.001367 
0.002222 
0.015890 
0.000526 
0.001887 
0.00119k 
0.000952 
33 
0.000327 
0.000133 
0.001975 
0.000001 
0.000001 
0.000001 
0.000009 
0.00000k 
0.00012k 
0.000165 
0.000003 
0.001003 
0.001086 
0.000723 
0.001737 
0.000001 
0.001665 
0.001k93 
0.000199 
0.050056 
0.001973 
0.001092 
0.002565 
0.018689 
0.000236 
0.005160 
0.001279 
0.000632 
3k 
0.000077 
0.0000k6 
0.017677 
0.000001 
0.000001 
0.000002 
0.000001 
0.000002 
0.00026k 
0.000002 
0.001581 
0.000227 
0.000699 
0.000358 
0.000873 
0.000675 
0.000099 
o.ooookk 
0.050183 
o.oook6o 
0.002k66 
0.018521 
0.0002k8 
0.001909 
0.001693 
0.000625 
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12 
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lit 
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30. (Continued) 
36 37 38 39 
0.000392 
0.000773 
0.000537 
0.000012 
0.000002 
0.000002 
0.000008 
0.000001 
o.oooooL 
0.000006 
0.000195 
0.000162 
0.001756 
0.001107 
0.00117Î 
0.000617 
0.000001 
0.000785 
o.oook65 
o.oooUi 
0.000078 
0.000965 
0.001913 
0.002230 
0.012513 
0.000761 
0.001226 
0.001806 
0.0012L8 
o.ooi5L9 
0.000711 
0.000660 
0.000001 
0.000002 
0.000002 
0.000013 
0.000001 
0.000003 
0.000013 
0.000195 
0.00000L 
0.000037 
0.00106k 
0.000865 
0.00L367 
0.000001 
0.007195 
0.0010L1 
0.002380 
0.001838 
0.0009W 
0.00259k 
0.152256 
0.0335kl 
0.000310 
0.001800 
0.001339 
0.001126 
0.000206 
0.000086 
0.001133 
0.000001 
0.000001 
0.000002 
0.00000k 
0.000001 
0.000002 
0.000003 
0.000215 
0.000010 
0.000126 
o.oook95 
0.001739 
0.000531 
0.000001 
0.000901 
0.00152k 
0.0002L7 
0.000156 
0.000637 
0.000328 
0.006567 
0.2029k6 
0.000329 
0.001298 
0.0015116 
0.001317 
0.0001L9 
0.000152 
o.oookio 
0.000001 
0.000001 
0.000002 
0.000003 
0.000001 
0.000002 
0.000003 
0.000253 
0.000003 
0.000032 
0.000308 
0.003L38 
0.000L69 
0.000001 
0.000676 
0.000826 
0.000L55 
0.000137 
0.00081k 
0.000301 
0.007129 
0.017793 
0.050103 
0.001217 
0.001251 
0.0017014 
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Table 30= (Continued) 
kl k2 5 
1. * mm mm 
2. 0.0002k7 0.000300 
3. — — — —  
k. 0.000115 o.oooikk 
5. 
6, 
0.000695 0.000569 
7. MM 
6. 0.000001 0.000036 
9. 0.000001 0.000016 
10. 0.000002 0.00006k 
11. 0.000005 0.000053 
12. 0.000001 0.00002k 
13. — —  MM 
m. — —  MM 
15. 0.000003 0.000065 
16. o.oooook 0.00005k 
17. MM 
16. 0.0000l|3 0.000095 
19. 0.000002 0.000013' 
20. 0.000153 0.000693 
21. —— Ma» 
22. MM MM 
23. MM M-l 
2k. 0.000267 0.000752 
25. 0.002658 0.01013k 
26. 0.000661 0.000788 
27. 0.000001 0.000012 
28. 0.000662 0.001870 
29. 0.0001:78 0.001309 
30. —• MM 
31. 0.000362 0.000286 
32. — —  MM 
33. 0.000260 0.000203 
3k. 0.000L36 0.000605 
35. 0.000k36 0.001035 
36. — MM 
37. 0.020985 0.008875 
38. 0.007875 0.1k0020 
39. O.OOOklO 0.00073k 
bO. 0.001878 0.003556 
ill. 0.050900 0.001260 
1|2. 0.001689 ' 0.050295 
0.090363 
0.152719 
0.201892 
0.020866 
0.050921 
0.220360 
O.OW1I23 
0.020039 
0.03 9036 
O.123IOI 
0.062010 
0.0k0960 
0.3U133U 
0.088k72 
0.251658 
0.295k8l 
0.100777 
0.236255 
0.112160 
0.122336 
0.010386 
0.099662 
0.159016 
0.302001 
1.1296L8 
0.066517 
0.293090 
0.10Wi52 
0.089507 
